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Foreword
South Korea’s economic development experience has been widely documented in development spheres. Our 
country’s story of development, which saw a war-torn country riddled in poverty transition into an economic 
powerhouse and vibrant democracy of today, is one that needs to be shared. KDI School of Public Policy and 
Management (KDI School) was established in 1997 to meet the educational needs of future leaders in an 
increasingly globalized world. One of its key missions is to share Korea’s development experiences with the 
development community and by doing so help public officials, academics, policy practitioners, and key agents 
of change better identify policy alternatives and solutions for their countries’ development challenges. 
KDI School is delighted to be part of the global sustainable development initiative, one that aligns with the 
School’s core values and serves to advance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) around the world. In 
collaboration with the SDG Academy and in the spirit of inclusiveness, KDI School launched a massive online 
open course (MOOC) entitled “The Korean Story: Secrets of an Economic Miracle” in October 2018. Through 
this innovative approach, KDI School hopes to realize its commitment to reach and serve the knowledge 
needs of isolated and underserved communities around the world by scaling its offerings to a massive open 
online community. 
As of January 2019, over 1,200 learners from more than 100 countries have enrolled in “The Korean Story” 
MOOC. Building on its success and to enhance the overall learning experience of its subscribers and other 
students of development, KDI School is pleased to present this volume that presents an in-depth look at 
the development topics covered in the online course. This includes economics, politics, education, health, 
women’s empowerment, rural development, and the environment. This printed volume will be an invaluable 
supplement to the MOOC and provide a more comprehensive blended learning experience.
Like the MOOC it accompanies, this volume provides an incisive look at the inner workings of Korea’s story 
of nation-building, including its key economic reforms, governance structure, and policy strategies that have 
propelled South Korea to its current status as the 12th largest economy in the world. The book also covers 
some of the critical mistakes made along the way, particularly with regards to sustainability, which may offer 
even more valuable lessons for the developing world. While the MOOC and this volume aim to share South 
Korea’s “secrets” of how it achieved its remarkable economic growth, it goes without saying that there is no 
 
 
 
one-size-fits-all secret recipe for success that can be transplanted everywhere. It is up to the readers of this 
volume to engage in an imaginative reinterpretation of the text, to put on your critical thinking hats and find 
what can be applicable and relevant to your local contexts.
We at KDI School of Public Policy and Management hope that this volume aids in your mission to formulate 
sustainable development strategies and policies that can help realize the SDGs.
Jong-Il You
Dean
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
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The Republic of Korea, commonly known as South Korea, holds the record of the highest long-term growth 
performance in the modern history of the world. In 1962, South Korea launched and maintained economic 
growth of an average of 8 percent per year for more than three decades. This growth is all the more remarkable 
because it followed Korea’s history of impoverishment during Japan’s 35-year colonial rule, Korea’s liberation 
in 1945, and the Korean War, which resulted in the separation of South and North Korea. South Korea’s gross 
national income (GNI) per capita increased from USD 91 in 1962 to surpass USD 3000 in 1987 and exceed 
USD 10,000 in 1994 (Korean Statistical Information Service 2018). During this period of economic growth, 
the South Korean economy increased by more than 16-times in terms of real gross domestic product (GDP), 
and the country achieved what Sir Angus Deaton (2013), the 2015 Nobel laureate in economics, called the 
“Great Escape” from extreme poverty.1 This Great Escape, further followed by the leap to prosperity that South 
Korea achieved is, in essence, what is often called the “Korean Economic Miracle.” Economic growth, however, 
is only one dimension to South Korea’s developmental success in the latter half of the 20th century, one which 
may be summarily described as “compressed development”. 
South Korea achieved another Great Escape when it transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a fully 
democratic government in 1988. South Korea shifted its focus from industrial to democratic development, 
focusing on political freedom, human rights, social modernization, and distributive justice. South Koreans 
celebrated their new prosperity and democracy by hosting the 1988 Summer Olympics and initiating formal 
diplomacy with all socialist economies, barring North Korea, making this Olympics the largest ever held.
By the early 2000s, South Korea completed comprehensive financial and structural reforms that dismantled 
the remaining legacy of government intervening in banking on behalf of large conglomerates and their 
businesses. South Korea’s industrial development had been accompanied by technological breakthroughs 
that enabled the country to emerge as a global competitor in a number of capital- and technology-intensive 
industries, such as steel products, automobile and ship construction, consumer electronics, and information 
technology (IT). By 2017, South Korea was the world’s fifth largest merchandise exporter (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2016).   
According to the World Bank (2017a), by 2017 South Korea ranked 12th globally in terms of GDP after Russia 
and ahead of Australia. In terms of GNI, South Korea ranked 31st after New Zealand and ahead of Spain 
with USD 38,260 per capita (World Bank 2017a). According to Korean Statistical Information Service (2018) 
estimates, South Korea’s GNI was 85 times as large as North Korea’s in 2013 and its GNI per capita (USD 
26,179) was 42 times higher than North Korea’s USD 622.
1 Deaton did not specifically refer to South Korea in this book.
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South Korea has grown into one of the most influential middle-power countries in the world. It has made and 
can continue to make significant contributions to global development and human betterment. The United 
Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), which launched at the UN Summit 
on September 25, 2015, offers some perspective on the pioneering lessons that South Korea can contribute to 
global sustainable-development efforts (United Nations 2015a). Target 9 of Goal 17 of the UN’s 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) recognizes the need to “enhance international support for implementing 
effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans for implementing 
all the sustainable development goals” (United Nations 2015b). In this regard, based on its own development 
experience, South Korea is uniquely situated to show currently developing countries ways to accelerate their 
own development process. 
The 2030 Agenda broadened the concept of development, previously viewed primarily as economic, to 
sustainable development that seeks development across three dimensions – economic but also social and 
environmental – in a balanced and integrated manner. The 2030 Agenda operationalized this new concept 
of development in 17 SDGs. Under the Agenda, all governments will implement the 17 SDGs as part of their 
own national development efforts. However, while setting the SDGs as the goals, the 2030 Agenda did not 
specify strategies and policies for achieving them, except to state that measures should take “into account 
different national realities, capacities and levels of development, and respect national policies and priorities” 
(United Nations 2015a). Formulating the strategies and policies to achieve the SDGs will be a challenge for 
all countries, especially developing counties. In this regard, developing countries can study the experiences of 
other countries, especially those that have successfully solved many developmental problems, such as South 
Korea. 
Development aid from industrialized nations was especially important to South Korea before the 1960s, 
during its years of extreme poverty. When South Korea joined the Organisation for Economic Development 
and Cooperation (OECD) as its 29th member in 1996, it was still listed as a recipient of official development 
assistance (ODA); however, it had already begun to provide development aid to other countries. In fact, South 
Korea had established the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in 1991 to administer such aid. 
In 2010, however, South Korea formally shifted its status from aid recipient to donor by joining the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), currently a 30-member group of many of the largest bilateral 
funders of aid. South Korea’s accession to the DAC signified the country’s commitment to pay forward the 
benefits it had received from development aid by assisting other developing countries. In addition to providing 
development cooperation in the form of financial assistance and development projects, South Korea also 
offers “Knowledge-Sharing Programs” (KSP) through various organizations and institutions. 
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One of these institutions, the Korea Development Institute (KDI), established the KDI School of Public 
Policy and Management in 1998 to produce international experts in the field of development economics 
and public policies. Over the past 20 years, the KDI School has developed outstanding international 
masters programs for Development Policy, Public Policy, and Public Management. The Network of Public 
Policy, Affairs, and Administration (NASPAA) accredited the KDI School masters programs in 2014, 2017, 
and 2018 for meeting global standards for public-service education.
As of 2018, the KDI School boasted an alumni network of more than 2000 graduates from 133 countries. 
The KDI School launched its first KSP in 2005. A KSP typically runs for two years; by attending seminars, 
going on field trips, and speaking with relevant Korean officials, experts, and businesspeople, students from 
partner countries learn how successful Korean policy and institutional experiences might inform or solve 
specific policy objectives in their own countries. As the number of partner countries grew, the range of policy 
objectives and institutions covered by the KSPs also grew. This growing interest prompted the KDI School 
to synthesize the content into a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) and thus open the knowledge base 
to anyone across the world interested in learning “the secrets” of South Korea’s remarkable compressed-
development performance. An eminent thought-leader in sustainable development, Dr. Jeffrey Sachs 
facilitated a partnership between the KDI School and the SDG Academy so that “The Korean Story: Secrets of 
an Economic Miracle” MOOC could be produced and uploaded onto the SDG Academy’s edX platform. This 
volume, a collection of papers on South Korea’s Economic Miracle, has been written to support the MOOC’s 
online material with more in-depth analyses of Korea’s development policies.     
“The Korean Story: Secrets of an Economic Miracle” MOOC reveals how South Korea’s successful compressed 
development stemmed from various long-term development strategies, including investment in industrial, 
social, and human capital, and in physical and technological infrastructure. Such investment enabled export-
led economic growth and rapid industrialization. But it was also directed at other objectives, such as social 
equity, inclusiveness, and balanced national development. Pursuit of those objectives was necessary to sustain 
South Korea’s economic growth and industrialization.  
The MOOC’s online material and the present volume intend to describe the strategies and policies, especially 
those that apply to specific SDGs, for the benefit of those who are interested in South Korea’s development 
experiences, particularly officials, academics, and practitioners in developing countries. As do the online 
materials, this volume presents the views of several South Korean professionals who are leading experts in 
the strategies and policies pursued by South Korean governments throughout its development process. In 
their respective chapters, the authors discuss the relevance of South Korea’s experiences for specific SDGs in 
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the following policy areas: health, political mobilization, education, public health, rural vitalization (Saemaul 
Undong), women’s empowerment, and environmental policies.      
This volume begins with Chapter One, “The Korean Economic Miracle: Its Secrets and Lessons” by Dr. 
Soogil Young, a Visiting Professor at the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, a Leading Professor 
at the State University of New York in Korea, and the founding Chairman of the Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network (SDSN) Korea. Dr. Young provides a comprehensive overview of South Korea’s economic 
miracle, focusing on how development policies shifted with various challenges in the course of the country’s 
compressed development. He details how the authoritarian governments of Park Chung-hee and his successor, 
Chun Doo-hwan, and the subsequent democratic governments that followed them effected the country’s rise. 
Dr. Young concludes with an explanation of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
including the 17 SDGs at its core, and suggests which aspects of the South Korean developmental experience 
may be leveraged by developing countries in pursuit of sustainable development. 
Chapter Two, “South Korean Health Policy and Universal Health Coverage” by Dr. Soonman Kwon of Seoul 
National University at the Graduate School of Public Health, begins with a succinct explanation of the 
critical importance of good public health in low-income countries’ development, and goes on to discuss how 
public health policies and institutions have evolved in South Korea to support its long-term development. 
In particular, Dr. Kwon explains how South Korea constructed a network of public health centers across 
the country by the early 1980s, and describes its free immunization programs. Dr. Kwon also describes how 
South Korea managed to achieve target 3.8 of the third SDG (good health and well-being) by 1989, providing 
universal health coverage to its population. Dr. Kwon further offers an in-depth look at how South Korea is 
currently coping with the challenge of managing its universal health-insurance system in terms of institutional 
design and financing.
Chapter Three, “Political Foundations for Sustainable Development in South Korea” by Dr. Byoung-joo Kim 
of the KDI School explains how Korea’s development was politically managed and sustained through the 
authoritarian era and the subsequent democratization process. In particular, Dr. Kim lays out the conditions 
for a system of sustainable development that the author argues should be based on constant, two-way 
interactions between bottom-up demand channeling and top-down mobilization in order to align interests 
between individuals, groups and the government. He reveals how each new policy paradigm throughout 
South Korea’s political history mobilized public support in order to undertake necessary reforms and preserve 
growth momentum.  
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In Chapter Four, “South Korea Accumulates Human Capital for Sustainable Development,” Dr. Ju-Ho Lee, a 
professor at the KDI School and a former Minister of Education, Dr. Hyeok Jeong, a professor at the Seoul 
National University Graduate School of International Studies and Dr. Song Chang Hong, Director of Planning 
and Evaluation at the KDI Center for International Development, discuss how South Korea invested in human 
capital through educational reforms. The authors explain Korea’s approach to three specific educational 
challenges for economic development: universal education for citizens, educating skilled workers to support 
industrial development, and investing in educated minds for innovation-led development.  
Chapter Five, “The South Korean Saemaul Undong Model for Sustainable Development,” by Professor 
Do-Hyun Han, from the Academy of Korean Studies, offers a comprehensive introduction to the Korean 
rural vitalization program known as Saemaul Undong or New Village Movement. In the 1970s, President 
Park implemented the Saemaul Undong as a nationwide movement to modernize rural villages as vibrant 
economic communities. Based on the three principles of diligence, self-help, and cooperation, the movement 
incentivized rural residents to organize lucrative non-farm activities, work together to repair and upgrade 
infrastructure for their villages, empower women, and participate in a nationwide reforestation campaign. 
While no longer an active domestic program, demand from developing countries for rural-vitalization 
experience-sharing has globalized the Saemaul Undong campaign.  
In Chapter Six, “The Advancement of Education and Human Rights for Women in South Korea,” Dr. Eun 
Kyung Kim, a Senior Fellow at the Korean Women’s Development Institute, offers an overview of how 
women’s status in South Korean society evolved during the development process and how social norms and 
government policies changed to empower women. In her analysis of Korean experiences, Dr. Kim underlines 
the importance of women’s education and women’s grass-roots movements as the twin drivers of those 
changes. 
In Chapter Seven, “Shifting the South Korean Development Paradigm Toward Green Growth,” by Dr. Sung Jin 
Kang of Korea University examines the environmental consequences of South Korea’s industrialization and 
its belated responses to environmental degradation. Dr. Kang also describes how the green growth strategy 
launched by President Lee Myun-bak in 2008 proposes to harmonize environmental protection and economic 
growth at both the national and global levels. 
While the above chapters provide essential additional detail to their respective authors’ online presentations, 
unfortunately the present volume does not cover all of the subjects presented in the online material. Readers 
who view “The Korean Story: Secrets of an Economic Miracle” MOOC can access two additional modules: an 
introduction to the SDGs and South Korea’s related development efforts, and a detailed look at South Korea’s 
transportation sector. 
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In the MOOC “Introduction” module, Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, Professor at Columbia University, Special Advisor to 
the UN Secretary-General on the SDGs, and Director of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network 
(SDSN) opens the course by giving five inspiring video lectures that explain the concept of sustainable 
development and highlight the importance of balanced, long-term investment in various kinds of capital. 
Dr. Sachs puts special emphasis on human capital and national planning, summing up his lectures with ten 
lessons from South Korea’s development experience. 
The other additional MOOC module covers South Korea’s remarkable transportation system. Dr. Jae-hak Oh, 
President of the Korea Transport Institute (KOTI) discusses the development of South Korea’s transportation 
network; it exemplifies how persistent long-term planning supported the building of efficient modern 
infrastructure in many areas over many decades.
The KDI School hopes that readers of this volume (and viewers of its related MOOC) will find many helpful 
insights into South Korea’s successful long-term development, and that these secrets may help identify paths 
toward sustainable development and effective SDGs implementation in developing countries. 
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I. Introduction2
For 35 years, during the colonial rule of Imperial Japan from 1910 to 1945, Korea was an impoverished 
agrarian society. Korea remained a poorly developed nation during the early modern years after liberation. 
A division between the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea) followed Korea’s liberation, culminating in a war between the two from 1950 to 1953. South Korea 
experienced years of economic and political turmoil after the Korean War. In 1962, however, South Korea 
launched and maintained economic growth that averaged 8 percent per year until the onset of a financial 
crisis in 1997. During these 35 years, South Korea recorded the highest economic growth performance in the 
shortest time ever seen in modern world history, one that set the stage for further growth through 2015 and 
beyond (Figure 1.1). This period of compressed economic development is known as the “Korean Economic 
Miracle,” or the “Miracle of the Han River.” During this period, the South Korean economy increased more 
than 16-fold in terms of real gross domestic product (GDP). Gross national income (GNI) per capita increased 
from USD 91 in 1962 to USD 3467 in 1987, when South Korea became a middle-income country, and further 
increased to USD 13,077 in 1996, when South Korea surpassed the mark for high-income countries (World 
Bank 2018a). That same year, South Korea became the 29th member of the Organisation for Economic 
Development and Cooperation (OECD), a club of high-income democratic countries that promotes the 
harmonious development of market economies and democracy (Gurria 2016).
Figure 1.1  South Korea’s Path of Compressed Economic Development (1960-2015) 
                Source: Korean Statistical Information Service
2  Much of the policy information and statistics about the South Korean economy in this chapter come from The Korean 
Economy: Six Decades of Growth and Development, (Sakong, Kho & Committee for the Sixty-year History of the 
Korean Economy 2013), a five-volume work first published in Korean in 2010 by the Committee for the Sixty-year 
History of the Korean Economy; it was chaired by Il Sakong and supported by the Ministry of Planning and Finance. 
Many government institutions participated in the publication of these volumes, which the Korea Development 
Institute coordinated. Unless otherwise cited, statistics about South Korea come from KOSIS, the database of 
Statistics Korea.
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As part of the Economic Miracle, South Korea achieved what Sir Angus Deaton, the 2015 Nobel laureate in 
economics, called a “Great Escape” from extreme poverty by the mid-1980s (Deaton 2013) (Figure 1.2).3 South 
Korea’s escape from poverty enabled another Great Escape in 1987: one from the suppression of democracy by 
the authoritarian government that General Park Chung-hee launched when he seized power in 1961.
Figure 1.2  South Korean National, Urban and Rural Poverty Rates (1961-1993) 
                      Source: Kim (2008) 
The Economic Miracle provided a foundation for South Korea’s subsequent rise in the 2000s as a global 
competitor in technology-intensive industries, such as steel, automobile, ship building, semi-conductors, 
consumer electronics, and information technology (IT) products (Sharma 2012). Furthermore, South 
Korea built a world-class digital economy and eventually ranked second (after Sweden) in information 
and communications technologies among more than 160 countries according to the 2007 International 
Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) ICT Development Index (Oh & Larson 2011). South Korea further 
solidified its position as a world-class digital economy by the late 2010s, ranking first among 169 countries 
from 2010 through 2016 according to the 2017 ITU ICT Development Index (ITU 2017). South Korea’s 
technological development in the 2000s indicated that South Korea had entered the post-catchup phase of 
technological development, playing alongside and in competition with leading industrial countries. 
As of 2018, South Korea, a middle-power on the international stage, plays a responsible role in global 
development and human betterment. In 2017, South Korea ranked 12th in GDP, just behind Russia and ahead 
of Australia, and 31st for GNI per capita of USD 38,260 based on purchasing power parity (PPP), just behind 
Israel and ahead of Spain (Kim & Cho 2018). By 2017, South Korea had become the fifth largest merchandise 
exporter on the global market, behind Germany and Japan and ahead of France and the Netherlands (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2016). These figures reveal the South Korean Economic Miracle in a nutshell. 
3  Deaton uses this expression to refer to an escape from extreme poverty, in general, and does not refer to the South 
Korean experience, in particular.
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Following the expiration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) campaign which was geared to the 
ultimate goal of eradicating extreme poverty around the world by 2015, the world community of nations at 
the United Nations (UN) Summit held on September 25, 2015 unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at its core as a new 
global development agenda to be shared by all countries. The 2030 Agenda commits all nations, developed 
and developing alike, to achieving the three dimensions of sustainable development – economic, social, 
and environmental – by implementing the 17 SDGs and their constituent 169 targets in a balanced and 
integrated manner by 2030. Subsequently, all countries have begun to mainstream the SDGs into their goals 
for national development, aligning their strategies and policies with these goals and targets. The 2030 Agenda 
raises an important question about South Korea’s Economic Miracle: how does South Korea’s development 
achievement measure up to the SDGs and what, if any, lessons can South Korea provide to developing 
counties as they pursue sustainable development by the terms of the SDGs?
This chapter will discuss South Korea’s Economic Miracle and post-Miracle experiences in order to identify 
what may be considered the “secrets” of its Economic Miracle, explaining how South Korea managed its 
remarkable rise as a new industrial country and overcame a series of social, economic, and political challenges 
and crises. It will also assess South Korea’s current development standing against a SDG-achievement 
scorecard in order to identify the country’s development challenges for the future. This chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the implications of South Korea’s experiences and challenges for developing countries 
today. 
II. The Korean Economic Miracle by Epoch
Technological leaders have propelled the world’s economic development since the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution. “Late industrialization” is a process in which a number of later-day developing countries, such 
as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, China, India, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)4, have been engaged since the mid-20th century. It can be considered to be an effort to catch up to 
already-industrialized countries by closing technological gaps between countries. A diffusion of advanced 
technologies from developed to developing countries characterizes this process (Sachs 2015). This diffusion, 
or “absorption” from the viewpoint of developing countries, allows developing countries to achieve a higher 
rate of economic growth. From this perspective, Korea’s Economic Miracle is a story of successful and rapid 
4  ASEAN member states: Cambodia, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam. 
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absorption of modern technologies that began in the 1960s and rapid endogenous growth that followed, 
averaging 9.2 percent through 1991, and 8.4 percent from 1962 to 2011 (Figure 1.3). By the early 2000s, 
South Korea largely closed the technology gap with the leading industrial countries, drawing a curtain on its 
Economic Miracle.
Figure 1.3  South Korea’s Average Economic Growth Rate per Period (1953-2005)
                  Source: Korean Statistical Information Service
1. South Korea’s Geopolitics and National Security
Through the 19th century, Korea was a pre-modern feudal kingdom that Koreans called Chosun5 (or Joseon). 
Korea was an agrarian hermit kingdom, a vassal to China, and closed to all other countries. Militaristic 
Imperial Japan invaded Korea in the late 19th century and colonized it in 1910. Korea remained a Japanese 
colony for 35 years until 1945, when the end of World War II saw Japan’s surrender to the Allied Forces. 
Liberated from Japan, the former Korea divided across the 38th parallel in 1948 into the Republic of Korea (or 
South Korea), a capitalist state backed by the U.S., and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North 
Korea), a communist state backed by the Soviet Union (Figure 1.4). In 1950, North Korea launched a war 
against the South, attacking by surprise, and U.S.-led UN forces saved South Korea from defeat. The war ended 
with the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953, which is still in effect, but ongoing military tensions along the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that lies between North and South Korea constantly pose security threats to South 
Korea. For this reason, national security against the North has been crucial to the economic development of 
the South. A Mutual Defense Treaty agreed between South Korea and the U.S. after the Armistice provides a 
security blanket for South Korea; it has served as a foundation for South Korea’s economic development. 
5 The word means “morning calm”.
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Figure 1.4  Political Geography of South and North Korea
                                               Source: Worldatlas.com 2018
2. “Struggling in Despair on the Verge of Starvation” (Up to the Early 1960s)
Prior to the 1960s, South Korea faced economic ruin. Japan’s abrupt departure from the Korean peninsula in 
1945 brought about destabilizing socio-political changes, including an ideological division between socialism 
and capitalism, and the economic shock of departing Japanese administrators, businessmen, and technicians 
who had controlled the economy. The post-war South Korea of the 1950s suffered from the sudden rupture 
of economic interdependence with North Korea, human casualties of approximately 1,500,000, and the loss 
of nearly half of its industrial capital stock and infrastructure. The government of Syngman Rhee, the first 
President of the Republic, is credited for having launched a market economy based on private property; it was 
formally democratic but also manifestly corrupt and incompetent. At the time, the political situation was so 
hopeless that in 1952, The Times wrote that “expecting democracy to bloom in South Korea is like hoping for 
a rose to bloom in a garbage bin” (qtd. in Hwang 2012). 
Throughout the 1950s, South Korea remained impoverished despite U.S.-assisted post-war reconstruction 
efforts, which stimulated economic growth by only 3.8 percent per year from 1953 to 1960. Near the end of 
the 1950s, strong inflationary pressure undermined economic growth, slowing it to a crawl as anti-inflationary 
policies kicked in and the United States began to curtail reconstruction aid to South Korea. The republic’s 
gross national product (GNP) per capita was USD 79 by 1960. At the beginning of the 1960s, South Korea 
ranked 101st among 125 countries in terms of income level (World Bank 2018a). On May 16, 1961, General 
Park Chung-hee toppled the democratically-elected government of Prime Minister John Myun Chang 
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and described the plight of South Koreans as “struggling in desperation on the verge of starvation” in his 
Revolutionary Pledge, thereby justifying his military coup. Unconstitutional as it was, the military coup was 
General Park’s response to the country’s widespread sense that it was undergoing a crisis of destitution.
3. Taking Off (1960s)
After taking power, General Park Chung-hee initiated South Korea’s drive for economic growth. His military 
government promised to deliver the nation from poverty by building a “self-reliant economy,” by which he 
meant a prosperous economy. Poverty was indeed pervasive across South Korea. According to the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), approximately 60 to 70 percent of South Korea’s population lived 
in poverty until the mid-1960s (Henderson et al. 2002). General Park’s military government established an 
Economic Planning Board and launched South Korea’s first 5-Year Plan for Economic Development (1962-
1966) in 1962. These two initiatives marked the beginning of what would become the Korean Economic 
Miracle. 
A civilian yet still-authoritarian government succeeded the military government when Park Chung-hee won 
the presidential election in 1963. His government implemented a series of economic reforms in order to shift 
the weight of South Korea’s industrial-development strategy from import substitution to export promotion. 
For this purpose, the government implemented measures to promote exports during the 1960s, including 
unifying exchange rates that had been differentiated by type of foreign exchange transaction. The new 
exchange-rate system devalued the South Korean won (KRW) by half against the U.S. dollar (USD). South 
Korea also introduced a comprehensive export-incentive regime, which included export-finance loans, tax 
subsidies for export earnings, exemptions from import restrictions on the purchase of intermediate goods for 
exporters, and other measures. Additionally, the government introduced administrative support for exporters 
and export targeting per firm. It also set up monthly meetings (chaired by President Park) to implement export 
targets and created both the Korea International Traders Association (KITA) and the Korea Trade Promotion 
Authority (KOTRA). These combined measures prompted a rise in exports and imports over the next 50 
years (Figure 1.5).
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Figure 1.5  Values of South Korean Exports and Imports Relative to GDP (1960-2014)  
(percent per annum)
              Source: Korean Statistical Information Service
In terms of industrial policy, with the First 5-Year Plan, South Korea focused on investment for import 
substitution in basic industries, such as cement, fertilizer, industrial machinery, and refinery. In the Second 
5-Year Plan (1967-1971), South Korea focused on investment in heavy and chemical industries (HCI), such as 
steel, machinery, petrochemicals, and ship building, along with textile, electronics, and non-ferrous metals. 
South Korea also emphasized investment in infrastructure that enabled rapid economic growth, such as water, 
electricity, and transportation. In particular, South Korea began to construct a network of expressways which 
included, in 1970, the Seoul-Busan Expressway,6 the longest in South Korea; it connected Seoul to the Port of 
Busan, South Korea’s largest seaport and main gateway to global markets. 
However, domestic savings could not finance the high levels of investment needed to enable robust economic 
growth. The government introduced measures to facilitate the inflow of foreign capital. For example, it 
merged existing laws into a Foreign Capital Inducement Law in 1966 to strengthen incentives for foreign 
investment. It also reinforced government-supported credit guarantees for foreign commercial loans, although 
the government maintained restrictions on the types and manner of foreign direct investment in order to 
nurture domestic entrepreneurship and facilitate technology transfer. In 1965, the government concluded 
6  Inspired by the autobahns he saw during his visit to West Germany in 1964, President Park Chung-hee pushed the 
construction of the Seoul-Busan Expressway, even when there were not many paved roads in the country, despite 
a chorus of objections, including from the World Bank. Construction launched in February 1968 and proceeded 
under the supervision of President Park. It was completed in July 1970, at one-tenth of the total cost estimated by 
international organizations. Construction took two and a half years, beating the general observation that it would be a 
10-year project. Chairman Ju-Yung Chung, the founding Chairman of Hyundai Construction Company, was President 
Park’s private-sector partner for the project. This expressway connected the greater Seoul industrial zone and Busan, 
Korea’s largest container seaport (Lankov 2010). 
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negotiations with Japan for the “normalization” of diplomatic relations on the condition that Japan make 
reparation payments of USD 300,000,000 for its past colonial occupation, USD 200,000,000 of concessional 
loans, and at least USD 300,000,000 of commercial loans. President Park Chung-hee moved these negotiations 
forward despite fierce protests from students and opposition-party politicians who called Park a “pro-Japan 
traitor” (Moon 2009). Measures to attract foreign capital, the opening of formal relations with Japan, and 
strong policies to promote industrialization all served to bring about a rapid increase in commercial loans 
as well as direct investment from abroad. A major measure to deregulate the domestic interest rate in 1965, 
which allowed it to rise much higher than international rates, also facilitated foreign capital inflows. 
As a result of these efforts, the South Korean economy took off toward export-led growth. The GDP grew by 
9.1 percent in 1963, and growth averaged 8.9 percent during the first two 5-Year Plans, until 1971. Exports led 
economic growth that, in real terms, increased at an annual average rate of 28 percent, and investment in fixed 
assets increased at an annual average rate of 23 percent. Imports also increased 23 percent per annum in real 
terms. A rapid increase in employment accompanied such high economic growth, especially since it was led 
by labor-intensive exports. The unemployment rate, which was 8.1 percent in 1963, dropped to 4.4 percent 
in 1971. The consumer price index (CPI) showed that the inflation rate was 20.7 percent in 1963 and 29.5 
percent in 1964; it decreased to an average rate of 12.6 percent per year from 1965 to 1971.
4. Investing in Heavy and Chemical Industries (1970s)
Following up on the Second 5-Year Plan’s HCI focus, President Park Chung-hee launched an enhanced HCI 
investment drive in 1973 in order to upgrade South Korea’s export capabilities which, with their concentration 
on cheap, labor-intensive light-manufactured goods, he thought were too fragile to sustain export-led 
economic growth for long. With many other developing countries joining the league of light-manufactured 
goods exporters, such goods faced growing competition in international markets and saw increased 
protectionism from advanced countries. South Korea also needed to strengthen its self-defense capabilities 
by developing HCI. In this regard, Park’s HCI drive was also a response to the Nixon Doctrine announcement 
in 1969, which stated that the U.S. intended to withdraw military forces from East Asia and asked its allies 
in the region to strengthen their own defense capabilities (Nixon 1969). For these reasons, President Park 
passionately doubled down on the HCI drive.   
In January 1973, President Park issued the Declaration of Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion. In 
June, a dedicated planning team issued the Plan for HCI Promotion; it proposed to raise the share of HCI in 
manufactured products from 35 percent in 1972 to 51 percent by 1981 and, in manufactured exports, from 
27 percent in 1972 to 65 percent by 1981. The planners’ ultimate goals were to increase GNP per capita from 
34  Secrets of an Economic Miracle: Lessons for Sustainable Development from South Korea
USD 324 in 1972 to USD 1000 and total exports from USD 1,600,000,000 in 1972 to USD 10,000,000,000 by 
1981. The Plan for HCI Promotion designated six strategic industries: steel, non-ferrous metal, machinery, 
shipbuilding, electronics, and chemicals. South Korea implemented the plan under President Park’s close 
supervision for the next seven years, until April 1979, when the government issued a comprehensive plan for 
economic stabilization in the face of mounting inflation. 
South Korea had to rely on domestic financing for the HCI drive. The South Korean government mobilized 
various means to reach its goals. It formed a National Investment Fund (NIF) in 1974, with deposits from 
all financial institutions supplying long-term funds at low interest rates. The NIF constituted 57 percent of 
facilities-investment loans made by financial institutions from 1974 to 1981. To augment the NIF, South 
Korea required banks to provide loans directly to HCI businesses. A major portion of foreign loans financed 
purchases of foreign capital goods for HCI. South Korea introduced a Tax Rebate and Exemption Act in 1975 
in order to subsidize HCI businesses. Additionally, South Korea raised import barriers for HCI goods and 
spent 50 to 70 percent of government research and development (R&D) expenditure on HCI technologies 
development. 
South Korea achieved most HCI drive goals far in advance of their target year. Notably, instead of taking until 
1981 as planned, by 1977, South Korea’s GNP per capita surpassed USD 1000 and exports increased to USD 
10,000,000,000, primarily due to increased HCI exports. The HCI share of manufacturing exceeded 50 percent 
by 1979. However, this achievement proved unsustainable.
Implementation of the HCI drive resulted in several problems for the South Korean economy. Because it 
was capital-intensive, HCI required large amounts of financial capital for investment and big businesses 
as investors. In order to mobilize the necessary capital, the government intervened in banking, directing 
low-interest loans to businesses that invested in HCI. This directed lending distorted the flow of funds and 
suppressed the banks’ autonomy. In particular, the preferential treatment of HCI encouraged the abuse of the 
preferential measures and induced excessive and overlapping investment from big businesses. Many of those 
businesses went into HCI and ended up with excess capacity by the late 1970s. 
In the meantime, light-manufacturing industries, where small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) were 
concentrated, suffered from a shortage of loanable funds. Government intervention in the banking system 
for directed lending weakened the central bank’s control of the money supply and added to inflationary 
pressures. These were brought on by large inflows of foreign exchange that stemmed from an unprecedented 
construction boom in Middle East following the first international oil price shock in 1974. A second 
international oil-price shock in 1979-1980 (triggered by the 1978 Iranian Revolution), followed by a U.S.-
led steep rise in international interest rates and a global recession, caused stagflation in South Korea and 
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exacerbated both the emerging HCI excess-capacity problems and non-performing loans problems in bank 
portfolios. A higher debt-service burden on large international loans weakened corporate balance sheets and 
worsened South Korea’s current account balance.  
In addition, government mobilization of big businesses for the HCI drive facilitated the enlargement of 
business groups that founder families controlled; these groups, known as chaebols, concentrated business 
ownership and economic power. With the rapid growth of South Korea’s leading business groups, such as 
Samsung, Daewoo, and Hyundai, the chaebols have become one of the most controversial economic and 
political issues to arise in South Korea since the 1970s.
5. Dismantling a Paternalistic Government (Late 1970s and Early 1980s)
The external shocks severely impacted the South Korean economy, slashing the growth rate to minus 1.9 
percent in 1980, doubling the CPI inflation rate from 15 percent in 1978 to 29 percent in 1980, and increasing 
the producer price index from 12 percent to 39 percent over the same period. The country’s current account 
deficit widened, from 2.0 percent of GDP in 1978 to 6.6 percent in 1979 and 8.3 percent in 1980. Furthermore, 
a spell of cold weather in the summer of 1980 caused rice crop yields to decline by 25 percent, a historically 
unprecedented crop failure that forced the government to scramble to secure emergency imports of the 
dietary staple from international markets. In this way, South Korea plunged into an economic crisis without 
precedent since the early 1960s.  
President Park’s HCI drive was the culmination of the government-led industrial-development strategy 
and policy practice of directing bank lending that had been implemented since the 1960s. However, strong 
government intervention in the allocation of resources to industries reduced the flexibility of the economy 
and its ability to adjust to changing environments at home and abroad (Baliño & Ubide 1999). The economic 
crisis revealed the non-sustainability of Korea’s government-led industrial development paradigm,7 one 
based on the government’s investment drive in specific industries; its nurturing of these industries with 
protections, subsidies, and big-business partnerships; its inflationary financing of industrial investment; and 
an overreliance on foreign borrowing rather than foreign direct investment. 
7  The problems of South Korea’s industrial development regime in the 1970s were first identified and analyzed by 
Soogil Young, et. al., 1982, The Basic Role of Industrial Assistance Measures and Proposal of Their Reform, Korea 
Development Institute (in Korean). Recommendations made in this report were incorporated into the comprehensive 
reform of Korea’s industrial-incentive system, including trade policies, which was implemented in the 1980s.  
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These characteristics of South Korea’s 1970s industrial-development paradigm manifested the paternalistic 
leadership of an authoritarian president, an industrial-policy regime characterized by protection rather than 
competition, and the prioritization of economic growth over price stability. These characteristics deprived the 
Korean economy of resilience to external shocks, reduced the international competitiveness of its industries, 
and dulled incentives for businesses to invest in innovation and efficiency. Thus, the economic crises of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s revealed a number of problems with the government-led, -subsidized and 
-protected aggressive industrial-development regime, showing that such an approach was not sustainable. 
This realization compelled the next government to make a series of far-reaching economic reforms, which, 
in effect, shelved the legacy of President Park Chung-hee’s paternalistic government and shifted the country’s 
industrial-policy paradigm from protection to competition. 
An unexpected political development facilitated this shelving of legacies from the 1960s and the 1970s: the 
assassination of President Park Chung-hee8 in October 1979. This incident threw South Korea into political 
confusion and led to the emergence of General Chun Doo-hwan as the self-appointed manager of what he 
called a “national emergency.” Through his military coup, General Chun quelled any hopes for restoring 
democracy that had been kindled by President Park Chung-hee’s death.9 In October 1980, Chun was elected 
the president of the Republic of Korea through an indirect presidential election that he arranged. 
Serving a seven-year term as another authoritarian president, Chun Doo-hwan was determined to claim 
legitimacy for his rule by overcoming the economic crisis. His government engineered a shift from an existing 
paradigm that guided and protected domestic firms and industries to one that was open to international 
competition and ceded market leadership to private businesses. President Chun placed economic policies 
entirely in the hands of a team of capable technocrats (including the U.S.-trained economists both in the 
government and at the Korea Development Institute [KDI]) who shared a firm conviction in the efficacy 
8  President Park Chung-hee was shot to death by Kim Jae-kyu, Director of the South Korean CIA and one of his two 
closest aides. He was killed while he attended a private dinner to discuss how to handle the escalating student 
and worker protests against the suppression of opposition and workers on October 26, 1979. The other aide in 
attendance was Cha Ji-chul, the president’s security chief and Kim’s fierce political rival. Their discussion developed 
into a quarrel between Kim and Cha when Kim suddenly pulled out his pistol and shot Cha to death. He then also 
shot President Park. Both killings were apparently unpremeditated. This incident thrust South Korea into a maelstrom 
of political confusion and instability and opened the opportunity for General Chun Doo-hwan to emerge as a self-
appointed successor to Park. Kim Jae-kyu was executed on the charge of “an attempted rebellion and murders for 
that purpose” by the military court 40 days after the incident.
9  Citizens of Gwangju, a provincial capital city, staged a massive protest on May 17, 1980, subsequently called “Gwangju 
Uprising,” against General Chun Doo-hwan’s unconstitutional assumption to power. General Chun crushed the 
demonstrating citizens with military force, which resulted in the death of hundreds of citizens. He was brought to a 
trial in 1996 on a number of charges, including treason against the country, the bloody suppression of this uprising 
and corruption, was found guilty on most charges, and sentenced to death, although his sentence was later reduced. 
He was eventually pardoned after serving 751 days in prison. 
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of market competition and the importance of price stability. By dismantling the paternalistic, government-
managed economy of Park Chung-hee, the technocrats brought South Korea into a new epoch of modern 
economic development. They replaced the previous economic regime with a market-led economy where 
companies struggling for survival in a competitive environment would promote efficiency and innovation 
for sustained industrial development. In such an economy, individual firms’ autonomy and creativity would 
provide resilience and flexibility so that the economy could adjust to changing environments at home and 
abroad. 
The Chun Doo-hwan administration, including an interim body that preceded his inauguration as president, 
implemented forceful measures to stabilize the economy; these included an austerity budget for the 
government, wage and agricultural support-price restraints, and a “pain-sharing” public-relations campaign 
to foster citizen acceptance of these austerity measures. Thus, the government succeeded in bringing down 
CPI inflation from 21 percent in 1981 to 7 percent in 1982, and kept it below 3 percent thereafter (Figure 1.6). 
South Korea finally exited decades of inflationary financing of economic growth and entered an era of price 
stability. 
Figure 1.6  Historic CPI Inflation Rate in South Korea (1953-1999) (percent per annum)
             Source: Inflation.eu 
In 1980, the Chun Doo-hwan government also took measures to expose monopolistic big businesses to 
competition by launching a new competition law, called the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. Even 
more significantly, the government took steps to open domestic industries and businesses to international 
competition. It implemented unilateral import liberalization programs; these consisted of a five-year import 
deregulation program (1984-1988), accompanied by a five-year tariff reform program (1984-1988) that was 
built on an 8 percent “central rate” system that cut import tariff rates by approximately two-thirds on average 
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and sought to eliminate as many tariff rates above 8 percent as possible (Figure 1.7).10 After a one-shot 20 
percent devaluation of the KRW to the USD in 1980, South Korea also shifted from a USD-linked currency in 
a fixed exchange-rate system to a managed, floating exchange-rate system. Another market-opening measure 
liberalized foreign direct investment (FDI), previously restricted in order to protect national firms and nurture 
domestic technological capability. The FDI program was meant to facilitate inflows of advanced foreign 
technologies that would augment and accelerate domestic R&D. 
Figure 1.7  Import Liberalization Rate and Tariff Rates in South Korea in 1981 & 1995
               Source: Sakong, Kho & Committee for the Sixty-year History of the Korean Economy (2013)
The Chun Doo-hwan government addressed the problem of excess HCI investment that Park Chung-hee’s 
drive had created in the 1970s, forcefully realigning, downsizing, or merging HCI plants, targeting power-
generation facilities, shipping companies, copper refineries, and manufacturers of automobiles, heavy 
construction equipment, heavy electrical machinery, diesel engines, and electronic telephone switch boards. 
Adjustment subsidies accompanied these investment-rationalization programs. These restructuring and 
rationalization measures ended the HCI industrial policy launched by Park Chung-hee. A 1986 Law for 
Industrial Development shelved industry-specific supports and sought to facilitate market-led industrial 
development by extending function-specific supports, such as R&D and manpower training, serving as the 
final ending to Park’s industrial policy. 
As the focus of South Korea’s industrial-policy regime moved from protection to competition and 
stabilization, this shift allowed the economy to steadily recover from the aftermath of the heavy-handed HCI 
drive of the 1970s and the external shocks of the early 1980s. As a result, the country’s current account deficit 
began to steadily abate.
10  This was done via a policy recommendation put forward by Soogil Young, et.al., 1983, The Basic Role of Industrial 
Assistance Measures and Proposal of Their Reform, KDI, and “Proposal of Comprehensive Tariffs Reform” at the 
Korea Development Institute Symposium on Tariff Rates Reform, July 6, 1982. 
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6. A Historic Shift to a Current Account Surplus (Mid-1980s)
The South Korean economy entered a new epoch in the mid-1980s as it experienced a trio of fortuitous 
international developments; called “the Three Lows,” they accelerated the ongoing improvement in South 
Korea’s economic situation. The most impactful of the Three Lows was a major devaluation of the KRW 
against the Japanese yen (JPY) that followed a 50-percent devaluation of the USD against the JPY under the 
Plaza Agreement in September 1985. As a result, the real effective exchange rate of the KRW depreciated by 
24 percent from 1985 to 1987, accelerating an increase in exports. A steep fall in the international price of oil 
and a decline interest rates constituted the other two “Lows” that accompanied the KRW depreciation. 
South Korea’s early 1980s economic reforms enabled domestic firms and industries to take advantage of these 
external developments with agility and to relaunch export-led high economic growth. From 1986 to 1988, the 
country’s exports increased more than 20 percent per year in real terms and the economy grew 12 percent 
per year. As a result, GNI per capita more than doubled from USD 2400 in 1985 to USD 5718 in 1989. The 
restructured HCI sector served as a growth engine for exports and the economy, speeding Korea’s transition 
to a path of technology-based industrial development. 
During the late 1980s, the Three Lows and the wide swath of earlier reforms caused a historic shift in South 
Korea’s current account deficit. Since the founding of the Republic, South Koreans had been exposed to 
national “patriotism” campaigns that exhorted them to live thrifty lives and avoid purchasing foreign products 
because the country suffered from chronic current account deficits that increased its foreign debt. The late 
1980s shift from deficits to the first enduring surpluses11 was historic. Together with an extraordinarily high 
economic growth rate, it signaled a new era of prosperity. In fact, high economic growth continued into the 
early 1990s. From 1982 to 1991, the two consecutive 5-Year Plan (for the fifth and sixth periods) saw average 
annual GDP growth of 10 percent; per capita GNI rose from USD 1686 in 1980 to USD 6505 in 1990 (Korean 
Statistical Information Service 2018).
7. Democratization at Last (1987)  
The South Korean people waged an incessant fight for democracy against the authoritarian governments of 
Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan; their battles took the form of frequent street demonstrations by college 
students, a clamor for democracy by courageous opposition leaders, and self-restrained yet critical reporting 
from the press. Both authoritarian governments brutally suppressed the democracy movement, however, on 
11  Just once before 1986, in 1977, there was a surplus on the current account due to large earnings from the construction 
boom in Middle East, but it was small and transitory.
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the grounds that political instability would make South Korea vulnerable to aggression from North Korea and/
or anti-government agitation from communist sympathizers in the underground. 
The democracy movement remained isolated and lacked support from the general public until the late 
1970s. With rising prosperity, however, South Koreans grew increasingly confident about the strength and 
future of their economy as well as about their country’s ability to defend itself from North Korea. A decisive 
democracy movement was inflamed when the torture and death of a dissident student at the hand of Chun’s 
government was exposed in 1987. This brought enraged ordinary citizens into the streets to join student 
protest demonstrations. 
On June 29, 1987, President Chun Doo-hwan gave into the voices of the citizens and issued a “pledge of 
democratization” through Roh Tae-woo, Chun’s handpicked presidential candidate, also a former military 
general. This opened the floodgates to a spontaneous and powerful socio-political democratization wave 
across the country. Following his own pledge, President Chun Doo-hwan held a fully democratic presidential 
election in December 1987, which Roh Tae-woo won against an opposition divided between two leading pro-
democracy fighters, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. The three-way competition among the presidential 
candidates created a National Assembly that had three main parties and no single majority, making Roh Tae-
woo’s party unable to dictate its agenda to the opposition parties. The two “civilian” politicians went on to win 
subsequent presidential elections in turn.12 
Democracy brought about a radical change in the paradigm for South Korea’s governance. Citizens whose 
voices had been suppressed by previous governments – the socially marginalized, various interest groups, 
non-governmental organizations, and political groups – began to raise their voices, demanding retribution 
for what they considered to be social, economic, and political injustices committed by the repressive Park and 
Chun governments. The government of President Roh Tae-woo sought to integrate as many of those demands 
as possible into the government’s policy agenda. In this way, people’s voices began to chart the path of national 
development. 
Therefore, rather than focusing solely on economic growth, President Roh’s policy agenda promoted political 
development, socially inclusive development, and investment in infrastructure that had been neglected 
from the viewpoint of inter-regionally balanced territorial development. In the first year of his presidency, 
12 A constitutional amendment in 1988 limited the presidency to a one five-year term.
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President Roh Tae-woo appointed a Presidential Committee on Economic Restructuring13 and gave it a 
mandate to develop and submit a comprehensive agenda for inclusive social development and economic 
internationalization. The Committee’s report, submitted in late 1988, provided guidelines for President 
Roh’s economic and social reforms (Presidential Committee on Economic Restructuring 1988). Ultimately, 
South Korea saw democracy as a means of balancing various dimensions of development in accordance with 
demands expressed by the population. 
Under President Chun Doo-hwan, the South Korean government had begun to focus attention on social 
development and social-investment goals as it tried to withdraw from the market. The Chun administration’s 
fifth 5-Year Plan (1982-1986) set out a plan for economic and social development for the first time. But it 
was under President Roh Tae-woo that the government began to prioritize social investment goals. For 
example, President Roh launched the National Pension System in 1988 for all workshops with more than nine 
employees, completed the introduction of universal health insurance and began supplying permanent rental 
housing to low-income households in 1989, and extended the national pension system to all businesses with 
five or more employees in 1992. The pension system was further extended to all rural residents in 1995 and to 
all urban residents in 1999.   
Following Roh, President Kim Young-sam, who served from 1993 to 1998, focused on improving quality of 
life for the population. In 1993, he enacted the Law for Employment Insurance, and, in 1995, the Law for 
Promotion of Public Health, Framework Act for Social Insurance, and the Framework Act for Women’s 
Development. President Kim also launched a Planning Office on People’s Well-being. Emphasizing population 
quality and welfare, he abolished a 1960s’ population-control policy in 1996 and passed the Prevention 
of Domestic Violence and Victim Protection Act in 1997, among other reforms (Cho n.d.; Presidential 
Commission on Women’s Affairs 1997). President Kim Young-sam also legislated three far-reaching measures 
to eradicate corruption14 and took measures to prohibit the military’s political activities, purging “political 
soldiers” from the ranks. 
Following democratization and economic reforms to transition to a competition-based market-economy, 
the South Korean government could no longer manage the economy by directing the market and private 
13  Modelled after Japan’s Maekawa Commission (1986), this committee consisted of 36 experts on South Korea’s 
economic, social, and internalization challenges. The Korea Development Institute served as its secretariat. The 
present author, Soogil Young, was one of its members. 
14  President Kim Young-sam introduced three related anti-corruption measures. First, he surprised capital markets with a 
Presidential Emergence Decree on Real-name Financial Transactions in August 1993 to prohibit financial transactions 
under false names. Second, he followed up on this reform the same year with a law requiring all senior officials to 
submit an annual report of changes in all assets they held. Third, in 1995, he introduced a law prohibiting real-estate 
transactions under false names. 
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businesses. The Kim Young-sam administration responded to this new reality by proposing a “New Economy” 
geared to “a small but strong government,”15 that featured financial deregulation, privatization of public 
corporations, and relaxed financial restraints on chaebol-controlled business groups. Furthermore, President 
Kim Young-sam terminated the practice of five-year development planning in 1993 and closed the Economic 
Planning Board in 1994. 
III. The Rite of Passage to a Developed Country 
1.  The Financial Crisis: Shedding the Final Legacy of a Paternalistic Government 
(1997-2001)
Park Chung-hee’s pursuit of compressed development left three legacies which haunted South Korea’s 
economy over the subsequent decades: recalcitrant labor unions, chaebol business groups financed through 
bank loans, and a government-controlled banking sector. The failure of Kim Young-sam’s New Economy to 
address these legacies, together with the government’s lack of proper oversight of the financial and corporate 
sectors, brought about a financial crisis of unprecedented severity in late 1997. 
As described above, during the 1960s and 1970s, President Park Chung-hee had launched an outward-
oriented industrialization strategy led by the large businesses that chaebols owned and that government 
policies fostered (Baliño & Ubide 1999). Park Chung-hee considered chaebol group leaders strategic 
partners for his HCI investment drive16 and encouraged their investment in “new” industries, providing 
various incentives and support for their investments, such as making government-guaranteed bank loans 
available virtually on demand. This amounted to the government sharing private-sector investment risks and 
encouraged the chaebols to ignore risk when making investments. Commercial banks were also willing to 
finance risky investments, even those without government backstops, because prudential banking regulation 
was weak. 
Even after the HCI drive ended, the Chun Doo-hwan government, which followed the Park Chung-hee 
administration, pressured banks to rescue troubled companies and restructure their debt on favorable terms. 
It also mandated industrial consolidation, forcing sound corporations to acquire troubled ones and requiring 
commercial banks to grant preferential loans for such company mergers. In return, the commercial banks 
15 “The 5-Year Plan for a New Economy (1993-1997)” was released by the Economic Planning Board on July 2, 1993. 
16  For a rigorous, in-depth analysis of the causes of Korea’s 1997 financial crisis and the role of chaebols and the banking 
sector, see Baliño & Ubide (1999). 
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received subsidized loans from the central Bank of Korea. In this way, the government validated the implicit 
assumption that it would not allow banks to fail and that large corporations were “too big to fail” (Baliño & 
Ubide 1999). This, in turn, created a moral hazard for the chaebols; they could disregard risk when expanding 
and diversifying their businesses, instead transferring risks to lenders. The chaebol groups disliked having to 
raise funding from capital markets because the groups did not want to dilute their business ownership and/or 
control. This problem of moral hazard remained embedded in South Korean banking and business practices 
long after the authoritarian governments expired; the latter effectively created the diehard problems of 
chaebol groups concentrating business ownership and national economic power.
The chaebol group was a complex cross-holding structure for component companies that enabled the family 
of the group’s founders to exercise control despite its small net investment, since the families relied on bank 
loans rather than capital markets or their own equity capital. In the 1990s, chaebol business groups raced to 
launch new businesses and secure necessary funding from a domestic banking sector that included many 
newly licensed merchant banks owned by chaebol businesses themselves. South Korean commercial and 
merchant banks made short-term borrowings from foreign banks in order to supply long-term loans to 
chaebol groups. This not only bloated the South Korean economy’s external short-term liabilities, but created 
a maturity mismatch on the balance sheets of the banking sector and the business groups.
As the business groups continued to expand, South Korea’s short-term debt ballooned, making the economy 
vulnerable to a liquidity crisis. The average debt-to-equity ratio of the 30 largest chaebols reached 519 
percent in 1997. South Korea’s total outstanding foreign debt was USD 42,800,000,000 at the end of 1992, 
but increased to USD 161,800,000,000 by November 1997. More than 60 percent of loans had short-term 
maturities (less than one year). At the end of 1977, South Korea’s central bank held foreign reserves of USD 
20,000,000,000, three times less than the amount of short-term foreign debt outstanding.
Many business groups deteriorated to the brink of bankruptcy, which contributed to the financial crisis. The 
real effective exchange rate of the KRW began a rapid appreciation in 1989, and, reinforced by the problems 
of “high cost, low efficiency” that beset the Korean economy by the mid-1990s, concerns grew over prospects 
for exports and the economy. A sharp drop in South Korea’s economic growth rate, from 9 percent in 1995 to 7 
percent in 1996, and the concurrent widening of current account deficit from less than 2 percent to 5 percent 
of GDP, confirmed these concerns. This economic trend resulted from “too-high costs” of doing business and 
“too-low efficiency” both due to rigidities that emerged with democratization in various sectors, including 
the labor market. Against this background, most chaebol businesses reported operating losses and began 
to demand bail-out money. In the midst of these economic woes, the government was at a loss over how to 
respond even as the Bank of Korea was rapidly running out of foreign-reserve holdings, especially since foreign 
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banks were withdrawing funds from South Korea in the wake of the ongoing financial crisis in Southeast 
Asia. The government refused to admit that the South Korean economy was facing an impendin g crisis. This 
caused international financial markets to lose confidence in South Korea, triggering capital flight and bringing 
the South Korean economy to the brink of a meltdown by late November 1997. Ultimately, the South Korean 
government was forced to request a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Lee 1999).
On December 3, 1997, the South Korean government and the IMF agreed on a stand-by credit arrangement 
to bail out South Korea from national bankruptcy on the condition that South Korea accept a deep-cutting 
structural adjustment program. The content of this program amounted to a complete overhaul of the South 
Korean economy. On December 18, 1997, South Korea elected Kim Dae-jung, a pro-labor and pro-common-
people politician and a long-time opposition leader, as their new president. As President-elect, Kim Dae-
jung began to reform the South Korean economy in order to shed the remaining legacies of government-led 
economic growth by mainstreaming the IMF’s program in his own policies for economic reforms. 
Addressing the three legacies mentioned above, the government forced itself to withdraw intervention in 
banking, leaving banks entirely on their own. The too-big-to-fail moral hazard was uprooted with reforms 
to corporate governance, strengthened bank regulations, enforced business and banking operational 
transparency, and closure of half of the 30 largest business conglomerates, including the Daewoo Group, 
which boasted the largest global presence among the 30 chaebol business groups. These measures helped 
South Korean business groups become self-reliant and competition-driven.17 However, even President Kim 
Dae-jung, with his well-known pro-labor credentials, could not work out a cooperative partnership between 
big businesses and labor unions. As a result, adversarial labor relations survived the crisis and continue to 
bedevil the South Korean economy to this day.
South Korea’s GDP growth recorded a minus 7 percent rate in 1998, but rebounded to 9.5 percent and 8.5 
percent in 1999 and 2000 respectively, before falling to 3.8 percent in 2001. The country formally graduated 
from the IMF program in August 2001, paying back the USD 19,500,000,000 in bail-out money it had 
borrowed and completing its transition from a long-time government-managed economy to a market-led 
economy. Its GNI per capita reached USD 14,161 in 2003, surpassing the pre-crisis peak of USD 13,077 in 
1996. Years of price stability and current account surpluses followed, but economic growth remained subdued 
17  The IMF-prescribed structural adjustment program had one serious flaw: it forced the South Korean government 
to introduce overly restrictive monetary and budgetary policies during the early months of 1998 in order to restore 
surpluses on the international current account; interest rates subsequently rose above 30 percent at one time. As 
a result, the current account turned from minus 1.6 percent of GDP in 1997 to a record high surplus of 11 percent 
in 1998. However, this was accompanied by a massive wave of bankruptcies among large and small enterprise and 
a spike in the unemployment rate from 2.6 percent in 1997 to 7.0 percent in 1998, which drove numerous small 
businessmen and households into deprivation. 
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at an average of 4.9 percent per year from 2001 to 2007, considerably below the average 7.7 percent rate from 
1990 to 1997. In the meantime, exports continued the trend that emerged in the 1990s towards increasingly 
high-value and differentiated final products and intermediate goods, such as parts, materials, machinery, 
and equipment, increasingly produced with South Korean technology. In the 2000s, the country solidified 
its position as a leading player in the global markets for leading-edge industrial products, as noted at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
Thus, in the 2000s, South Korea finally joined the league of leading industrial countries, competing with its 
highly-advanced technologies. From this perspective, South Korea’s 1997 financial crisis and subsequent 
struggle to dismantle its too-big-to-fail financial and corporate sectors was a rite of passage into the ranks 
of industrialized nations. The South Korean economy grew 3.8 percent per year from 2001 to 2015, within 
the band of “normal growth rates” for a developed country. As of 2017, its GDP per capita was USD 38,335 
according to the World Bank (2018b) as measured by purchasing power parity (PPP) in international dollars. 
With a Human Development Index of 90.3 in 2018, South Korea ranks 22nd out of 189 countries (UNDP 2018). 
South Korea has grown into an internationally influential middle power as the fifth-largest trader in the world, 
a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and a member of the G20, the world’s 
“premier forum for international economic cooperation” (Group of 20 2009). 
2. The Miracle Years Defined
The definition for the Korean Economic Miracle period is open-ended. The term refers to South Korea’s 
exceptionally high economic growth over a sustained period. Using this definition, we can consider 1962 
through 1996 to be the years of the Miracle. The growth rate fell precipitously from 7 percent in 1996 to 4.7 
percent in 1997, at the onset of the financial crisis after which the South Korean economy entered a new 
era of subdued growth performance. In retrospect, however, signs in the early 1990s foretold the impending 
financial crisis. 
As described above, these signs included bloated chaebol business groups that were increasingly assertive 
vis-à-vis the government. They were also emboldened by the moral hazard of believing that they were too-
big-to-fail; the banking sector validated this belief out of the same moral hazard and continued to finance the 
expansion of the chaebol business groups even as they were losing international competitiveness. Increasingly 
acrimonious labor relations in big businesses were another sign of an impending crisis. All contributed to the 
“high-cost, low efficiency” of chaebol-dominated industries that resulted in South Korea’s weakened export 
performance and trade and current account deficits from 1990 to 1997 (except for small surpluses in 1993). 
These problems worked to create a crisis of confidence in the South Korean economy while the Kim Young-
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sam government demonstrated its ineptitude in coming to grips with the impending crisis by simply replacing 
the Economic Deputy Prime Minister every several months as foreign-exchange reserves were being depleted. 
Whatever secrets of the Economic Miracle may have worked in the past were rapidly losing their efficacy in 
the 1990s. In this sense, the curtain began to fall on the Economic Miracle in the early 1990s. 
The end of the South Korean Miracle was, in fact, an implicit theme advanced by Mark L. Clifford, a South 
Korea correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review during 1987-1992. Clifford summed up his view 
of the secrets of the South Korean Economic Miracle in terms of the “Korea, Inc.” paradigm, the essence of 
which was a business-government partnership (Clifford 1994). Writing at the dawn of the crisis, he then 
argued that “Korea, Inc.” was an old order that was shriveling, but that the new order had yet to be born.   
IV.  Secrets of the Economic Miracle: Securing the Right Fundamentals
The secrets of South Korea’s Economic Miracle can be summarized in four elements: (1) a clear vision for 
national development; (2) an outward industrial development strategy; (3) an effective governance system; 
and (4) investing in capabilities for long-term development.  Those four secrets of the Economic Miracle may 
in turn be summed up as securing the right fundamentals.
1. A Clear Vision for National Development
The foundation of the Economic Miracle was laid by President Park Chung-hee as he launched South 
Korea’s high economic growth to eradicate poverty and realize a prosperous national economy. For most of 
his tenure, he exercised firm and effective leadership, setting the South Korean economy on a path toward 
high economic growth by pursuing it as the country’s priority goal on a sustained basis. For this goal, he 
inspired people with his slogan “Let’s work for prosperity!”18 He managed to instill a “can do” spirit in South 
Koreans by setting and achieving ambitious goals. He earned the citizens’ trust by personally practicing 
integrity and frugality. He mobilized capable officials based on a strict meritocracy and maintained a 
system of effective “economic policy governance,” including a structure and practices for economic policy-
18  The better-nuanced translation of the original Korean expression might be “Let us, too, achieve and enjoy 
prosperity!” or “Achieve and enjoy prosperity, yes, we, too, can!”
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making and management (Henderson et al. 2002) and a close partnership with business leaders.19 President 
Park Chung-hee demonstrated his commitment and utmost sincerity to this goal by building fundamental 
institutional capabilities for its implementation, including the Economic Planning Board, 5-Year Plans for 
Economic Development, and the Monthly Economic Review Meeting, which he personally chaired. The can-
do spirit that was inspired by President Park Chung-hee remained prevalent among South Koreans up to 
the early 1990s. Although economic growth no longer remained the priority goal that it was under President 
Park Chung-hee, each subsequent president set clear policy goals and pursued them by mobilizing capable 
technocrats. The economic policy governance paradigm that Park Chung-hee built, and close coordination 
and collaboration among ministries for 5-year plans as its foundation, supported the continuation of the 
Economic Miracle at least until the early 1990s.  
Despite the disputed constitutional legitimacy of his presidency, Chun Doo-hwan contributed to the 
continuation of the Economic Miracle by reforming the country’s industrial development paradigm in 
order to promote sustained economic growth. He pursued a triad of policy goals with clarity: price stability, 
market autonomy, and market opening. He was remarkably successful in achieving price stability and market 
opening. He also made strides towards a market autonomy, although he did not completely achieve market 
autonomy insofar as he failed to address government intervention in commercial banking. The secrets to 
his achievements included assembling a team of capable senior economic technocrats who had been well-
trained in modern economics and proposed the three economic policy goals to him. To his credit, President 
Chun delegated full responsibility for those goals to the technocrats and used his authoritarian presidency to 
support them. 
2. An Outward-oriented Industrial Development Strategy
The Economic Miracle arose as South Korea launched an outward-oriented industrial development strategy. 
The key to this was the promotion of export-led economic growth that was based on labor-intensive 
manufacturing in the 1960s. In the 1970s, South Korea promoted a shift to capital- and technology-intensive 
heavy and chemical manufacturing for exports in the 1970s. The effort paid off by laying the foundation 
for HCI-led exports and industrial development that accelerated in the 1990s. The shift rested on a heavily 
19  As discussed by Clifford (1994), over time this partnership nurtured collusive and corrupt relationships between big 
businesses, on one hand, and politicians and bureaucrats, on the other hand, undermining the independence of the 
banking sector and facilitating the sprawling of chaebol business groups with complicated consequences for the 
South Korean economy, such as contributing to the financial crisis in 1997, in particular. It is also true, however, that 
the partnership between the government and big businesses that was nurtured by Park Chung-hee played a critical 
role in “building” the South Korean Economic Miracle.
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interventionist approach in the form of government-directed investment in HCI and protection and 
subsidization. This approach reflected the paternalistic development paradigm of an authoritarian president. 
As seen above, it brought the South Korean economy a major economic crisis in 1979 and the early 1980s, 
showing the fallibility of an authoritarian government. However, the subsequent revival of export-led growth 
that was achieved under Chun Doo-hwan’s presidency demonstrated the robustness of South Korea’s outward-
oriented economic strategy. With the extensive import liberalization of manufactured goods in the 1980s, 
the accelerated increase in imports facilitated increases in exports. This led the South Korean government to 
rebrand its growth strategy as a trade-led economic growth. 
3. An Effective Economic-Governance System 
President Park Chung-hee developed and operated an effective system of economic policy-making and 
implementation. As has already been noted, South Korea created the Economic Planning Board (EPB) as a 
super economic ministry to establish 5-Year Plans for Economic Development as well as the annual budget 
plans to implement the 5-Year Plans. The Minister of the EPB was also the Economic Deputy Prime Minister 
who supervised and coordinated all economic and other related ministers. President Park appointed ministers 
and senior officials strictly on the basis of personal competence and dedication to work and exercised strict 
accountability in overseeing them. President Park was fond of engaging officials of all ranks in discussions with 
him on policy issues at the Monthly Economic Review Meetings he chaired. 
President Park Chung-hee and his successors established a series of specialized research institutes to assist the 
government with research, policy recommendations, and public discussions in order to make up for the lack 
of in-depth specialized knowledge and insights on the part of the government employees who were constantly 
rotated between different posts. The forerunners of these research institutions were the Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology (KIST), established in 1966, and the Korea Development Institute (KDI), established 
in 1971. The main body of researchers consisted of experts with Ph.D. training from abroad, mostly from the 
U.S. Generous salaries and amenities, such as apartment housing and chauffeur-driven cars, lured researchers 
back to their home country. As of today, there are 26 governmental research institutes working in humanities, 
economics, and social sciences, and 25 governmental research institutes working in the natural science 
and technology fields, for the purpose of assisting ministries with in-depth specialized research and policy 
advisory services. 
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4. Investing in Capabilities for Long-term Development: 5- and 10-Year Plans 
Five-Year Plans consisted of investment plans in various sectors for long-term economic development. The 
fifth 5-Year Plan also covered social development and was renamed the 5-Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development (1982-1986). The sixth 5-Year Plan (1987-1991) was the last plan. The seventh 5-Year Plan 
(1992-1996) was replaced in 1993 by a 5-Year Plan for the New Economy (1993-1997). The latter was not a 
comprehensive development plan; instead it focused on fiscal and financial reforms that aimed to promote fair 
competition and deregulation rather than investment; however, this New Economy Plan failed to forestall the 
1997 financial crisis. 
The six 5-Year Development Plans served as blueprints for investment in capabilities essential for long-term 
national development. Implemented over 30 years, these plans focused on promoting investment in various 
sectors and had far-ranging yet differentiated priorities for each period: agriculture and rural development, 
basic and strategic industries, energy security and power generation, water resources, transportation including 
expressways and metropolitan subways, telecommunications, various other types of physical infrastructure, 
national territorial development, forestation, public health, education and training, promotion of exports, and 
development of science and technologies. Infrastructure built according to the plans included a national network 
of Industrial Complexes across the country. In 2018, there were at least 38 industrial complexes in operation.
These 5-Year Plans collaborated with supportive sectorial multi-year plans. For example, the 5-Year Plans 
for Economic Development was accompanied by successive 5-Year Plans for the Promotion of Science 
and Technology. South Korea also established 10-Year Comprehensive Plans for Territorial Development 
in 1971. The 5-Year Plan for the Promotion of Electronics Industry (1966-1970) initiated South Korea’s 
electronics industry. There were also a series of 5-year plans for telecommunications from 1961 to 1981. 
In 1987, South Korea released the Framework Plan for the National Artery Computer Network. Although 
the 5-year development-planning practice was discontinued in 1993, the practice of long-term planning 
continued for specific strategies. For example, in 1996, South Korea implemented the First Framework 
Plan for Informatization, and in 1997, released a Comprehensive Development Plan for Information and 
Communication Industry. 
5. Using Major Crises to Launch Paradigm-shifting Reforms 
South Korea has experienced at least three profound economic crises in its modern history. The first was the 
“crisis of destitution” that occurred in the early 1960s when the economy was stagnant, poverty was rampant, 
and political and social instabilities prevailed. Approximately 60 to 70 percent of South Korean citizens 
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were impoverished before the mid-1960s (Henderson et. al. 2002). This situation provided an opportunity 
for Park Chung-hee to take control of the country with a military coup and launch an export-led industrial 
development strategy followed by comprehensive reforms to the country’s economic paradigm. The second 
major crisis was a “crisis of industrial protectionism” in which the government sought to select and protect 
many infant industries as future winners. Various protective interventions in the market deprived the 
economy of resilience to external shocks and hampered its ability to sort out and nurture winning industries 
and firms in the context of market competition. This resulted in stagflation and a serious domestic recession. 
South Korea seized the subsequent economic crisis as an opportunity to reset its paradigm for economic 
growth and industrial development. The third major crisis struck the South Korean economy in late 1997 as 
part of the Asian Financial Crisis. It can be called a “crisis of sclerosis” because it was caused by the sclerotic 
reactions of the chaebols, banks, labor unions, and President Kim Young-sam’s government to mounting signs 
of a crisis; all acted like the proverbial frog in slowly boiling water. Prodded by the IMF, South Korea used this 
crisis as a valuable opportunity to dismantle the remaining legacy of government interference in the allocation 
of resources between industries and between businesses that had begun in the early 1960s.  
Each of these crises triggered or contributed to a change of government, and each new government saw crisis 
as an opportunity to reset the country’s economic paradigm through multiple reforms. In each crisis, the 
new leader, that is, the new president, focused on the structural causes of economic problems and proposed 
solutions that would earn the support of citizens. They may not have liked their new president, but South 
Koreans nonetheless supported reform to the extent that they agreed on its necessity and their support helped 
make the reforms successful. 
V. The Role of Authoritarian Presidency in Development 
Presidents Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were both authoritarian presidents who presided  over the 
main part of South Korea’s Economic Miracle. There are two issues, however, that arise from the role played 
by these authoritarian presidencies. First, one may misread the South Korean experience as advocacy for 
an authoritarian approach to development. Second, it is crucial to understand that, although South Korea’s 
authoritarian approach to development underpinned its Economic Miracle, it was accompanied by problems 
that haunt the South Korean economy to this day.
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1. Is an Authoritarian Approach to Development Recommended?
If Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian presidency contributed to the Economic Miracle, it is not the authoritarian 
presidency per se that did the work but rather Park’s personal merits. His firm grip on the government 
enabled him to exercise those merits. Park’s strong attributes included a long-term view of South Korea’s 
development challenges, managerial abilities that stemmed from his training as a military officer, creativity 
stimulated by his deep commitment to overcoming obstacles to economic development, and the integrity 
that he tried to encourage from himself and his government officers. History shows that most authoritarian 
leaders are unlikely to possess those positive attributes; in fact, it shows that authoritarian leaders are more 
likely to be a detriment to the development of their country. Like virtually all authoritarians, Park Chung-
hee also had problematic inclinations, such as an intolerance for critics and democracy; however, he was 
not a typical authoritarian ruler. President Chun Doo-hwan could claim credit for recruiting capable senior 
economic technocrats and entrusting them with full responsibility for implementing a timely reform agenda 
for the economy. As will be elaborated later in this chapter, the good practices implemented by Park Chung-
hee and Chun Doo-hwan can be emulated or taken up by democratic governments without incurring the ill 
consequences of authoritarianism.
2. The Downsides of South Korea’s Authoritarian Approach
Although Park Chung-hee ran an effective government for economic development, his approach counts at 
least five drawbacks. First and perhaps foremost, he suppressed civil rights, including freedom of speech, 
workers’ labor rights, and protests from dissidents, journalists and opposing politicians. President Park 
used the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, police, and prosecutors as instruments to suppress critics 
and opponents under the pretext of anticommunism. During his tenure, President Park grew increasingly 
intolerant of critics – particularly pro-democracy critics – and sought to suppress resistance to his 
authoritarian rule over the country. This culminated in his assassination in the middle of a quarrel with his 
two closest aides over the issue of how to deal with the mounting protest demonstrations against him (Breen 
2010a). Park’s suppression of civil rights set South Korea’s political development back and undermined the 
government’s ability to reflect citizen voices and appropriately balance the nation’s development path. 
Second, Park’s suppression of critics drove most intellectuals into one of two groups – a conservative camp 
and a progressive camp – a polarization that continues to divide many South Korean intellectuals and 
politicians to this day. The “right wing” conservatives are ideological heirs of the so-called “industrializers,” 
the businesspeople and government officials who collaborated with Park’s power elites. At the time, they 
enthusiastically participated in the Park Chung-hee-directed economic development drive while staying 
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clear of political discussions. Today as then, they value economic growth, market competition, and business 
freedom. They are anti-communists and criticize the North Korean regime for the suppression of its people 
and their human rights. At the same time, they consider South Korea’s military alliance with the U.S. critical 
for South Korea’s survival and development. In contrast, the “left wing” progressives are the ideological 
heirs of the so-called “democratizers” who fought against the authoritarian regimes. They openly criticized 
Park Chung-hee for suppressing free speech and workers’ rights, and staged protests at the risk of physical 
harassment and incarceration. Present-day progressives prioritize social equity and environmental protection 
over economic growth; they distrust the so-called neoliberal economic policies. They further argue that South 
Korea’s Economic Miracle was built on sacrifices made by the working class and remain highly critical of the 
chaebols and their business groups. Progressives also tend to be sympathetic to the North Korean regime and 
critical of the U.S. for its past support of South Korea’s authoritarian governments. Inter-Korean unification is 
a priority goal for them. Thus, largely as a legacy of Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian 18-year rule, South Korean 
politics remain bitterly divided between conservatives and progressives on almost all issues. 
Third, both authoritarian leaders harshly suppressed labor unions. In particular, they coerced industrial peace 
and wage stability by collaborating with big-business employers at the expense of the rights and safety of the 
working class. Their suppression of labor rights was followed by adversarial labor relations in the years after 
democratization. Such relations remain an underlying factor for South Korean labor-market inflexibility today.
Fourth, the authoritarian governments focused on economic growth without much regard for environmental 
protection. South Korea’s rapid economic growth and industrialization was accompanied by increasingly 
widespread soil, air, river, and surface-water degradation, at the expense of the environment and public 
health. Environmental consciousness rose rapidly with industrialization, but the government tended to regard 
pro-environment activists as irritants until the mid-1980s. The government began to take environmental 
protection seriously in response to a series of water pollution scandals in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly 
as democracy fueled pro-environmental activism. The South Korean Economic Miracle, however, includes 
one important environmental initiative under President Park Chung-hee: the reforestation of mountains, the 
success of which has earned the country international recognition as “a reforestation model for the world” 
(Breen 2010b) (also see e.g., Chapter 7 in this volume). 
Fifth, Park Chung-hee’s authoritarianism infected the South Korean bureaucracy with an authoritarian 
culture. This culture bred top-down policy-making and encouraged a regulatory approach to problems. It also 
bred favoritism and corruption. President Park’s partnership with chaebol business leaders for the HCI drive 
further encouraged an unhealthy business climate and the spread of corruption in the 1970s. By the 1980s, 
South Korea was a highly corrupt society. As elaborated below, an investigation ordered by President Kim 
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Young-sam revealed that two of the most corrupt government officials during this era were former Presidents 
Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. 
VI. The Role of Democracy in Development 
South Korea’s authoritarian approach to economic growth delivered the Economic Miracle but also 
fostered a number of long-lasting problems. The new democracy prompted efforts to redress many of 
these issues. Democratization restored all civil rights, including freedom of speech and association. It gave 
voice to all people and encouraged unconstrained social dialogue, airing many of the grievances that the 
earlier authoritarian governments would not hear, and making room for various imbalances in the national 
development agenda. 
Democracy contributed to balancing national development across economic, social, and environmental 
dimensions in three principle ways. First, the South Korean policy agenda under the new democracy 
prioritized various social issues. This opened a two-decade-long era of rapid social development after 
democratization in 1987. Social protection and insurance for the economically and socially marginalized, 
including workers, were extensively enhanced. By the mid-2000s, South Korea had established a social welfare 
system that closely resembled those in other advanced countries. 
Second, democracy encouraged environmental protection. South Korea upgraded the existing Agency for 
Environment, established in 1980, to the Office of Environment in 1990, and to the Ministry of Environment in 
1994. The Office and the Ministry of Environment greatly contributed to various measures for environmental 
protection. South Korea introduced local autonomy in 1994, allowing local residents to elect the heads of their 
local governments. This grass-roots democracy contributed a great deal to the strengthening of environmental 
protections across the country because local residents were the most knowledgeable as well as the most 
sensitive about local environmental problems. 
Third, democracy facilitated measures to uproot corruption. President Kim Young-sam introduced a law to 
ban financial transactions under false names in 1993 (Young 1994).20 President Kim followed this reform with 
legislation that required all senior officials to register the amount and composition of their wealth holding 
20  In his capacity as Senior Counsellor to the Economic Deputy Prime Minister in 1993, the present author contributed 
to this reform, which took the form of an “Emergency Presidential Decree on Real-name Financial Transactions” 
(August 13, 1993), to ban all financial transactions under false names. The author brought the idea of the “emergency 
presidential decree” to the attention of President Kim Young-sam; its promulgation would take the financial market 
by surprise and block capital out-flight due to the ban. 
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once a year and a law banning transactions for real estate in false names. Prosecution of corrupt politicians 
and officials, beginning with two former ex-military presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, followed 
the implementation of this financial transparency law.21
South Korea’s experiences with its new democracy also revealed five major difficulties in balancing 
development. First, because of South Korea’s five-year, one-term system for the presidency, the incumbent has 
limited planning horizons for economic development. This makes long-term planning nearly impossible and 
promotes “short-termism” in the setting and implementation of policy agendas, an especially serious problem 
in South Korea.
Second, lacking long-term visioning exercises for the nation, a population will have no shared vision and goals 
for development. The country as a whole, then, will lack a unified set of action norms and agendas that could 
otherwise facilitate coherent actions from the population.
Third, a change of government, especially between opposite parties, tends to cause a pendulum movement of 
policies from one position to an opposing position, creating oscillating and unstable policies that confuse the 
market, further making it virtually impossible for people and companies to make meaningful long-term plans. 
This has occurred in South Korea since the early 2000s. 
Fourth, effective social dialogue is very important for ironing out differences among social groups and 
pursuing collaboration and cooperation at the national level. Pursuit of the so-called “collective egoism” on the 
part of individual interest groups would promote confrontation among such groups and impede cooperative 
solutions to problems. This was the exact situation with tripartite negotiations on labor-market flexibility 
among the government, labor unions, and big businesses in South Korea during the lead-up to the financial 
crisis and post-crisis economic-adjustment process. This limited the success of President Kim Dae-jung’s 
Tripartite Committee. 
Fifth, democracy tends to encourage individualism on the part of governmental ministries, weakening inter-
ministerial consultation and collaboration. This exacerbates the “silos” phenomenon among individual 
ministries and hurts consistency and effectiveness in the government as a whole. This occurred in South 
Korea in the 1990s in the lead-up to the 1997 financial crisis after the abolition of 5-Year Development Plans 
and the Economic Planning Board.
21 Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo each served more than two years in jail as a result of their prosecution. 
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VII.  Challenges for Sustainable Development in South Korea Today
From 2000 to 2015, the United Nations adopted and pursued eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
in order to help poor countries around the world achieve their main developmental goals: eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce 
child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental 
sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development (United Nations 2000). Encouraged by 
the considerable success achieved in implementing these goals (Sachs 2012), as the end of the MDG period 
approached, member countries attending the 2012 United Nations Rio+20 Summit agreed to develop and adopt 
a set of development goals for the whole world, beginning in 2015, as a successor to the MDGs. After two years 
of extensive global consultation at various levels, including civil society, attendees of the UN Summit held on 
September 25, 2015 adopted a consensus document entitled the “United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development” (2030 Agenda) with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as its core.
The 2030 Agenda commits all countries, developing and developed alike, to taking action to eradicate poverty 
in all its forms and dimensions and further to achieve sustainable development in all its three dimensions: 
economic, social, and environmental. The 2030 Agenda signifies that no country can achieve its sustainable 
development alone, that actions must achieve economic and social development as well as environmental 
sustainability, and that countries can only achieve such development collectively and collaboratively. Under 
the Agenda, countries have agreed to implement 17 SDGs and 169 targets by 2030 (Figure 1.8). The Agenda 
includes a pledge to “leave no one behind” and to include all counties, regions, races, ethnicities, sexes, age 
groups, incomes, and other social groups in the development process. The UN subsequently developed 230 
indicators to gauge countries’ implementation of the 17 SDGs and 169 targets over time. 
The 15-year time horizon for the goals and targets was meant to overcome short-termism. Integrating all 
relevant considerations into an indivisible set of goals and targets, the well-crafted SDGs were meant to help 
overcome the “silos” problem and decentralized government. The 2030 Agenda constitutes a framework for a 
global partnership for sustainable development while emphasizing that cohesive, nationally-owned sustainable 
development strategies should be at the heart of the global efforts. The Agenda further states that “each 
country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development and that the role of national 
policies and development strategies cannot be overemphasized” (United Nations 2015b). Accordingly, the 
Agenda requires each country to reset its own development goals, strategies, and policy agendas in order to 
mainstream the SDGs, using the goals and targets as a checklist for national goals (Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network 2015). Likewise, the SDG performance indicators should be used as a scorecard to measure 
a country’s progress toward sustainability targets. Furthermore, the targets and indicators should be quantified 
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and applied at the national level and further disaggregated to regions, races and ethnicities, sexes, age groups, 
incomes, and other social groups. The idea is that such targeting and tracking will help ensure that no one is 
left behind, and hold governments and all other stakeholders accountable. 
Figure 1.8  17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
                                Source: United Nations 2015b
The SDGs include Goals 1-7 which focus on social issues addressing human basic needs, Goals 8-11 which 
focus on economic growth and development, Goals 12-15 which focus on global environmental protection, 
Goal 16 which focuses on justice and institutions, and Goal 17 which focuses on the multi-stakeholder 
partnership at the global and national levels for the implementation of all other Goals, including partnerships 
to support developing countries. The 17 SDGs underscore how complicated a task it is for countries and 
the world to shift to a path of sustainable development. The need to implement these goals in an integrated 
manner, recognizing and managing interdependence among them, is particularly challenging.
Since 2016, Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network annually published the 
“SDG Index and Dashboards Report” in which, in an illustrative informal exercise, the development standing 
of individual countries is assessed in terms of their distance to the target values of the indicators to be achieved 
by 2030 and the overall SDG Index value aggregated over all goals.
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Figure 1.9  The 2018 SDG Dashboard for South Korea
Note:  Color signals indicate distance from worst position to targets: already achieved (green), more than halfway (yellow-
Targets 1, 2, 4, 8, and 11), less than halfway(brown-Targets 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, and 16), and long way (red-
Targets 5, 13, and 17)
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung & SDSN 2018
Figure 1.9 reproduces the SDG Dashboard for South Korea as of 2018. The report assigned an overall SDG 
Index value of 77.4 percent and ranked South Korea as 19th among 156 countries with comparable data. This 
is a good development standing relative to the country’s ranking in terms of other indicators, such as the 
per capita GDP. However, Figure 1.10 also shows that, despite its remarkable development record thus far, 
including that of its much-touted Economic Miracle, South Korea has not yet fully achieved any of the goals. 
The country has a long way to go to fully implementing all SDGs, especially gender equality (G5), climate 
actions (G13), and global partnerships (G17). South Korea is currently also less than halfway to the 2030 goals 
for health and well-being (G3), water and sanitation (G6), clean energy (G7), infrastructure and innovation 
(G9), gender equality (G10), responsible consumption and production (G12), below-water ecosystems (G14), 
terrestrial ecosystems (G15), and justice and institutions (G16). 
Figure 1.10  SDG Achievement Trends for South Korea as of 2018
SDG Trend Indicators:
                                    Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung & SDSN 2018
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Figure 1.10 reports an assessment of South Korea’s SDG trends, that is, whether South Korea’ is moving 
forward or backward in the pursuit of individual SDGs. According to the assessment, South Korea is moving 
in the wrong direction on climate action (G13) and terrestrial ecosystems (Goal 15). South Korea is stagnating 
on education (G4), below-water ecosystems (G14), and justice and institutions (G15). The country has to 
accelerate efforts for poverty eradication (G1), health and wellbeing (G3), gender equality (G5) and clean 
energy (G7), while it is on track for food and agriculture (G2), water and sanitation (G6), and infrastructure 
and innovation (G9). Sufficient data has to be collected and analyzed to assess the policy trends for the 
remaining goals. This analysis helps to identify the areas in which major policy reforms are warranted. A 
further analysis of indicator values and their trends will help identify specific challenges and where policy 
direction is needed. The analysis presented in Figure 1.10 is only an illustrative exercise to demonstrate how 
SDGs, targets, and indicators may be deployed by national authorities in order to determine an appropriate 
policy agenda for their national sustainable development. 
VIII. Lessons from South Korea for Developing Countries
The challenges for developing countries today include setting long-term development goals, measuring the 
distances to these goals, “backcasting” the paths to the goals, identifying priority issues and tasks therein, and 
looking for sustainable solutions for goal implementation. South Korea’s earlier experiences with its Economic 
Miracle, together with the guidelines in the 2030 Agenda, suggest the following five lessons and raises a couple 
of questions.
First, on setting the vision and policies for development: long-term national goals for 2030 and beyond, and 
strategies for their implementation, should be clearly identified by type of issue, and well communicated to 
citizen, including all stakeholders. National goals should be inclusive of the SDGs and related targets, but 
the prioritization and sequencing of approaches to them should reflect the country’s own national realities, 
capacities, and development (United Nations 2015c). 
Second, on the governance of development policies: setting up the right institutional arrangements for the 
inclusive and participatory governance of policies is a prerequisite for setting the right goals and strategies 
and communicating about them to citizens. Sustainable development requires a continuous, society-wide 
dialogue – one that is open to all citizens, transparent, and democratic – in order to ensure that the views and 
wishes of all citizens are integrated. Such integration allows policy planning and implementation to take place 
in a balanced way and helps hold all stakeholders accountable for effective implementation. The 2030 Agenda 
suggests that such dialogue and integration of citizen voices requires the following institutional arrangements:
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•  Creating a whole-of-government council for inter-ministerial coordination to integrate economic, 
social, and environmental goals and issues, as well as for vertical coordination between the central and 
local governments;
•  Launching a national follow-up and review process on progress toward implementing goals. This 
process should be transparent and open to all stakeholders, institutions, citizens, and regions;
•  Monitoring progress based on real-time data disaggregated by sex, age, ethnic distinction, region, and 
other social characteristics in order to leave no one behind;
• National and local parliaments should support the process (United Nations 2015).
Third, on the fundamentals for sustainable development: long-term planning will bring into focus the critical 
importance of securing the right fundamentals for sustainable development through balanced investment in 
long-term capabilities and/or capital of various kinds, ranging from financial resources to human (education 
and health), natural, intellectual, social, and infrastructure.22 South Korea’s early investment in long-term 
capabilities emphasized universal education at the primary and secondary levels, basic public health, and 
hard and soft infrastructure, including electricity, public transportation, water resources, rural community 
development, science and technology, and competent public administration and bureaucracy. South Korea 
did not prioritize environmental protection against industrial pollution in the early stage of its development. 
However, it did initiate forestation of the mountains and countryside very early with urgency and consistency, 
because the authorities realized that reforestation required a sustained, long-term effort. Such efforts provide 
an example of good pro-sustainable development policy prioritization.
Fourth, on securing the national leadership of the right kind. Our discussion of South Korea’s Economic 
Miracle highlighted the meritorious qualities with which President Park Chung-hee orchestrated the early 
portion of the Miracle: his long-term outlook on national development challenges and solutions, abilities 
and creativity to successfully manage many policies and projects, and personal integrity that was exemplary 
among government officials. However, we also highlighted how Park could put those qualities at the service 
of the nation only because he was an authoritarian leader and we noted that his authoritarian rule had several 
detrimental consequences for South Korea’s long-term development, including his increasing oppressiveness 
in ruling over the country. Authoritarian governance is no longer a political option in most parts of the world, 
nor is it sustainable or something to recommend. The relevant question, therefore, is whether a country 
can be democratic and also secure political leadership that has the better of Park’s qualities. The answer is 
22 Dr. Jeffrey Sachs emphasizes the importance of this point in his introductory module to “The Korea Story” MOOC.  
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that specific individuals may not be found, but the form of a country’s institutional arrangements can satisfy 
the first and the second points above, that is, a long-term approach to planning and the recommended 
arrangements for democratic governance of development policies. These two points are, in fact, the core of 
the 2030 Agenda recommendations for SDG governance arrangements. Ensuring a leader’s integrity and, in 
fact, that of all government officials, is a different matter that may be approached by ensuring the transparency 
of all financial transactions involving the government and public officials.  
Fifth, we may wonder if there is any lesson to be drawn from South Korea using major economic crises as an 
opportunity to undertake reforms and reset the economic development paradigm. The lesson is, of course, 
that a crisis provides a valuable opportunity to change the status quo and that such an opportunity should 
not be wasted. There is a broader lesson here, as well. All governments typically are hostile to criticisms of 
their policies and the state of their countries. The lesson that can be drawn from South Korea’s experience of 
responding to crises with development-enhancing reforms is that governments should take in, and actually 
welcome, all criticisms with an open mind and make use of crises to critically reassess present policies and 
look for room to improve those policies.
Finally, South Korea’s experience shows that an authoritarian approach to economic development may work 
for a while under the best of circumstances, however authoritarianism is unlikely to work for long without 
running into resistance and giving way to democratization. If economic development yielded the fruits of 
prosperity as intended, this would make people value human rights and political freedom more highly and 
demand more of both as development progressed. Democracy thus seems to be an inevitable outcome of 
economic success in countries that began without it. An authoritarian regime’s resistance to people’s demands 
for democracy will either bring an end to the regime or will engender measures that undermine the social 
cooperation necessary to develop an economy. Thus, it seems that democracy is both an eventual outcome of 
economic development and a necessary condition for long-term economic development.  
At a more fundamental level, democracy should be seen as the very means of realizing sustainable 
development, because a society can meaningfully determine how to balance its path of development 
among various goals, not only economic, but also social and environmental, solely through democratic 
processes. “Balancing” here is essentially the political process of polling the preferences of the people and 
integrating citizen views into a society’s goals. This is to say that, when planning for a transition to sustainable 
development by pursuing the SDGs, the governments of developing countries should plan to transition to a 
democratic order, or to improve their democratic institutions, by way of implementing the first two lessons 
given above on citizen communication and participation. An important proviso must be met here: as they 
participate in social decision-making processes, the people should be provided with the necessary and right 
sets of information about their choices. 
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I. Health, Sustainable Development, and Universal Health Coverage 
Health gives value to life, gives people the capacity to learn and grow at intellectual, physical, and emotional 
levels, and enables personal and universal development (Sachs 2001). The United Nation’s 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) explicitly include health in the third goal: to attain healthy lives for all at all 
ages. SDG 3 outlines three key elements to a holistic approach to health: Universal Health Coverage (UHC), 
accelerating progress on the unfinished health Millennium Development Goal (MDG) agenda, and reducing 
the burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). The importance of health cannot be overemphasized, and 
health is implicitly relevant to all 17 SDGs. For instance, health is relevant to SDG 1 (to end poverty in all its 
forms) because poor health may reduce an individual’s ability to work, generate income, or invest in education, 
or SDG 5 (to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls everywhere) because women are the 
majority caretakers in households, and women’s empowerment impacts their ability to make decisions for 
maternal and child health (Every Woman Every Child 2015).
1. Sustainable Development Goals and Health  
Table 2.1 outlines the nine targets and four additional points within SDG 3, including three targets associated 
with the MDGs, three targets aligned with the emerging agenda for NCDs and injuries, and three targets 
focused on UHC (World Health Organization 2015a).
Table 2.1  Nine targets and four additional points under SDG 3
Association Target/point Content
MDGs
1
By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 
100,000 live births
2
By 2030, end preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years 
of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at most 
12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at most 25 per 1,000 live 
births
3
By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected 
tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, waterborne diseases and other 
communicable diseases
NCDs and 
injuries
4
By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable 
diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health 
and well-being
5
Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including 
narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol
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Association Target/point Content
6
By 2030, reduce by 50 percent the number of global deaths and injuries 
from road traffic accidents and, by 2020, stabilize and then reduce global 
deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents
Mix
7
By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care 
services, including for family planning, information and education, and the 
integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programs
8
Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, 
access to quality health-care services, and access to safe, effective, and 
affordable medicines and vaccines for all
9
By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from 
hazardous chemicals and air, water, and soil pollution and contamination
a
Strengthen the implementation of the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries, as appropriate
b
Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for 
the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect 
developing countries; provide access to affordable essential medicines 
and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing 
countries to use the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public 
health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all
c
Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, 
training, and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, 
especially in least developed countries and small island developing states
d
Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, 
for early warning, risk reduction, and management of national and global 
health risks
Source: United Nations 2015
2. Healthcare Financing and UHC in Low-Income Countries 
There is a close link between health and economic development. Many countries, however, underestimate 
the qualitative and quantitative significance of health during investment decision-making. As a result, the rise 
of non-communicable and communicable diseases in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) severely 
impede economic progress (Haines et al. 2012; Sachs 2001). Figure 2.1 summarizes the impact health can have 
on a society’s economic development: 
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Figure 2.1  Contribution of Health to Sustainable Development
                                        Source: Vega 2015
The World Health Organization (WHO) reported in 2001 that the The Commission on Macroeconomics 
and Health proved that disease in many low-income countries (LICs) has often been a barrier to economic 
development (Sachs 2001). In order to see economic improvement, health has to become part of development 
strategies in LICs through policy changes, such as the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and the 
MDGs (Suhrcke et al. 2005). Figure 2.2 illustrates the various ways health affects per capita income: 
Figure 2.2  Links between Health and GDP per capita
                                                   Source: Bloom et al. 2004
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The experience of high-income countries in Europe reveals that health contributes to economic development 
in four ways. First, health impacts labor productivity. Physically and mentally healthier people increase 
productivity per working hour through a more effective use of technology or equipment and demonstrate 
more efficient time-management or flexibility. Second, health contributes to an increase of labor supply. 
Good health reduces the number of workers’ sick days, which increases productivity and wages, which leads 
to higher worker incentive and increased labor supply. Third, a population with good health is more likely 
to achieve higher education, and an educated population can be more productive and earn higher incomes. 
Finally, people with better health enjoy a higher life expectancy; therefore, they may save more money than 
people with poorer health because the healthy may expect returns over a longer time frame, which may result 
in a higher willingness to invest in physical or intellectual capital (Suhrcke et al. 2005). 
The relationship between health and development is bi-directional (Figueras & McKee 2011; Spence & 
Lewis 2009; Suhrcke et al. 2005). Economic growth improves health in several ways, including increased food 
availability and affordable health services (Spence & Lewis 2009). Figure 2.3 shows how LMICs rely heavily 
on out-of-pocket payments (OOPs) for healthcare services (an average 30-48 percent of the total health 
expenditure (THE)) (Mills 2014; Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011). In LMICs, approximately 50 percent of THE 
comes from OOPs, compared with 14 percent of THE in high-income countries (Mills 2014). Households 
with high OOPs without proper prepaid payments drove the adoption of the 2005 World Health Assembly 
Resolution across the Member States (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011). UHC aims to secure access to 
appropriate promotive, preventive, curative, and rehabilitative services for all without generating financial 
hardship (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011). 
Figure 2.3  Source of Health Financing as a Percentage of Total Health Expenditure by World 
Bank-define Income Group (2011)
     Source: Mills 2014
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OOP is an important determinant of equity in healthcare (Kwon 2011). High OOP for health services 
indicates health services are a market commodity, can limit the accessibility of health services in LMICs, 
and causes catastrophic healthcare expenditure and impoverishment (Kwon 2011). A 1 percent increase in 
the share of OOP in the THE relates to a 2.2 percent increase in households that have catastrophic health 
payments (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011). A lack of financial protection for healthcare expenditure forces 
approximately 100,000,000 people below the poverty line each year in LMICs (Mills 2014). Universal Health 
Coverage is a possible solution to high OOP and its consequences. UHC requires a functioning health system, 
including quality services and sound health financing systems. 
LMICs have seen an increased participation in service delivery from private providers. Although the 
involvement of private providers could invite the privatization and commodification of healthcare, the low 
capacity of the public sector in LMICs suggests utilizing both public and private providers is a realistic policy 
option for LMICs (Mills 2014; Saksena et al. 2010). According to the 2010 WHO report, 27 out of 39 LMICs 
offered more than 50 percent of outpatient services at public facilities. The study suggested that individuals in 
the richest quintile tend to use private facilities more than the lowest income quintile; however, even among 
the lowest income quintile, private facilities used more than 20 percent of total outpatient visits (Saksena et 
al. 2010). Table 2.2 reveals the much lower density of health workforce infrastructure in LMICs compared to 
high-income countries. 
Table 2.2  Availability of health workforce per 10,000 population in the world
Country group Hospital beds Doctors Nurses Pharmaceutical personnel
Income group
Low-income 21 2.4 5.4 0.5
Lower middle-income 10 7.8 17.8 4.2
Upper middle-income 32 15.5 25.3 3.1
High-income 54 29.4 86.9 8.4
WHO region
Africa23 Not available 2.6 12 0.9
Americas24 23 20.8 45.8 6.7
South-East Asia 10 5.9 15.3 3.8
23  “Africa” includes Algeria and all sub‐Saharan African countries except Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia (World Health 
Organization).
24 “Americas” includes US, Canada, and Latin and South America (Pan American Health Organization).
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Country group Hospital beds Doctors Nurses Pharmaceutical personnel
Europe 53 33.1 80.5 5.1
Eastern Mediterranean 8 11.4 16.1 6.1
Western Pacific 43 15.3 25.1 4.5
Global 27 14.1 29.2 4.3
Source: World Health Organization Statistics 2015b
Figure 2.4 demonstrates the disparities in healthcare utilization across six regions in the world.
Figure 2.4  Ratio of the use of six primary-care services for low and high economic quintiles of 
the population among LMICs in six regions25 of the world
   Source: Peters et al. 2008
There are several factors for accessing healthcare in LMICs. Geographic accessibility and safe road conditions 
are important for health facilities, the distribution of drugs and medical supplies, and emergency referrals. 
Health services must be readily available, but can be impacted by limited hours, long waiting times, lack of 
drugs, and absentee health workers – all common issues in LMICs. Financial accessibility, which relates to the 
affordability of and financing health services, is also crucial. Finally, acceptability of services, which links to 
cultural norms, such as gender inequity, is equally important for accessible healthcare in LMICs (Peters et al. 
2008). 
25  Regions include East Asia and the Pacific, Central Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and 
sub-Saharan Africa
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3. History of Health and Sustainable Development in South Korea
Table 2.3 shows selected indicators for health-related MDGs and health financing in the Republic of Korea 
from 1980 to 2013:
Table 2.3  Selected indicators of Health-related MDGs and Health Financing in South Korea 
(1980-2013)
       Source: World Health Organization 2015b; World Bank 2015 
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In South Korea, OOP as a percent of THE has decreased by 16.4 percent from 1980 to 2013. However, OOP 
as a percent of GDP has increased by 2.6 percent from 2003 to 2013. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the source of 
health financing as a percent of THE and as a percent of GDP, respectively, in South Korea from 1980 to 2013: 
Figure 2.5  Source of Health Financing as a percentage of Total Health Expenditure, South Korea 
(1980-2013)
Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure database
Figure 2.6  Source of Health Financing as a percentage of GDP, South Korea (1980-2013)
         Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure database
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II. Public Health Centers and Immunization Programs in South Korea26
1. Public Health Centers27
Under United States (U.S.) support, Korea initiated the Korean Health Center Project following the nation’s 
liberation from Japan in 1945. At that time, health centers provided preventive healthcare services for only the 
low-income population. The Korean War, however, destroyed the majority of health centers. Following the 
war, the remaining health centers offered preliminary treatments, prevention services, and relief support. In 
1956, South Korea enacted the Public Health Center Act to establish municipal and provincial health centers. 
South Korea revised the Act in 1962 to establish health centers directed by city and county governments and 
specify health center responsibilities, which included the prevention of infectious diseases, maternal and child 
health, and family planning. The development of public health centers in South Korea can be divided into four 
stages: the initial period (1945-1952), the formation period (1953-1976), the settlement period (1977-1989), 
and the developing period (1990–present).
In 1977, South Korea introduced public health insurance and the Medical Aid Program for the low-income 
population. The majority of patients that received Medical Aid also utilized health centers, as many private 
medical institutions had medical fees too high for low-income patients. As the number of Medical Aid patients 
increased, the government increased investment in health centers to meet the demand. The government 
chose the primary health management project as the national health policy and introduced the Special Act for 
Healthcare in Rural Areas (SAHRA) in 1980. The SAHRA laid a foundation to dispatch Community Health 
Practitioners (CHPs) to rural areas, construct Primary Health Care Posts (PHCP), and send public health 
doctors to sub-health centers. South Korea introduced the Community Health Act in 1995, which designated 
health centers as the central organizations of health management in communities. 
Following the Korean War, the gap between the health of urban and rural residents widened, accelerated by 
rapid urbanization, the concentration of private medical institutions in large cities, and insufficient medical 
resources in rural areas. In 1979, 90 percent of doctors and 82 percent of hospital beds were located in cities, 
where only 55 percent of the total population lived. Along with 5-Year Economic Development Plans, the 
government emphasized the development of the public medical system to reach South Korea’s low-income 
population. Although the first three 5-Year Economic Development Plans from 1962 to 1976 implemented 
26 Research assistance by Inuk Hwang is gratefully acknowledged.
27  This case is based on “Healthcare Improvement Activities of Public Health Centers in Rural Areas” by Yong Ae Shin, 
KDI School, 2012.
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healthcare projects focused on providing medical workers to unstaffed locations, disease prevention and 
control, and family planning, the healthcare budget was less than 1 percent of the national budget. The fourth 
and fifth phases of the development plan from 1977 to 1986 improved the public healthcare system in rural 
areas. In addition to sending Public Health Doctors (PHDs) to sub-health centers, the government located 
CHPs to PHCPs in rural areas. CHPs could perform simple medical practices in medically underserved areas. 
As a result, all South Korean counties became staffed with medical personnel by 1983.
The Ministry of Public Administration and Security is responsible for the general administration of health 
centers, such as employment. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) is responsible for centers’ 
policies and work plans. Local governments supply health center workers. The organization of the center 
varies depending on locality and can be classified under one of the following: Seoul, metropolitan, mixed 
urban/rural, city (urban), gun (rural), or hospital. Depending on its type, the organization of health centers 
varies in their size and departments. For instance, city health centers consist of health administration, 
medicine, communicable disease control, house calls, and health promotion, and rural centers consist of 
health administration, preventive medicine, health promotion, and local health and sanitation. Initially, South 
Korea required health centers to have officers of medical consultation, pharmacy, health, nursing, health 
education, radiology, germ control, and statistics. The guidelines now include specialized officers, such as 
traditional medical doctors, midwifes, nurse aids, and others. In 1999, of 19,126 employees in 243 nationwide 
health centers, 27.2 percent had nurse’s licenses, 19.8 percent had nurse aid’s licenses, and 10.5 percent had 
doctor’s licenses. Through a number of legislations, health centers expanded to include the management of 
medical records and mental health in 1991. In 1999, health centers added health promotion projects, such 
as tobacco and alcohol control, physical activity, and nutrition. The recent work of health centers includes 
smoking cessation, nutrition improvement, exercise consultation, community-based rehabilitation, medical 
expense support, and patient home visiting programs. 
In 1973, South Korea introduced the Standards of Health Service Institutions to set guidelines on health 
center construction. In 1982, the government mandated that health centers in metropolitan areas be two-
stories high and cover 900 square meters. South Korea undertook the construction and renovation of health 
center buildings primarily in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1994, the government legislated the Special Tax for 
Rural Development Act to provide additional funds for equipment and facilities. The budget of health center 
s consisted of subsidies from both central and local governments, but many centers suffered from insufficient 
budgets due to limited support from local governments. 
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To resolve the regional imbalance of medical resources, the government introduced legislature to create sub-
health centers in 1969. The law required that at least one sub-health center be established in every county 
with one commissioned doctor, staff in family planning, maternal, and child health, and tuberculosis workers. 
However, treatment in sub-health centers lagged due to bureaucratic processing, limited facilities, and legal 
complications for the status of physicians. In response, the government abolished the operation committee of 
sub-health centers and turned the status of the Public Health Doctor (PHD) into a special local public official 
in 1993. Many public physicians worked in sub-health centers short-term as a substitute for a mandated three-
year military duty. As of 1995, an average of five public employees worked in each sub-health center. In the 
beginning, sub-health centers largely followed the work of health centers, but their work expanded to include 
primary healthcare, control of chronic diseases, visiting health management, maternal and child health, and 
health improvement programs for the elderly.
The imbalance of medical personnel between urban and rural areas has concerned the government since the 
creation of health centers. In 1985, health workers, termed multi-purpose health workers, became full-time 
officers. Following the change in status, South Korea required each worker to attend a three-month training 
program; afterwards they had to work in maternal and child healthcare (MCH), family planning, tuberculosis 
control, and home healthcare. Since 1981, Korea has maintained a pool of more than 3,000 available public 
health doctors for health centers. The pool consists of general practitioners, board-certified specialists, 
dentists, and traditional medical doctors. More than 1,000 specialists have been registered since 1996. In 1992, 
the government mandated all mayors and governors provide job training programs to PHDs and report the 
results to the Minister of Health and Welfare. PHDs received training consisting of pre-training to learn the 
functions of primary care and post-training to learn public health work. PHDs are responsible for medical 
consultation, preventive programs, and health education. According to a study in 1992, 90 percent of PHDs 
focused on consultation. 
Following the Public Health Center Act in 1956, MCH became a formal task of health centers. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, MCH workers and family planning staff promoted family planning at each local community. 
MCH staff were mainly midwives and nurses but nurse aids gradually replaced both. South Korea established 
MCH centers in 1980 to decrease maternal deaths during home births and increase institutional delivery in 
vulnerable areas, such as low-income and rural areas. The hospital delivery rate in 1982, before MCH centers, 
was 35.3 percent in rural areas but increased to 73.3 percent in 1988. 
Following a pilot project in 1976, the government approved plans to train, dispatch, and manage CHPs. In 
1981, the government dispatched CHPs to PHCPs in rural and remote areas. The government required 
CHPs to work in their initial workplace for at least two years, record their work in a workbook, live in the 
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jurisdiction, retire at the age of 60, and attend a training course once a year to update their knowledge and 
skills. PHCPs authorized CHPs to use selected types of medicines that fall within the scope of primary 
healthcare.
To encourage community participation, the government established a village steering committee, attended by 
residents of the community. Many operation committees initially supported CHPs by donating land or lending 
buildings to construct PHCPs. As South Korea stabilized the CHP system in 2001, however, 84 percent of 
the CHPs reported that the committee did not contribute to the operation of the post. To encourage liaisons 
between residents and posts, the government created the role of village health workers. Village health workers 
were women older than 20-years-old who had graduated from middle school. Their work included reporting 
health statistics, healthcare projects for infants, children, and pregnant women, family planning, tuberculosis 
control, and emergency care. The government supported posts through a budget for capital and labor costs. 
After the initial provisions of the budget, however, the post funded operation through its own income. In 2000 
and 2001, medical consultation fees were 74 percent of posts’ net income. 
2. National Immunization Programs28
Following the Korean War, there was a sharp increase in the spread of infectious diseases. To resolve this 
issue, the government established immunization centers in towns, sub-counties, and neighborhoods, and 
appointed at least one certified professional to each center. The central and local governments provided free 
immunizations. To raise public awareness for immunization programs, the government distributed education 
materials via newspapers and other media. Health centers also played an important role in immunizing infants 
as part of the Maternal and Infant care program, especially in rural and remote areas. 
In the past, the biggest concern in South Korea regarding infectious diseases was herd immunity. 
Consequently, healthcare staff visited schools and other populated places to implement mass immunizations, 
which significantly increased immunization coverage. South Korea enacted the Law for the Prevention of 
Infectious Diseases in 1954 and affected the law in 1999. The law required guardians to immunize all children 
under 14. In 1999, South Korea reached the goal immunization coverage rate, and the government abolished 
mandatory child immunization. The most recent law on infectious disease management in South Korea is 
the Law of the Prevention and Management of Infectious Diseases, enacted in 2011. As of 2018, the national, 
provincial, and county government shares 50 percent, 15 percent, and 35 percent, respectively, of the cost 
28  This case is based on “Korean National Immunization Program for Children,” by Sok-Goo Lee, So-Youn Jeon, Keon-
Yeop Kim, Ho-Jin Nam, and Kyung Lee, 2013. 
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of the immunization program. Mandatory immunization, which include 11 immunizations, is based on 
professional review, and complementary immunization is administered in cases of sudden epidemic. Since 
2009, the public has access to required immunization services from private providers, which is reimbursed by 
national health insurance. As of 2012, immunizations in public health centers are free, but one must bear the 
cost up to KRW 5000 (about USD 5) per immunization at private health institutions. 
As of 2018, approximately 7,000 private providers offer immunizations. In 1999, the Division of Quarantine, 
the sub-unit responsible for infectious diseases in the Ministry of Health, transferred to the National Institute 
of Health (NIH). In 2002, the Task of Immunizing Children of the MOHW merged with the Task of Adult 
Immunizations administered by the NIH Quarantine Division. In 2003, the government established the Korea 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) to expand the tasks previously covered by the NIH and set 
up the first separate immunization division. In the following years, South Korea employed a variety of efforts 
to improve the quality of the immunization program, including individual records management systems and 
systematic training of the workforce. The introduction of the National Immunization Registry Information 
System (IRIS) in 2002 marked the change in South Korea’s immunization policy from group immunizations 
to quality management through personal immunizations. The government also implemented various public 
health programs to fight communicable diseases, including tuberculosis and leprosy. 
Following its formation in 2003, the KCDC addressed tasks related to immunization under different 
government agency oversights, including testing, purchasing, supplying vaccines, setting up prevention plans, 
and managing immunization programs. In particular, the Diseases Policy Division of the MOHW set the 
majority of immunization policy and the Korea Centers for Disease Control decided technical judgments 
about immunizations and the operation of the immunization programs. The provincial government fiscally 
supported immunization programs in the city, county, and district health centers. The health centers were 
responsible for offering immunizations and overseeing the practice of immunizations in medical institutions 
under their jurisdiction. 
Immunizations at the national level are under the jurisdiction of the Infectious Disease Management 
Committee of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. It deliberates on the methods and standards of conducting 
immunizations and the pre-purchase, production, and stockpiling of medicines and equipment. A sub-
committee, the Immunization Expert Committee, deals with the designation of diseases that should be 
targeted through immunizations, immunization criteria and methods, policies on tackling infectious 
diseases with immunizations, and the control of diseases. Another sub-committee, the Expert Committee on 
Compensation for Immunization Victims, holds hearings on injuries or other related situations that arise from 
immunization. 
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Both public health centers and private medical institutions currently provide immunization services. Public 
health centers offer the most immunization services and are responsible for the national immunization 
program. Sub-health centers also perform immunizations. Private institutions acquire vaccinations directly 
from the manufacturer and public health centers receive vaccinations through the Public Procurement 
Service. Since 2012, South Korea developed the Vaccine Supply Monitoring System, connected to IRIS, to 
track the status of vaccine supplies at health centers and to respond to vaccine shortages. 
South Korea has seen tremendous success through its immunization policies in largely eliminating the spread 
of diseases, such as hepatitis B, measles, and the influenza A virus H1N1. To increase the public participation 
and awareness of immunizations, South Korea implemented four tools. First, since 2011, South Korea has 
participated in the annual Korean Influenza National Immunization campaign which provides free influenza 
vaccinations to children from infants 6-months-old to children 12-years-old and adults over 65-years-old 
(Korea Centers for Disease Control & Prevention). South Korea also offers free immunization services for 
other infectious diseases, such as diphtheria, polio, and hepatitis, to children from age 6-months to 12-years 
under a national immunization program. Second, the Korea Centers for Disease Control established an 
immunization reference website that provides information, such as immunization schedules, immunization 
related programs, and immunization records. Third, South Korea established a messaging service for 
immunization confirmations and notifications of the next immunization schedule. In 2002, South Korea 
developed and installed IRIS in all public health centers, and, in 2004, expanded to include private medical 
institutions. IRIS systematically manages immunization related data, makes a list of recipients in need of 
vaccinations, and sends recipients reminder notifications. As of 2018, the IRIS database registers nearly 
all newborns. Moreover, since 1982, the Korean Immunization Survey has been conducted as part of the 
National Survey on Fertility, Family Health and Welfare in South Korea. Since 2011, the immunization rates 
have been determined by a nationally standardized survey method to determine the immunization rate at the 
national, metropolitan, and province level. The target populations of the survey are 3- to 7-year-old children 
whose immunization records have been registered in IRIS at least once. Fourth, South Korea offers extensive 
vaccination training for healthcare providers. 
80  Secrets of an Economic Miracle: Lessons for Sustainable Development from South Korea
III.  National Health Insurance and Universal Health Coverage in South 
Korea 
In the healthcare system, where the majority of hospitals were private, and public hospitals charged a 
nontrivial user fee, health insurance value was very high. Rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s 
contributed to the extension of population coverage in South Korea. Employees of businesses with more than 
500 workers were the first group to be covered by health insurance in 1977. Health insurance covered the low-
income population, school employees, and public sector workers in 1999, followed by employees of smaller 
corporations. The government implemented pilot programs for the self-employed in five localities (four rural 
and one urban). In 1988, the self-employed in rural areas joined the health insurance system.29 The health 
insurance system also adopted a family-based membership, which required all dependents to be covered by 
the insurance of the head of the family. South Korea achieved universal population coverage in 1989. Table 2.4 
offers key economic and health indicators of South Korea during the period of health insurance initiation: 
Table 2.4  Economic and Health Indicators in South Korea (1977-2008)
1977 1989 2000 2014
GDP per capita 
(in USD)a
1,042 5,430 11,347 28,180
Life expectancy b 64.8 71 76 81.8 (2013)
Mortality 
(per 100,000 persons) c
690 542.3  527.3
Infant mortality
(per 1,000 births) b,c
38
(average over 
1970-1975)
12
5.8
(average over 
1999-2002)
3 (2013)
Number of physicians 
(per 10,000 persons) b
5 (1981) 8 13 22
Number of beds 
(per 10,000 persons) b
17 (1981) 23 47 110
Number of physician visits 
per capita b
3.7 6.2 10.6 (2002) 15
Number of admissions 
per capita c
- 0.06 (1990) - 0.12 (2013)
Number of hospital days per 
admission b,c 
12 13.6 13.8 (2002) 16.5 (2013)
Note: 1977 marked the introduction of health insurance; 1989 marked the onset of universal coverage
Sources: Kwon 2018, p. 12 using data from a Bank of Korea 2016; b OECD 2016 a & b; c Statistics Korea 2015
29 See Kwon (2009) for details.
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1. Development of Health Insurance for Universal Health Coverage
Before the merger of statutory health insurance funds into a single insurer in July 2000, the national health 
insurance system consisted of multiple not-for-profit insurance funds, which were subjected to strict 
regulation by the MOHW. Except for the review and assessment of claims submitted by providers, health 
insurance funds did not actively exercise their purchasing power and had no selective contracting with 
providers. Fee scheduling, along with the regulation of balance billing, contributed to the financial protection 
of the insured and cost control. There was no competition among insurance funds to enroll the insured, and 
each insurance fund covered one of three well-defined population groups: employees and their dependents 
(36.0 percent of the population), school and government employees and their dependents (10.4 percent), and 
the self-employed, also called regional health insurance (50.1 percent) (Table 2.5). As of 1998, the Medicaid 
program for the poor, funded by a government budget, covered the remaining 3.5 percent of the population. 
In 1998, there were 227 insurance funds for the self-employed (92 in rural and 135 in urban areas) established 
as sub-districts of the city. There were 142 funds for employees and a single insurance fund for school and 
government employees. 
Table 2.5  Number of Insured for Types of Health Insurance Funds
(Unit: 1,000 persons)
1988 1989 1990 1995 1999 2000
Total 33,196 44,168 44,110 45,429 46,821 47,466
Health insurance 28,906 39,922 40,180 44,016 45,184 45,896
Employee
Sub total 22,129 20,982 20,759 21,559 21,717 22,404
Insured 6,966 6,479 6,511 7,166 6,803 7,268
Dependents 15,163 14,503 14,247 14,393 14,914 15,136
Self employed Insured 6,777 18,940 19,421 22,457 23,467 23,492
Medical Aid 4,290 4,246 3,930 1,413 1,637 1,570
Source:  Kwon 2015, p. 6 using data from National Health Insurance Corporation 1999, 2015 and Health Insurance 
Review and Assessment Service, 2010, 2015. 
All insurance funds provided the same statutory benefits package to enrollees and same reimbursement to 
healthcare providers. Insurance systems based self-employed contribution rates on income, property, and 
household size, but based employee contribution rates only on wage income. Each insurance fund set their 
contribution rate within the range dictated by the MOHW. The government worried that providers would not 
want to join the health insurance program due to tight fee scheduling, so it mandated all medical providers 
treat insurance patients rather than contract with them. 
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The government provided subsidy only to the insurance funds for the self-employed, intending to cover 
administrative expenses and a part of the contribution for lower-income groups. Over time, the government 
increased subsidy to self-employed insurance funds, but health expenditure increased faster, and the 
proportion of government subsidy in the total revenue of the self-employed funds decreased. In 1988, the 
relative share of government subsidy in the revenue of the insurance funds for the self-employed was 44.1 
percent, which decreased to 25.6 percent in 1999. The decrease in government subsidy resulted in the increase 
of contribution for the self-employed, but, as low-income in rural areas limited the ability to pay contribution, 
many insurance funds for the self-employed suffered chronic fiscal deficits. In response, the government 
introduced a risk sharing mechanism, called the fiscal stabilization fund, to reallocate contribution revenues 
across all insurance funds, which benefitted the funds but still failed to solve their financial insolvency. As 
of 1998, the relative share of the revenue from the fiscal stabilization fund in the total revenue of the self-
employed insurance funds was 10.9 percent, down from 13.6 percent in 1997 (National Health Insurance 
Corporation 1999). 
Medical care utilization was the highest in school and public employee funds and the lowest in self-employed 
funds, due to the fact that the school and public employees funds listed a larger proportion of elderly enrollees 
and dependents, and the self-employed funds served a lower-income population. The burden of contribution 
compared with capacity to pay for members of self-employed insurance funds in low-income areas was 
greater than for those in wealthier regions. As a result, many self-employed insurance funds in rural areas 
experienced serious fiscal deficits that were further aggravated as rural areas experienced a decrease in 
population size but an increase in the elderly population. The government grew concerned that gaps in fiscal 
status between higher-income urban and lower-income rural insurance funds threatened social solidarity and 
fiscal sustainability of the National Health Insurance (NHI) system.
Extending health insurance to the self-employed incited debate on whether health insurance for the self-
employed should adopt the pluralistic approach of multiple insurance funds or if it should create a new 
single insurer system by merging with existing insurance funds. Through nation-wide risk pooling, the 
single insurer system could serve as a smooth extension of health insurance to the self-employed, with better 
fiscal sustainability. However, the difficulty of income assessment and contribution collection from the self-
employed deterred the merger. Differences in setting contribution – for example, some insurance funds for 
employees included base salary only, while others were based on total compensation – caused horizontal 
inequity across insurance funds. Proponents of the merger maintained that the surplus of employee health 
insurance funds could be used to extend insurance to the self-employed. As of 1997, accumulated surplus 
of employee health insurance funds amounted to more than 113 percent of one year’s health expenditure 
while self-employed insurance funds were 30 percent of one year’s expenditure. Parliament, supported largely 
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by rural residents, passed the law on the merger of employees and self-employed insurance funds, but the 
president vetoed the law. The Ministry of Finance, especially, wanted to keep the existing multiple insurance 
funds to minimize the government’s role in healthcare financing and worried that a nation-wide single fund 
system would require a huge budget subsidy, resulting in a fiscal burden on the government.
2. Healthcare Reform and the Merger of Health Insurance Funds
In order to improve the efficiency of health insurance, the health insurance funds for school and government 
employees and for the self-employed merged to create the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) in 
October 1998. In July, 2000, employee health insurance funds merged into the NHIC, and the national health 
insurance in South Korea changed into a single insurer system. As a result, the single insurer applied a nation-
wide contribution schedule for the insured and increased the pooling capacity and the bargaining power of the 
insurer in health insurance contribution. The merger not only introduced a new single insurer agency, NHIC, 
but also created a new insurance review agency, independent of NHIC, called Health Insurance Review and 
Assessment (HIRA). 
Although the South Korean population faced the same contribution schedule, benefits coverage, and provider 
payment, management of the health insurance system divided into two agencies. The two agencies hoped to 
mitigate the inefficient bureaucracy of a single insurer. NHIC, renamed the National Health Insurance Service 
(NHIS), handled premium collection, fund pooling, reimbursement to providers, and social security programs, 
and HIRA handled purchasing claim reviews, benefits packages, and provider payment systems. Negotiations 
between NHIS and each provider associations determine the fee level of the fee-for-service payment system. 
In the case of pharmaceuticals, HIRA determines positive listing of new medicines based on cost-effective 
economic evaluation, then NHIS and the pharmaceutical manufacturer negotiates the reimbursement price 
of medicines. In the 2000s, NHIS expanded health insurance benefits coverage to include screening programs 
for five cancers, reduced coinsurance rates for catastrophic conditions, and introduced ceiling for cumulative 
out-of-pocket payment for covered services. The savings in administrative expense of NHIS contributed to a 
fiscal space for benefits expansion.
Since the emergence of the single insurance agency, NHIS became a major policy issue for politics and the 
central government. The Ministry of Health and Welfare heavily affects insurance policies implemented 
by NHIS and HIRA through budget approval and appointing agency officials. In a health system where 
the majority of hospitals are private, the MOHW does not play the role of service provider but regulates 
healthcare providers and formulates health insurance policies. Also, after experiencing a major financial 
deficit in 2001, the health insurance system introduced the Health Insurance Policy (Deliberation) Committee, 
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which approves major decisions on health insurance, such as contribution rates, benefit packages, and 
pricing (Kwon 2007). NHIS and HIRA provide technical input to the health insurance policy committee. The 
committee is a tripartite committee of payers, providers, and public agencies, which has 25 members and the 
Vice Minister of Health and Welfare as the chair. Eight members are from payer representatives, eight from 
provider representatives, and eight from public interests. 
Healthcare financing reform introduced a paradigm change in Korean health policy making (Kwon & Reich 
2005). The government’s interest in health policy has led to democratization in public policy and a more 
pluralist context. Civic groups played an active role in the policy process by shaping proposals for reform, a 
major change from the closed group of experts, bureaucrats, and medical professionals that dominated the 
authoritarian process.
IV. Challenges and Lessons for Universal Health Coverage 
1. Future Challenges for UHC
Although South Korea achieved universal coverage of population, it still falls short of universal expenditure 
coverage. Out-of-pocket payment still accounts for more than 30 percent of total healthcare expenditure 
in South Korea. High OOP results in unmet needs, catastrophic health expenditure, and illness-based 
impoverishment. High OOP mainly results from full payment for services not covered by health insurance. 
High OOP, however, is not simply a matter of a benefit package, but is also affected by provider behavior. 
South Korea has experienced a rapid increase in uncovered services because they are not subject to fee 
scheduling which results in high-profits for providers. South Korea must increase benefits coverage while 
minimizing the negative effects on the financial sustainability of the health insurance system. Although health 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP in South Korea is lower than the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) average, its rate of increase is one of the highest in OECD countries. Without 
changing the current payment system of fee-for-service for providers, inefficiency in healthcare provision 
will lead to the challenges of expenditure control and financial sustainability. Improving the efficiency of the 
healthcare delivery system by strengthening primary care and reducing the reliance on large tertiary-care 
hospitals is also a challenge for financial sustainability of the healthcare system.
Wage income dictates health insurance contribution for employees. The current contribution setting is 
inefficient, however, because it discourages labor participation in the formal sector. The contribution setting 
is also inequitable because it treats wage income less favorably than other types of income. South Korea must 
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expand the income base for health insurance contribution, which should be charged on all types of income, 
including rental income and financial income.
South Korea has experienced a rapid aging of population due to an increase in life expectancy and decline in 
fertility. Health expenditure of the elderly has rapidly increased in South Korea and accounted for more than 
35 percent of national health expenditure in 2013. South Korea introduced public long-term care insurance in 
2008 in order to reduce social admissions in acute-care hospitals (Kwon 2008). However, the overall healthcare 
system is not ready to cope with the rapidly aging population, and the coordination of healthcare and long-
term care is a critical issue. A continuum of care from preventive care, acute care, rehabilitative care, long-
term care, and community-based welfare services not only saves expenditure but also increases the quality of 
life for the elderly. 
In a healthcare system where more than 90 percent of hospitals are private, the threat of strike by physicians 
discourages the single insurer agency from fully exercising its monopsonistic power. For example, payment 
system reform to prospective case-based payment has faced opposition from healthcare providers. The 
financial sustainability and the efficiency of the South Korean health insurance system hinges on its capacity to 
use its purchasing power over providers and implement effective payment systems other than fee-for-service, 
such as capitation, diagnosis-related group-based DRG-based inpatient prospective payment systems,30 
and global budgeting (Kwon 2009). Furthermore, South Korea must reconsider the contractual relation 
between the insurer and medical providers. South Korea may not need to require all medical providers to 
join the health insurance system, as it already has a sufficient supply of providers who cannot survive without 
participating in the system of universal health insurance. In fact, the mandate is a barrier for the monopolistic 
purchasing power of the single insurer because the single insurer cannot selectively contract with providers 
based on their performance. Selective contracting faces opposition from the Korean Medical Association and 
civic groups who worry that some leading hospitals may not want to join the NHI system. 
2. Policy Lessons for UHC and Sustainable Development
In the 1970s and 1980s, the South Korean government mobilized public and school resources to implement 
immunization campaigns and actively supported community organizations for family planning programs. 
South Korea found that mandatory insurance was crucial for implementing UHC income-based contribution. 
30  Under the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS), each case is categorized into a diagnosis-related group 
(DRG). Each DRG has a payment weight assigned to it, based on the average resources used to treat Medicare 
patients in that DRG. For more information, see https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/
AcuteInpatientPPS/index.html.
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A financial commitment to provide subsidy for the low-income population is also vital to UHC. Because a 
healthy population contributes to economic development, the implementation of a sustainable healthcare 
financing mechanism will lead to economic growth. A top-down policy process by an authoritarian 
political regime also contributed to the rapid expansion of population coverage when the government 
avoided opposition from employers who had to pay half of the contribution of employees and healthcare 
providers who had to accept the tight fee regulation. The South Korean government drove the design and 
implementation of health insurance development, which resulted in a minimum difference across insurance 
funds. 
Compared with the formal sector, the capacity of the informal sector to pay and contribute to NHI is more 
difficult to assess. In most LMICs, the informal sector accounts for more than half of the labor force. If the 
government fully subsidizes the informal sector, population coverage will rapidly increase, but the government 
must have the financial capacity to provide budget subsidy for informal sectors. Informal sector workers 
do not pay contribution, and formal sector workers do, but full subsidy to the informal sector can increase 
the informalization of the formal sector labor. If the government does not pay any subsidy to the informal 
sector, however, it is difficult to extend coverage to the informal sector because of limited capacity to pay. 
Alternatively, the government can pay partial subsidy to the informal sector, which provides incentive for the 
informal sector to join health insurance. 
UHC aims to reduce the financial barrier to quality healthcare for the entire population. Either NHI or tax-
based financing can achieve UHC by minimizing OOPs and maximizing the role of the pre-paid public 
financing mechanism. As a result, UHC focuses on the amount of people covered by a public financing 
scheme and the percentage of healthcare cost covered by the public pre-paid scheme. South Korea found it 
difficult to prioritize over population coverage and benefits coverage. Policy priority over rapid coverage of 
the population with a low contribution resulted in limited benefits coverage and limited financial protection. 
If South Korea began with generous benefits coverage, however, the rapid extension of population coverage 
would not have been possible due to the required high contribution. If a government has the commitment to 
regulate the behavior of providers along with efficient payment systems for providers, it will be more beneficial 
to implement policy priority on population coverage rather than benefits coverage. In terms of institutional 
structure, a single risk pool for health insurance systems makes it possible to better pool risks and cross-
subsidize from high- to low-income populations. Starting with multiple insurers, however, may contribute 
to a rapid extension of population coverage. Therefore, starting with multiple pools, but minimizing the 
differences in contribution, benefits, and provider payments across pools, can be a more beneficial option. 
Centralized claim reviews and information systems also reduces the differences across the pools and enhances 
the efficiency and equity of health insurance systems.
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UHC should be supported not only by a financing mechanism but also by a service delivery system to provide 
quality healthcare. If the quality of healthcare dissatisfies enrollees, they may drop out from health insurance. 
At the same time, health insurance, as a purchasing mechanism, is an effective tool to encourage hospitals 
to provide quality, cost-effective healthcare. The purchasing agency can selectively contract providers, 
operate a tight claim review and quality assessment system, and design provider payment systems. The rapid 
increase in the supply of private providers motivated to increase productivity had several positive effects on 
the development of the health insurance system in South Korea, such as increased capacity in healthcare 
delivery, responding to consumer needs, and improved quality of care. The predominance, however, of private 
providers or passive privatization has led to the diminishing role of primary healthcare and the rapid increase 
in the role of specialists and hospital-based care. Private provider dominance impacted health politics as well 
as health expenditure. Healthcare reform is inherently political with vested interest groups. In South Korea, 
private health providers have been a very strong opponent to healthcare reforms, including payment system 
reform toward case-based payment. Healthcare delivery in South Korea, dominated by private providers 
that are financed by a fee-for-service system, is vulnerable to cost increase and fiscal crisis. Under the fee-
for-service, medical providers have incentives to increase the volume and intensity of services and to choose 
treatments with a greater margin. 
In general, a single payer system is efficient because it can utilize the economy of scale in management, 
has a greater risk pooling capacity, and can better use its financial leverage while bargaining with providers 
(Kwon 2011). Efficiency, however, can also be achieved by reasonably large insurers. After a certain threshold, 
increasing the size of an insurance pool may have a marginal effect on the increase in risk pooling and 
bargaining capacity of the insurer. Equity may also be achieved by uniform benefits packages, contribution 
settings, and provider payment systems across insurance funds; although, it requires a strong governmental 
role. Therefore, LMICs should consider their own context in the decision to move toward a single payer 
system or a system of a few well-regulated insurers.
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I. Conceptualizing the Political Side of Economic Development
Politics play a critical role in sustainable economic development. In fact, sustainable economic development is 
not possible without politics setting the rules for reforming and maintaining the economy. Through collective 
action, politics determine economic foundations, such as property rights and the protection of property rights, 
resource mobilization and income distribution, and providing solutions to national problems. 
Economic development in developing countries largely revolves around mobilizing and channeling resources. 
Mobilization is a process by which economic actors, such as the government, businesses, and individual 
citizens, assemble resources in order to contribute to collective action, such as economic development. 
Mobilization is most effective when it is based on a vision shared among all economic actors. In some cases, 
the mobilization of some resources may occur at the expense of opportunity costs – the potential losses 
resulting from a particular use of that resource, as opposed to another use that may result in different benefits. 
The proactive, collective participation of all economic actors, despite individual opportunity costs, can yield 
especially efficient results. 
In industrializing economies that follow industrialization forerunners, such as the United Kingdom (U.K.) and 
the United States (U.S.), mobilization often takes place when political leadership directs the public toward 
the use of resources. This is called “top-down mobilization.” In top-down mobilization, political leadership 
decides which resources to mobilize and where to allocate them. These choices are made with opportunity 
costs in mind. Opportunity costs are often borne by the public, as it may have to give up an option of seeking 
potentially greater short-term individual benefits, in favor of the government’s decision for long-term 
collective benefits; therefore, decisions must be effectively communicated to the public so that the public will 
accept and understand the leaderships’ vision and directions. 
Top-down mobilization, however, is often not sustainable on its own. It can become obsolete once a political 
regime changes or when the economy grows large enough that it produces sets of information too large to be 
processed by the limited resources of a top-down system. Top-down leadership in such situations may quickly 
lose its effectiveness. In order to guarantee the continued success of mobilization, the public must demand 
that the leadership adopt different options in order to continue to perform in the country’s best interest. The 
process by which the public holds the government accountable is called “bottom-up demand channeling.” In 
such situations, the public may demand that the government retreat from the day-to-day management of the 
economy and ask for market liberalization. 
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Sustainable Development Goal 16 (to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels) 
highlights the importance of public participation in sustainable development. Public participation and 
collective decision-making are vital elements for inclusive and responsive governmental policy-making. 
Ultimately, political leadership can serve the public interest only if leaders can accommodate and satisfy the 
public’s demands as they are channeled from the bottom-up. The public will eventually hold the government 
accountable for its decisions and performance or, if necessary, can demand a change in leadership. 
Countries or communities may often have their own macro-level interests that are separate from micro-
level interests of smaller groups and the individuals that constitute them. For instance, a country may 
need economic development, but some individuals may have an interest in not allowing it to happen. For 
a community, such as a country, or a group, such as a company, to achieve sustainable development, these 
varying interests must properly align. When interests get coordinated at all levels, macro and micro, collective 
action issues become much easier to solve. The interaction between top-down mobilization and bottom-up 
demand channeling, what management theorists define as “interest alignment,” often results in a foundation 
for sustainable mobilization and economic development.
Classical economist Adam Smith assumed that a market-based economy will naturally align the development 
of the national economy to the mutual benefit of individuals. Karl Marx, however, rejected such natural 
alignment and believed a communist education under a proletariat dictatorship could alter the minds of the 
people to align their interests with the ultimate communist vision of the country. What Smith and Marx both 
envisioned, although they approached the idea through different avenues, was interest alignment between 
individuals and communities.
The South Korean experience over the six decades since the 1960s offers a case of successful interest 
alignment during South Korea’s industrialization process. Interest alignment was particularly successful from 
the 1960s to the mid-1980s. Top-down leadership mobilization from the South Korean government and 
bottom-up demand channeling from the population resulted in interest alignment across different social levels 
in the country and eventually sustained economic development. In this process, the South Korean media often 
played an important role by discerning national objectives in order to align interests between the public and 
the government. 
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II.  Dramatic Development and Correction: Park (1962-1979),  
Chun (1980-1987) and Roh (1988-1992) Governments 
1. Survival and Development: The Park Government (1962-1979)
A military coup in the early 1960s established Park Chung-hee as the president of the Republic of South 
Korea. Park Chung-hee was South Korea’s third president since the country’s liberation from Japan in 1945. 
He came after Syngman Rhee, who served for nearly a decade and a half, and Yun Bo-seon, who was in power 
only briefly. Park Chung-hee’s government promised to bring political stability and economic development to 
South Korea. Many South Koreans welcomed the coup; they hoped to leave behind the poverty and hardships 
left in the aftermath of Japan’s colonization and the Korean War. The Park government eventually delivered 
the economic prosperity it promised through a drive for manufacturing-based, export-focused growth, a 
success that lasted through the 1960s into the 1970s. Following this success, the government sought a next 
step forward, but, by then, the people demanded a new direction for economic and political development. 
The Rhee government, established in 1948 as the first independent government after South Korea’s liberation 
from Japan, failed to respond to popular demand for national economic building and was unable to raise the 
South Korean economy out of poverty. The government tried to secure as much foreign aid as possible, but 
the economy remained in ruin. The Rhee government wasted a large amount of foreign aid on corruption 
rather than economic turnaround when government officials, military generals, and others often stole foreign 
money and goods for private use. Democratic political development also failed to occur, and the public feared 
President Rhee sought to remain in power for life. 
In 1960, the South Korean people, led by young students, called for the end of the Rhee government. They 
staged street protests for days. Eventually, Rhee gave in to the public’s demands, marking South Korea’s first 
regime change by means of popular political protest. For a year, the new democratic government, headed by 
President Yun Bo-seon, failed to stabilize the nation, and political turmoil persisted. The South Korean people 
yearned for progress, but they were left only with disappointment. Progressives wanted more time to be given 
to the democratic government, but conservatives hoped for a quick change that would bring stability and 
order, a change that finally came in 1961 when a young general, Park Chung-hee, led a military coup against 
President Yun Bo-seon and promised that his new government would bring stability and prosperity. Park 
won the popular vote in the presidential election, and the South Korean people watched the new leadership 
with mixed feelings of hope and wariness. Park immediately addressed the need to legitimize his leadership 
and devoted himself to rectifying the political discord his coup created. Initially, Park sought more foreign aid 
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but there was not enough foreign money available to finance South Korea’s industrialization and Park quickly 
realized that South Korea had to rely on itself in order to move forward.  
President Park borrowed the idea of the 5-Year Economic Plan from the preceding government in order to 
deliver the economic prosperity the South Korean people wanted. In 1961, South Korea had a small number 
of economic players and its businesses were still in early development stages. It was not too difficult, therefore, 
for the Park government to gather a near-complete assessment of the economy. The government assigned 
highly educated bureaucrats the role of analyzing information, and this combination of talent and evaluation 
resulted in economic strategies that could move the country forward.  
At this stage, South Korea’s advantage sprang from its human resources and emphasis on the education 
and hard work of its citizens. A comparative advantage was South Korea’s light manufacturing, which soon 
flourished despite a lack of available capital or accumulated experience. At first, South Korea produced low-
quality manufactured goods that were sold overseas because the domestic market was too underdeveloped 
to rely on itself. Export-led industrialization was necessary to finance national development through foreign 
exchange earnings. The political leadership successfully shared this vision with the public through media 
campaigns and education. It coined the term “export war front” to mobilize the nation’s efforts. School 
children memorized the National Education Charter, which began with a declaration: “We were born in 
this land with a historic mission to revitalize our nation.” As South Korea sold more labor-intensive, light 
manufactured products overseas, its product quality improved and foreign earnings increased rapidly. The 
South Korean public bought into the idea, and soon the reality, of a virtuous economic cycle. 
After the 1960s recorded nearly double-digit economic growth every year, President Park Chung-hee 
envisioned a drive into a new phase of heavy manufacturing. On the political front, justified by national 
security arguments that centered on the communist threat from North Korea, he worked on extending his 
presidential tenure during the early 1970s. However, political opposition mounted fiercely against President 
Park’s move, but the general public eventually complied with Park, persuaded by his economic achievements 
during the previous decade. 
The government quickly mobilized the economy for a shift to heavy industries. Under government direction, 
banks channeled large amounts of capital to new heavy-industry investments. Some economists were 
concerned that, due to an excessive amount of resources channeled into heavy industries, the economy would 
lose its balance. Additionally, the mid-1970s were a turbulent time for the global economy because of oil 
shocks and other issues. Heavy-industry investments in South Korea could not produce quick returns within 
the global conditions, and exports slowed on most fronts. Meanwhile, with worldwide hyperinflation, the 
cost of borrowing capital skyrocketed and South Korean banks, with their money sunk in newly-built heavy 
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industries, could not recover. The financial sector grew unstable, manufacturing industries suffered, and South 
Korea’s citizens complained about the rising cost of living and the slowing economy. 
Political opposition mounted against the Park government, and a sense of crisis spread across the country. 
The nearly two-decade-long period of growth and industrialization faced critical challenges when the South 
Korean people began to question the legitimacy of Park’s leadership. A leadership that had succeeded, with 
the public’s help, in mobilizing the nation for growth saw that same public turn its back on it. Street protests 
broke out in southeastern South Korea in 1979. Citizens demanded change. In the midst of political turmoil, 
President Park was assassinated by J.K. Kim, his intelligence chief, in October 1979. 
2. Correction and Liberalization: The Chun Government (1981-1987)
The end of the Park government offered another opportunity for democratization, but just like in the Korea of 
20-years before, this hope was crushed by a military coup and political upheaval. Economically, South Korea 
continued to grow. The new government, led by General Chun Doo-hwan, needed to secure legitimacy for 
their rule by delivering what the public wanted. Eventually, the government succeeded in delivering economic 
results by stabilizing and liberalizing the economy. This led to another period of dramatic economic growth 
throughout the 1980s. While the population enjoyed a new level of affluence, towards the later part of the 
decade they once again demanded full political freedom, which eventually led to the beginning of an era of full 
democracy in 1987.   
In 1980, after the new military regime came into power through a coup, it quickly identified action targets to 
win the public on the economic front. The public’s economic concerns were clear: the South Korean people 
were tired of high inflation, particularly rising real estate prices, and economic imbalances, such as those in 
regional development and those caused by the turn to heavy industrialization. The economy had outgrown 
the government and the public pressed the government to let the market operate as freely as possible.  
South Korea’s new president, former Army General Chun Doo-hwan, delegated economic policy-making 
power to Western-trained economists. President Chun fervently backed the economists’ policy-making and 
froze a government budget increase when advised to do so. The economists continued to introduce ideas for 
economic stabilization, and the new president resolutely continued to implement those ideas. The economists 
thought South Korean industries received excessive government protection and believed the only way to 
make the industries more competitive and sustainable was to lift trade protections, cut government support, 
and let South Korean companies compete on their own in the global market. South Korea soon implemented 
unilateral trade market openings, which removed various import barriers. 
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The government undertook public campaigns to overhaul public values related to economic issues. They 
challenged the traditional mercantilist thinking of negating imports. At first, this reversal in reasoning 
confused the public, but the results of the new economic policy, such as lower prices, wider choices, and 
better-quality goods available in the market, satisfied the people. The 1980s marked continuous policy 
adjustments that brought rapid economic growth. Due in part to liberalization, the growing national wealth 
translated into rising income for the population. Low oil prices, low interest rates, and the low value of the 
U.S. dollar relative to the Korean won, which made imports cheaper, also helped improve the economy. South 
Korea’s international trade marked a major surplus for the first time, bringing considerable foreign currency 
into the country. 
For the first time, the South Korean people enjoyed the fruits of their new prosperity. With this growing 
wealth, the population turned their attention to politics and insisted on a fully democratic presidential 
election. In 1987, with the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games approaching, democracy advocates saw a golden 
opportunity to seek political change. For the third time in the latter half of the 20th century, the South Korean 
people took to the streets, demanding a new constitution. In the end, President Chun gave in to the population 
and, for the first time in nearly two decades, South Koreans went to the ballot to elect a president directly, 
ending the previous era when President Park installed an indirect election system to keep himself in the office 
for life in the early 1970s. 
3. Openness and Growth: The Roh Government (1988-1992)
The political transition that South Korea faced after the election was a gradual one, however. The South 
Korean people elected the most conservative candidate, Roh Tae-woo, a former general and the previously 
designated successor to President Chun. He won over his rivals, politicians from the democracy movement 
who were unable to support a single candidate. Despite this, the new president was extreme different from 
past leaders, and demonstrated an elevated sensitivity to popular demand. Some called him “Fuzzy Roh,” 
highlighting a style of leadership that was much softer than the two previous authoritarian strongmen, Park 
Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. 
The popularly-elected President Roh worked on addressing the public’s concerns for the housing market and 
infrastructure. During his term, demand for further democratization poured out in many areas of society. In 
the economy, labor relations were particularly turbulent. 
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By the end of the 1980s, the South Korean people wanted to fully enjoy the benefits of the three-decades-
long economic development. Leading up to that point, many South Koreans sacrificed themselves for the 
sake of their communities, family, and country. That tradition began to change by the end of the 1980s. With 
an increased awareness of economic fairness, many South Koreans observed large real-estate investment 
gains. The causal mechanism for the property boom was simple: a rapidly growing population combined with 
increased wealth, due in part to a Middle East Oil Boom that brought U.S. dollars into South Korea through 
Korean-built construction projects in the Middle East, meant greater liquidity in the economy and a bolstered 
housing market. Those who could not acquire housing in newly built apartment buildings felt excluded 
from this prosperity. In response to the shifting public sentiment, the Roh government introduced plans 
to dramatically increase the housing market supply. To accommodate the public, the government planned 
and built gigantic residential satellite cities. Domestic housing construction, particularly that of apartment 
buildings, became an essential part of the national economy and mortgage financing became a central element 
of consumer banking businesses. 
The Roh government also needed to upgrade South Korea’s infrastructure. The country’s infrastructure until 
the late 1980s was built largely during the early period of industrialization. The economy had vastly expanded 
since then, and people’s expectations rose for higher-quality infrastructure. Thus the government initiated 
projects for building high-speed railways and a new main international airport. 
In the meantime, South Korean citizens prompted the labor market to rectify past practices, particularly 
practices that took place during the pre-democratization era, when the government, business leaders and 
the Korean public in general discouraged wage hikes and labor movements for the sake of industrialization. 
Laborers organized in large numbers to protest their past treatment. Two decades31 of underground 
movements had made labor leaders unusually confrontational. Some unions had turned increasingly militant 
since their official launch at the end of the 1980s. Subsequently, many labor leaders moved into politics, where 
most joined opposition and progressive parties, and few joined the conservative ruling party. As labor activism 
surged, labor costs dramatically increased. Many South Koreans came to believe the days of labor-intensive 
manufacturing were ending. 
31 South Korea’s labor movement dated back to the 1970s, but labor unions were not allowed to be formed until 1987.
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III.  Internationalization and Reform: Kim Young-sam (1993-1997) and  
Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002) Governments 
1.  Transparency and Internationalization:  
The Kim Young-sam Government (1993-1997)
As the Roh presidency ended, South Koreans elected Kim Young-sam as the new president; he was a 
prominent politician who had fought for democracy for decades. President Kim Young-sam acted against 
the political corruption that became entrenched under the two previous presidents, Chun and Roh. More 
than ever before, the South Korean people expected greater rule of law, heightened transparency, decreased 
corruption, and overall system maturity from their government. President Kim Young-sam responded to these 
expectations. 
For thirty years, from 1961 until 1992, former army generals ruled South Korea. President Kim Young-sam, 
the first full-term civilian president in three decades, had plenty of work to do to resolve past political issues. 
People demanded belated justice for the 1980 military coup that resulted in the death of many civilians. 
Previous presidents Chun and Roh stood trial for the coup and corruption that followed during their tenures 
as president. They had created large slush funds during their reigns and South Korean citizens wanted to 
separate from past corrupt-money practices in politics. President Kim’s Ministry of Justice held Chun and Roh 
accountable for their crimes and jailed both men. 
The popular sentiment of the South Korean people drove President Kim Young-sam to work on strengthening 
rule of law and building a new principles-based political system. The public expected him to build a political 
system that was driven not by the personal will of the president but by broad public consensus. President Kim 
Young-sam announced a government-wide initiative to upgrade the nation’s institutions, political system, and 
economy to global standards, hoping that this initiative would define his legacy. For this, he focused his efforts 
on South Korea joining the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). Even though 
it looked as if this initiative belonged to President Kim Young-sam, it resonated well with South Koreans’ 
desire to leave behind the country’s past challenges on the way to further democratization and economic 
development. For OECD membership, South Korea had to undertake an extensive range of economic 
liberalization, particularly in finance, and opened the country further to global financial flows.  
President Kim Young-sam streamlined an economic policy-making apparatus and reformed fiscal and 
financial systems. The most visible action was the introduction of a “real name” system for finance. Before 
the action, South Koreans could deposit money in other people’s names. This practice greatly compromised 
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transparency and justice. Abusers of the system could evade taxes and channel money for criminal purposes. 
Because of popular demand, both Presidents Chun and Roh tried to introduce the real-name finance system, 
but neither succeeded. Resistance from those with money and influence overturned their proposals. Kim 
Young-sam successfully implemented the reform in 1993 when he announced the measures overnight, 
without any prior notice, leaving no time for any opponents to organize against them. Actions were taken 
quickly and meticulously, allowing no room for reversal.
In 1995, President Kim Young-sam moved forward with a real-name system for real estate, as well; this sent 
another shockwave through the nation and earned more popular support. With the two real-name systems 
in place, South Korean citizens could no longer hide their wealth and financial transactions, and the country 
secured a foundation for tax justice. Money laundering and illegal transactions became much more difficult.  
Based on the government’s efforts to improve fiscal and financial systems, South Korea succeeded in joining 
the OECD in 1996. When the Asian financial crisis hit South Korea the following year, critics blamed South 
Korea’s excessive OECD-accession-related liberalization, claiming that it made the country vulnerable to 
speculative international capital flows.  
Before Kim Young-sam entered his office in 1992, he competed against two rivals in the campaign process. 
One of them was Chung Ju-yung, the founder of the Hyundai group of companies. While Chung’s bid excited 
some South Koreans, others questioned the increasing financial influence between businesses and politicians. 
Through investigations, the nation learned that a tremendous amount of money transferred from the hands of 
chaebols, South Korea’s family-owned conglomerates, into the pockets of politicians during the 1980s. 
The 1980s’ rapid economic growth led to various social imbalances, including the exponential growth 
of the chaebol conglomerates, along with regional imbalance and the growing wealth gap between those 
with property investments and those without. By the mid-1990s, a small number of chaebols generating a 
large amount of foreign earning in just a handful of industries made observers nervous about South Korea’s 
economic vulnerability to external shocks. Furthermore, weaknesses in the financial sector, which opened 
up before the 1996 OECD accession, received negative attention as well. Foreign borrowing became easier 
for South Korean banks, and they borrowed heavily from overseas and lent the money to large South Korean 
companies. This link between South Korean banks and foreign money triggered a credit-freeze chain reaction 
when the 1997 financial crisis hit East Asia. Sometime before then, a growing number of skeptics had already 
sensed that South Korea would soon face the consequences of its splendid economic success during the 1980s 
and 1990s.
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2. Rationalization and Reform: The Kim Dae-jung Government (1998-2002)
The consequences for South Korea’s economic success in the 1980s and the 1990s came sooner than most 
skeptics anticipated. The 1997 financial crisis was the biggest economic challenge that South Korea ever faced. 
South Korea declared a moratorium on loan payments to its external creditors and went to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. The IMF, together with leading economies of the world, came to South Korea’s 
rescue, promising to help South Korea reach greater financial liquidity. In return, the IMF put forward its 
“conditionalities” – primarily a demand to dramatically restructure the economy. The IMF conditions were 
painful to accept and implement, but the South Korean government, companies, and citizens fully cooperated. 
The sense of national crisis was widely shared. The public prioritized national interests and set aside personal 
interests. The South Korean people rose up, united, and did everything in their power to help the country. 
Even housewives brought precious metals out of their homes and donated them to the government in order to 
boost the country’s capital reserves.
South Korea chose a new national leader in the midst of this crisis. With a united popular response, the public 
expected the new president to offer decisive leadership and define a new economic turnaround. The new 
government of President Kim Dae-jung, the most progressive among the top presidential hopefuls for decades 
leading up to his election, surprised both supporters and critics when he announced a set of sweeping market-
friendly reforms. President Kim Dae-jung responded to those who saw problems with excessive, overlapping 
chaebol expansions; his economic reforms sought to further streamline the banking industry and strengthen 
the equity market. To those who argued for the need of domestic-demand-driven growth, the Kim Dae-jung 
government responded with policies for consumer credit expansion. Observers later argued that this policy 
direction triggered a dramatic increase of credit-card issuance.
Economists disagreed on the key causes of South Korea’s 1997 financial crisis. Many believed that South Korea 
faced a simple liquidity crisis as foreign exchange reserves dried up in the midst of an Asia-wide financial 
panic. Others thought the situation was the inevitable result of fundamental structural problems of the 
economy. The Kim Dae-jung government embraced the latter view. The government went as far as calling the 
crisis a “blessing in disguise,” an opportunity to address structural impediments and overhaul the economy 
for long-term sustainability. The government’s vision for the future was reasonably coherent: a smaller 
government that did not dictate the business and financial sector, chaebols that accepted more transparent 
corporate-governance systems and tightened corporate finance, and a financial sector where banking and 
equity markets developed simultaneously. 
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The Kim Dae-jung government named their initiative “4 Sector Reform” because it targeted reforms in 
the corporate, labor, financial, and public sectors. The government asked various chaebols to sell poorly 
performing businesses and close highly leveraged subsidiaries. This drove parts manufacturers, suppliers, 
and contractors out of business. Unemployment skyrocketed and people were driven out of what they once 
believed to be life-time jobs. Furthermore, the government simply shut down numerous banks, and sold many 
of the remaining banks to new owners, including foreign investors.
The government also requested that corporations should rely on shareholders instead of borrowing from 
banks. This required open and transparent corporate governance. The South Korea government asked banks 
to strengthen independent loan evaluation rather than relying on government guidance. Corporations and 
banks were asked to forget about the “too big to fail” myth. The government knew that it now had to let 
some of South Korea’s biggest and most-indebted companies go bankrupt. Eventually, banks reduced their 
dependency on corporate loans and focused more on consumer banking. Across the economy, South Korea 
encouraged transparency and openness. 
Transparency went hand in hand with technological development. Expanding infrastructure for online 
financial settlements resulted in tax collectors securing greater monitoring ability. Additionally, the government 
encouraged consumers to use credit cards. Increased credit-card use further enhanced transparency since all 
transactions were recorded, unlike cash purchases; it also opened a promising new revenue source for banks. 
As the equity market played a greater role for corporate finance, banks had to find new avenues for the future: 
they promoted consumer retail banking and assisted the credit card boom. The government hoped greater 
consumer borrowing would lead to greater consumer demand, but instead it led to an alarming growth of 
consumer debt at the beginning of the 21st century.
IV. Applying South Korea’s Experience to Theory and Practice
South Korea’s experience revealed that, for an economy or a company to work toward sustained and 
sustainable economic development, beyond following a formula of market liberalization, financial-sector 
restructuring, housing construction, or other standard “remedies,” its members, subunits, and groups must 
act together. The leadership may need to enact top-down mobilization by allocating and setting the direction 
for resources, and the people have to demand socially-positive performance from their leadership, channeling 
their demands from the bottom up. Bottom-up demand channeling requires that the public engage in a dialog 
about their collective interests and ways to make their collective action feasible. South Korea’s experience 
demonstrates that development is largely about mobilizing the nation. Successful mobilization includes 
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the population’s willingness to set aside varying personal interests and act together for a shared cause. As 
exemplified in South Korea, a people’s persistent expectations for the government’s performance can force one 
leader after another to deliver what the people want and the country needs. 
1. Preconditions for Top-down Mobilization and Bottom-up Demand Channeling
To develop a society in which the mechanism of top-down mobilization and bottom-up demand channeling 
could work together, South Koreans continuously enacted active social discourse, sometimes beneath the 
surface and other times openly. The media played a critical role in the process of social discourse, ever since 
Japan’s colonial rule. Even in times of political oppression, journalist and intellectuals never ceased searching 
for ways to define collective interests and to align interests at different levels of society, both national and 
individual, articulating what the country should do collectively and what individual South Koreans should do 
to help the common cause. For this discussion to continue to take place in South Korea, an educated public 
must take part in the conversation. For other countries to draw lessons from the South Korean experience, 
they must examine how macro issues and micro interests have been discussed through collective discourse in 
South Korea. 
Most importantly, to achieve sustainable development, countries need to examine – in South Korea’s 
experience and elsewhere – how they can create more opportunities for empowering their population so that 
individuals have the ability to make demands for their needs. South Korea’s story during the second half of 
the 20th century focused on its people demanding changes from their leadership. It is critical for all countries 
seeking sustainable development to empower their populations and allow them to take ownership over the 
nation through democracy. Democracy may take different forms at different stages of national development, 
but the spirit of democracy has always been to make the people see themselves as proactive owners of their 
nation, demanding that politicians ensure sustainable development for all. 
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I. Human Capital and Development in South Korea 
1. Sustainable Development and Human Capital 
Sustainable development requires economic prosperity, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability, 
which should be harmonized each other, as indicated in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (United Nations General Assembly 2015). All goals and targets to be achieved should be pursued 
by and for people. In this sense, human capital is a vital component to sustainable development. Human capital 
refers to the various dimensions that a human being can contribute to a society, accumulated through the 
qualitative dimensions of an individual, such as education, vocational skills, health, culture, and values. 
Human capital develops primarily through improved education and training. Education includes formal 
schooling and any activity that seeks to develop knowledge, skills, perspectives, and values that empower 
learners of all ages to assume responsibility for creating a sustainable future (UNESCO 2010, p.19). This 
expanded conception of education frequently results in increased employment and income and decreased 
income inequality (Becker 1993; Lee & Francisco 2010). 
A sustainable economy requires a literate population that is equipped with proper vocational training, which 
fosters rapid technological progress across a broad spectrum of industries. A properly trained workforce can 
adapt to changing market demands; it can also exploit and benefit from innovative technologies for clean 
energy, the environment, health, and infrastructure (International Labour Office 2010). The economy cannot 
sustain itself without technological progress, which alters and enhances production capabilities. Technological 
and scientific breakthroughs result from the research and development of talented, educated people who are 
supported by public institutions or private businesses. 
2. Human Capital in South Korea
The experience of the Republic of Korea in the latter half of the 20th century reveals a remarkable feat of 
sustained developmental growth. A series of combined efforts contributed to South Korea’s sustained growth, 
and it is impossible to exclude the development of human capital through multiple educational programs from 
those efforts. 
South Korea faced many difficulties in the initial stage of education development, most of which are explained 
by South Korea’s history and traditions. Traditionally, South Korean students attended school and college to 
acquire white-collar jobs, resulting in a limited blue-collar workforce, including few technicians or vocationally-
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trained workers in industries. Additionally, the Japanese colonial rule prohibited Korea from accumulating 
capital for industrial development, and the Korean War severely devastated the country’s economic and 
social infrastructure. The first government of the Republic of Korea, established in 1948, laid grounds for a 
modernized liberal democracy and market economy. Later, the military government that took power in 1961 
implemented a series of economic development drives which transformed the structure of the economy.  
Within a decade after the establishment of government, South Korea successfully universalized mandatory 
education. Consequently, more than 80 percent of the country’s youth attended secondary schools by the 
mid-1980s, and more than 50 percent of high school graduates advanced to tertiary education by the mid-
1990s. South Korea now has the highest enrollment rate for higher education in the world. Moreover, in 2010, 
South Korea ranked third in the world in terms of average years of schooling for the working-age population, 
after New Zealand and the United States. A more-educated public also resulted in a dramatic change in the 
composition of workers. In 1980, more than 50 percent of the workforce was made up of graduates from 
primary or lower secondary education, and only 6.7 percent of the workforce had received some amount 
of tertiary education. By 1987, workers with upper secondary education composed 33.9 percent of the 
workforce, exceeding those with only primary or lower-secondary education (33.7 percent), for the first time. 
By 2011, university graduates composed 40 percent of the workforce, exceeding the 39.8 percent of high 
school graduates (Statistics Korea). 
After transforming itself from an agricultural to an industrialized country by the 1980s, South Korea invested 
even more in human capital in order to continue national innovation. After 2000, the number of researchers 
in the population rapidly grew. In the mid-1990s, South Korea’s ratio of researchers to population was 
smaller than that of other advanced countries, but South Korea surpassed most other countries by 2010. An 
international comparison of the size of investment in research and development (R&D) revealed that, in 2018, 
South Korea ranked fifth in the world, following the United States, China, Japan, and Germany (National 
Science & Technology Information Service 2018). 
South Korea’s expanded education also increased student performance scores and equity. The results of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Program for International Student 
Achievement (PISA) tests in 2015 showed that South Korea is one of the five highest performing OECD 
countries in science, mathematics, and reading. In addition, the relationship between test scores of students 
and their socio-economic status in South Korea is below the average of other advanced countries, which 
means South Korea has a comparatively equitable educational system among advanced countries (OECD 
2018). 
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With the successful universalization of basic education within a short period of time, the South Korean 
government monitored the sequential expansion of secondary and tertiary education under its centralized 
bureaucratic administration system. The government also considered the supply and demand for manpower 
and distributed the student population across academic disciplines in order to meet workforce demand. 
During the developmental stage, the participation of private schools and households supplemented the 
shortage of the government’s financial resources. Technical assistance and financial support from foreign 
countries also helped South Korea strengthen its education and training capacity. Vocational training 
contributed to building a new culture for technicians who were indispensable for the modernization and 
industrialization of South Korea. Government-targeted industries were supported by the manpower policies 
of related ministries and vocational education, and the National Technical Qualification System’s close 
relationship with industry prompted specific training for skilled workers. Government-led skills development 
strategies contributed significantly to closing the productivity gap. Investment for skill development, R&D, 
and general education was a critical factor for national innovation. 
II. Expanding Education with Equality 
1. Early Focus on Literacy and Basic Education 
After liberation from the Japanese, the illiteracy rate in South Korea was approximately 80 percent. South 
Koreans suffered under the imposed official language of Japanese during the colonial period and a lack of 
educational opportunities. After the liberation in 1945, Korean was adopted as the official language and 
the government focused on two educational tracks with a strong emphasis on literacy: mandatory primary 
education for children and literacy education for adults. Literacy is a key element of economic growth and 
sound societal governance. Literacy can help eliminate poverty, raise the standard of living, and prompt self-
efficacy and social participation. For example, once a population can read and write, they can understand 
manufacturing-site manuals, medical prescriptions, improve their knowledge of products before purchasing, 
and better educate themselves before voting for government officials. 
In 1949, the government enacted the National Education Law which established Citizenship Training Schools 
across the country. Citizenship Training Schools were three-year elementary school programs for illiterate 
adults, located especially in rural areas. Farmers had to attend at least one 200-hour class for a minimum of 70 
days. Training Schools offered most classes during off-season in winter. Table 4.1 charts the progression of the 
illiteracy rate from 1945 to 1958. The illiteracy rate dropped to 4.1 percent by 1958, according to the education 
ministry.
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Table 4.1  Illiteracy Rate in Korea from 1945 to 1958
Year Population above age 12 Number of the illiterate Illiteracy rate
1945 10,253,138 7,980,902 77.8
1948 13,087,405 5,411,080 41.3
1953 12,269,739 3,145,259 25.6
1954 12,269,739 1,709,020 13.9
1955 12,269,739 1,524,041 12.5
1956 13,911,678 1,419,205 10.2
1957 13,713,873 1,145,293 8.3
1958 13,713,873 562,982 4.1
Source: Ministry of Education 1958; Kim 2015, p.120
The National Education Law also required that every child, beginning at age six, attend elementary school, 
but the plan faced many challenges, including the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and a lack of financial 
resources from the government. Even worse, many families could not afford to pay tuition, and parents usually 
prioritized sending the eldest boy to school. Thus many girls and younger siblings did not receive formal 
education. As soon as the Korean War ended, however, the government enforced mandatory education 
more actively with a Six-year Compulsory Education Expansion Plan that lasted from 1954 to 1959. Parents 
or guardians now risked fines if they did not send their children to schools. The plan targeted a 90 percent 
enrollment of elementary school-aged children by 1959. The government allocated approximately 80 percent 
of the educational budget for compulsory education and spent most foreign aid for education on repairing or 
building classrooms. Owing to strong law enforcement from the government and the support of families, by 
1957 the enrollment rate surpassed 90 percent and, in 1959, reached 96.4 percent (Lee et al. 2010, p.73).
The new and repaired classrooms, however, were not enough to accommodate all new students. During this 
period, 40 percent of all classrooms were utilized for double or triple shifts per day,33 and the classes were 
overcrowded, with more than 100 students packed into small classrooms in some urban areas. To tackle a 
shortage of teachers, the government established temporary teacher training centers and “Normal Schools” at 
the secondary level for training elementary school teachers. Although it was important to establish logistics 
for the National Education Law, such as classrooms, teachers, and textbooks, it was more important to 
emphasize the significance of education in setting the next generation free from ignorance and poverty. 
33  Typically, schools operated two to four different batches of classes. After one batch of students attended morning 
class, another batch of students attended afternoon class in the same room. 
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A belief that only education can liberate the children from vicious cycle of poverty brought them into 
the classroom. People believed that new opportunities and values created by economic growth would be 
distributed to individuals on the basis of merit and accomplishments that cannot be achieved without 
education and learning. The following sections explain how education and the South Korean economy 
developed together, reinforcing each other: human capital was the nexus of development.     
2. Sequential Expansion 
After successfully universalizing basic education, the government expanded its focus on education 
sequentially, moving through secondary, to vocational, and then tertiary education. An increasing enrollment 
rate at each education level followed the trends of prior levels. Enrollment in higher education stabilized by 
the 1980s because of a strong intervention system the Park government established in 1961. 
When the Park government initiated a strong economic and industrial policy, national leaders realized that 
the education system failed to supply the necessary qualified workforce, so they established a centralized 
control system for public and private schools. The government enforced new enactments and regulations 
for admission, graduation, curriculum, teacher qualification, and supervision for all education levels. South 
Korea also institutionalized a coordination mechanism between education and industry; this included an 
enrollment quota system by majors and universities, a national skills qualification system, and university and 
industry cooperation. During the 1960s, the government encouraged the establishment of new secondary 
and vocational schools, closed down several underperforming colleges, and transformed some colleges into 
vocational institutions. 
Increased primary-education enrollment in the 1950s resulted in increased demand for secondary education, 
making admissions highly competitive. In the 1960s and 1970s, parents who could afford private tutors 
hired them for their children to better prepare for middle and high school entrance examinations. In order 
to relieve the burden of private tutoring and to prevent unfair admission practices, the government replaced 
the entrance examination system with an admittance lottery for middle schools in 1969, and for high schools 
in 1974. The government also made all schools, including private institutions, qualitatively equal in terms 
of teachers, funding, facilities, and curriculum. This equalization policy resulted in a less costly admission 
process for secondary schools. More than 90 percent of elementary graduates advanced to middle school in 
1979, and the same ratio of middle-school graduates advanced to high school in 1985. Thus, universalized 
secondary education guaranteed access to education for the general population, provided South Korea with 
more equitable workforce opportunities, and accumulated more human capital for the economy.
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This rapid expansion of education opportunities, however, was, to some extent, at the expense of education 
quality. Classrooms were over-crowded and teachers were overwhelmed with students. In the 1960s, the 
average number of students per classroom was 65.4 in elementary schools, 60.7 in middle schools, and 59.8 in 
general high schools. The ratio of students to teachers was 62.4 to 1 in elementary schools, 39.4 to 1 in middle 
schools, and 32.2 to 1 in general high schools. 
The government gradually expanded tertiary education, especially junior colleges, in response to increasing 
industrial demands for advanced technicians during the late 1970s. Higher education opportunities remained 
limited, however, and college admission was competitive. Once again, most households paid for private tutors, 
which affected educational opportunities and social equity. 
Finding itself at the threshold of technological progress and a new economy in the 1980s, South Korea needed 
to nurture globally competitive scientists and engineers; this called for expanding access to tertiary education. 
In July 1980, the new military government announced comprehensive education reforms, including the 
expansion of higher education enrollment. In the 1981 academic year, the total number of students in 
tertiary education grew by 29.4 percent compared to the previous year. In addition to increasing the number 
of colleges and universities, a policy change to the graduates-quota system, beginning with the freshmen 
quota, also contributed to the expansion of higher education opportunities.34 Under a new and temporary 
scheme, higher education institutions were allowed to recruit 30 percent more freshmen than the targeted 
number of graduates. The authorities expected it could promote a competitive learning environment among 
students, and bring in more tuition revenue for institutions as well. The reforms also banned private tutoring 
and abolished written tests administered by individual universities in order to relieve students of the burden 
of extra educational spending. As a result, the net enrollment rate in tertiary education jumped from 6.7 
percent in 1975 to 11.4 percent in 1980 and 22.9 percent in 1985. In the 1990s, deregulation of the operations 
of higher-education institutions, such as simplifying the process of establishing a new university or relaxing 
regional universities’ student-enrollment limits, led to achieving 52.5 percent enrollment by 2000, at which 
point tertiary education was considered universalized. 
These expanded higher education opportunities – the government’s response to rising economic and social 
demands in the 1980s – contributed to South Korea’s economic growth and social mobility. Moreover, 
universalized higher education promoted citizen monitoring of political power and encouraged democratic 
 
34  Beginning in the early 1960s, the education ministry approved the number of freshmen or graduates for each 
institution and its department every year, based upon individual institutions’ faculty and facility capacities and national 
manpower forecasting. 
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participation in community activities. The advancement of higher education contributed to a peaceful 
transition of autocratic governments in 1988 and the launch of a democratic and civil government in 1993. 
3. Active Private Sector Participation
The active participation of the private sector was another important factor in the development of South 
Korea’s human capital. Public sector resources by themselves could not provide a free education for the entire 
population. In the 1950s and 1960s, government resources insufficiently covered even universal primary 
schooling, let alone secondary or tertiary education. While the government concentrated on expanding access 
to elementary schooling, the private sector filled the gaps for secondary and tertiary schooling. Many donors 
and households shared the financial burden by donating their land and assets to build secondary schools 
and colleges. From 1955 to 1967, Korea established an equal number of private and public schools, although 
private participation was more active in higher education. The lack of educational opportunities during the 
Japanese colonial rule turned into a national private education movement immediately after liberation. From 
1946 to 1960, 32 private universities were reopened or newly established. Active private sector donations 
resulted in 74 percent of college students and 59 percent of high school students enrolling in private schools 
in 1980. In general, households were also important stakeholders in public education, sharing the burden of 
expenses, such as tuition, Parent and Teacher Association fees, textbooks, and special activity fees. In fact, 
educational expenses paid by households almost equaled the size of the education budget of the government. 
Also, after 1950, the effect of land reforms on human capital accumulation cannot be ignored. Thanks to the 
restructuring of land ownership, tenant farmers transformed into independent farmers and their incomes 
increased. As their incomes rose, farmers could send more of their children to schools, spending more on 
education than any other household expenses. Thus, education became the most important vehicle for social 
mobility and income equality in the South Korean society.
4. Effective Education Financing System 
The South Korean government effectively utilized foreign financial and human resources to establish basic 
educational infrastructure and build policy capacity for sustainable conditions. Foreign aid and technical 
assistance supplemented scarce domestic financial resources and weak educational leadership. From 1952 to 
1963, the South Korean government received about USD 100,000,000 in official aid for education. Education 
authorities prioritized investment in building and repairing classrooms, which consumed the largest portion 
of donor funding, USD 70,000,000. South Korea invested the second largest portion, USD 19,000,000, in 
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tertiary education institutions, including Seoul National University. South Korea allocated another USD 
9,000,000 to teacher education, in partnership with the George Peabody Teacher College, and USD 7,800,000 
for materials for vocational education (McGinn et al. 1980). 
During the 1960s, the South Korean government began to rely on loans rather than foreign aid. From 
1959 to 1999, South Korea allocated 4.6 percent of public loans from multilateral development banks and 
foreign governments to human-capital building, such as education, R&D, and health. In education, relevant 
authorities utilized these borrowed resources mainly to modernize vocational and technical education 
facilities and to support tertiary education. Specifically, training facilities and R&D equipment accounted for 
94 percent of total borrowing (Lee 2004). 
Meanwhile, to secure finances for education, the government legislated the Educational Grant Act in 1971 
which automatically allocated a certain percentage of the national tax revenue to the education budget. To 
enhance educational equality among regions and stabilize the education budget, the central government 
provided the most funding of regional governments for their primary and secondary schooling by linking 
the resources with domestic tax revenue. The percentage of total domestic tax allocated to finance regional 
education, originally 12.98 percent in 1971, increased to 13 percent in 2000, and 20.27 percent in 2010.  
III. Linking Education to the Economy
1. Difficulties in the Early Stages
Even though universalized primary education provided light manufacturing industries with an adequate 
workforce, the economy still needed skilled workers to transition to technology-intensive heavy and chemical 
industries. Most South Koreans looked down on vocational education or technical training because of the 
deep-rooted tradition of Confucianism, which praised scholars of the humanities and agriculture and had 
little regard for manufacturing and trade professions. In spite of liberation and the establishment of a modern 
government, this legacy of Confucianism prevented economic transformation. Even in the 1970s, industries 
lacked skilled workers, while many college graduates remained unemployed. A report prepared by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology in 1972 pointed out that problems included a lack of skills in primary-
school graduates who did not move on to secondary education, a lack of a practical ways to utilize secondary-
school graduates as professional technicians, an unclear role for vocational high schools, and a need to revise 
the system to allow practical education and field experience in tertiary educational institutions (Hong et al. 
2013; Ministry of Science and Technology 1972).
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2. Building a New Culture 
In the early 1970s, the government pledged to mobilize a heavy-manufacturing and chemicals industrialization 
drive, but still lacked enough technical workers to realize its ambitions. The shortage of technical personnel in 
industrial fields stemmed from the population’s negative attitude toward blue-collar workers. To change this 
mindset and boost manufacturing industries, the government grouped skilled workers into three categories: 
craftsmen, technicians, and engineers. In the 1970s, South Korea rebranded all blue-collar workers as “technical 
professionals” and, through a national campaign, praised them as “flag-bearers – or forerunners – of [the] 
modernization of the country” (Maeil Kyungjie Shinmun 1977).
The primary objective of the national campaign, called the “scientification movement,” was to “change the 
mode of thinking and living among the [Korean] people.” The campaign wanted all people, from housewives to 
scientists, to acquire and apply practical technical skills. South Korea’s professional workers, the highest level 
among technical personnel, were asked to reach beyond domestic borders to gain “internationally recognized 
qualifications.” One of the responsibilities of technical personnel included a proficiency in adaptable skills for 
new technology that could contribute to national development through R&D for new industrial technology 
(Cho 2010, p.92; Song 2008).
Moreover, when the Economic Planning Board (EPB) announced six Economic Development Plans during the 
period of 1962 to 1997, the plans were supported by manpower forecasting and skill-development plans from 
several ministries. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Ministry of Education (MOE) 
forecasted manpower supply and demand for craftsmen, technicians, and engineers of every industry; the 
ministries filled gaps by controlling the number of graduates from high schools and colleges in certain academic 
fields. Policy-makers gathered predictions on demand for manpower and prepared a supply plan that aimed to 
meet those needs. Government officials, businessmen, and experts seriously and periodically monitored plan 
progress. The monitoring mechanism for the plans was much more important than the plan itself. 
The first Manpower Development Plan in 1962 emphasized supplying engineers by increasing the quota for 
science and engineering freshmen in universities and the number of graduates from technical high schools. 
The plan also included in-plant vocational training and technical training in the military. In 1967, the second 
plan decreased the quantitative expansion of colleges and general high schools, strengthened the quality of 
education in science and technology, and supported the expansion of vocational training. The third and fourth 
plans in the 1970s, a period of heavy and chemical industrialization, focused on high education for a larger 
supply of skilled workers. The third plan specifically underscored the importance of university and graduate 
school education, reinforcing the education system for skill development and securing specialized manpower 
in medicine, teaching, and marine technology. In 1977, the fourth plan highlighted graduate school education 
Chapter 4. South Korea Accumulates Human Capital for Sustainable Development
KDI School of Public Policy and Management  117
for fostering scientists, specialized universities to secure engineers in the heavy and chemical industries, 
technical high schools to promote middle-level engineers, the necessity of technical universities, and the 
improvement of the National Technical Qualifications System. 
In the 1980s, to meet the demand for technology-intensive industries, the fifth and sixth plans emphasized 
securing human capital in order to adapt to industries’ technological changes. The government planned to 
increase overseas technical training in advanced economies and to invite more experts from overseas. The sixth 
plan aimed to secure high-level scientists and technicians who could lead technical innovation and expand the 
number of research personnel with doctoral degrees in engineering (Lee & Hong 2013, pp.45-48; Kim 2002).
In the freshmen quota system, the Ministry of Education determined the number of freshmen admitted into 
each department of each university. In principle, when distributing students, the ministry considered the 
demand from the government’s strategic industries, other industries, and institutions’ regional conditions. The 
Special Act on Education, prepared by a military ruling committee in 1961, authorized the education ministry 
to adjust the number of classes and students of public and private colleges. A presidential decree confirmed 
this control in 1966; it lasted more than 20 years before it was eased in 1990. 
3. Vocational Education System
To strengthen the link between educational institutions and industry, the government legislated the Industrial 
Education Promotion Act on September 19, 1963. The act included the promotion of vocational education by 
central and local governments, provided funds for experiments and practice, required teacher qualifications, 
and created scholarships. It also established the Central Industrial Education Council, which invited experts 
from various industries to ensure that curriculum reflected the experience of the industrial sector (Lee & 
Hong 2013, p.71).
The government also initiated the Science and Technology Education Promotion Plan for vocational 
training, which lasted from 1967 to 1971. The plan fostered scientific creativity, promoted science in daily 
life, accelerated technological innovation and scientific inventions, and cultivated scientific capabilities for 
technicians. It focused especially on expanding industrial vocational high schools to increase the supply 
of technical manpower. It also allowed an increase in the enrollment quota of science and engineering 
universities and established more industrial related majors in high schools and colleges. South Korea also 
enacted new legislation for guidelines for science experiments and practical lessons for school students and 
promoted industry-education cooperation at the tertiary level (Lee & Hong 2013, p.71). 
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When the Park government initiated economic development plans in the 1960s, the government also 
emphasized the practical uses of education and curriculum. The second educational curriculum, started in 
1963, highlighted life experience rather than academics. The reform also developed a special curriculum for 
vocational high schools, offering an increased number of specialized subjects to promote practical skills and 
technologies. The third revision also strengthened job-readiness education through obligatory field experience 
and national engineer certification examinations (Lee & Hong 2013, pp.52-54). 
The Specialization Initiatives for Technical High Schools (SITHS) was another project to bring education 
and industry closer. South Korea adopted the SITHS to support the heavy-manufacturing and chemical 
industrialization policy of the 1970s. The quality of vocational schools at the time was not high enough to 
nurture the skilled workers needed in industrial sites, and policymakers found it too difficult to enhance the 
quality of all schools at the same time. Thus, the government rejected a one-size-fits-all approach and adopted 
a “selection and concentration strategy” instead. With limited resources, the government invested in a small 
number of institutions to foster a higher chance of successful vocational education. 
In 1973, the SITHS divided technical high schools into four categories: mechanical technical high schools, 
experimental schools, specialized schools, and generalized high schools. Mechanical technical high schools 
developed precision workers for the machinery and defense industries. Specialized technical high schools 
nurtured technicians for the electronics, chemicals, construction, iron, and railways sectors. Experimental 
technical high schools trained manpower to work overseas. Experimental schools, at least one designated for 
each province, served as models for exemplary school management, which hopefully would translate to other 
general technical high schools (Kim 1992; Kim 2002; Lee & Hong 2013, p.74; MOE 1980). 
4. WorldSkills Competitions and Job Qualifications 
To encourage participation with modern technology, beginning in 1967, the government prepared young 
technicians for WorldSkills Competitions.35 South Korea hailed WorldSkills medalists as heroes, parading 
them from the airport to the city to be welcomed by the president. Additionally, some students in vocational 
schools benefited from full scholarships, dormitories, and stipends. Government officials often visited 
schools to encourage students and teachers, and awarded presidential scholarships to students who acquired 
precision licenses. The strong support for vocational education garnered many talented students, often from 
 
35  WorldSkills coordinates a biennial global championship for vocational skills where young people compete in different 
professional trades, including technology, electronics, mechanics, construction, and many other skills (WorldSkills 
2018). 
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underprivileged and rural area; it also opened up new career paths for technicians. Rewarded with stable jobs, 
graduates from vocational schools went on to form the South Korean middle class (Ryu & Kim 2011). 
The National Technical Qualification System (NTQ), installed in 1973, also promoted vocational and 
technical training. The Ministry of Science and Technology devised the system to cultivate technical talents 
for industrials fields. The NTQ categorized technical sectors into engineers and technicians, and all students 
of technical colleges, technical high schools, and vocational schools had to take the NTQ examination before 
graduation. Those who passed received employment opportunities. Engineers and technicians with the 
highest qualifications of Professional Engineer or Master Craftsman were considered to be equivalent with 
academic PhDs. This system corroded deeply rooted disdain for blue-collar workers and increased respect for 
technicians and skilled workers. 
Table 4.2  Changes to Qualification Systems by Stage
Stage Technical, Vocational Education and Training (TVET)
National Technical Qualification (NTQ) 
System
Before NTQ 
(1945-1972) 
- Fostering technicians 
-  Infrastructure for technical training 
(vocational training centers by aid and 
loans)
- license system by individual industry acts 
- Introduction of certified technician system 
-  Promotion of skilled personnel assisting 
certified technicians 
Introduction 
of NTQ 
(1973-1981) 
-  Expanding technical high schools, 
technical skills university and 24 public 
training centers 
-  Operating national skills competition and 
participating World Skills Olympics 
-  Legislation of the National Technical 
Qualification Act and implementation 
agency   
-  Integrating the qualification items in all 
industrial areas, and adopted the grades 
for skill levels 
-  Reinforcing regulations (the prohibition of 
similar or overlapping qualification items 
Development 
of NTQ 
(1982-1997) 
-  Training course to foster high-level skilled 
personnel 
-  Industry-academic cooperation course 
and training course for incumbents 
-  Refresher training, qualification renewal 
system 
-  Service area added to technology and 
skill 
- Establishment of irregular test system 
-  Computerization of item bank and 
operation of qualification information 
system 
Maturity
of NTQ 
(1998) 
-  Needs for in-service program for 
unemployed, and employee   
- Training for incumbents 
-  Course for re-employment and vocational 
training for seniors 
- Reorganization of 5-grade system 
- Diversification of testing techniques 
- Easing qualifications for exam 
- New qualification items in service area 
- Commissioned tests for specialized items 
Source: Park et al. 2012
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5. Employee Training  
The public and private sectors of South Korea also jointly worked to improve workers’ industrial skills. In 
1967, the Vocational Training Act required companies to train their employees with specific qualification 
instructors, public training institutes, and in-company training facilities. The number of training recipients 
increased from 10,000 in 1967 to 30,000 in 1970. Both public vocational training and private in-plant 
vocational training, however, relied heavily on government budgets or subsidies; this raised concerns about 
training-program sustainability (Lee 2005; Ra & Kang 2012). In order to address the shortage of skilled 
workers more forcefully, the Vocational Training Special Measures Act was adopted in 1975. The new 
measure required enterprises in certain industries and with more than 500 employees to provide self-funded 
in-plant vocational training programs.36 
In 1976, the Basic Vocational Training Act merged the Vocational Training Act with the Vocational Training 
Special Measures Act, extending the latter’s scope to companies with 300 or more employees. The 1976 Act 
also entitled the government to annually decide the number of trainees for each company, reflecting demands 
for skilled workers within 10 percent of the total workforce. Enterprises could now pay training levies instead 
of complying with in-plant training requirements. In 1978, about 70 percent of relevant companies operated 
in-plant programs, while the rest of them chose to pay levies (Ra & Kang 2012, pp.32-34). By 1986, two-thirds 
of the enterprises required to provide in-plant training chose, instead, to pay training levies (Lee 2005).37 
In addition, to tackle the shortage of financial resources and technical expertise, the government set up 
vocational training centers with grant support from Germany in 1971 and Japan and Belgium in 1976, and 
loans from the Asian Development Bank from 1973 to 1976, and the World Bank from 1977 to 1980 (Ra & 
Kang 2012, pp.36-39). 
In the 1990s, the, advances in information and communication technology (ICT) and dynamic global 
value chains changed the circumstances of the knowledge-based global economy, and the South Korean 
government realized it needed to shift its skill-development strategy toward bringing in more active 
participation from the private sector. With the 1994 adoption of the Industrial Manpower Supply and Skills 
Development Restructuring Plan, businesses could take a leading role in adopting a voluntary training 
36  Those industries are mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply, construction, transportation, storage, 
communications, and services (Ra & Kang 2012).
37  Many developing countries in Latin America, which implemented a training levy system, set up independent public 
vocational training agencies that used collected training levies. However, the agencies’ financial independence 
prevented them from responding to enterprises’ demands to provide training courses, instructors, location, and 
equipment, thereby exposing their weaknesses, such as low training practicality and efficiency (Ra & Kang 2012, p. 
43).
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program for their employees and the government could support private sector efforts through an incentive 
system. In the following year, the government introduced the Employment Insurance System, which replaced 
the mandatory vocational training system. Additionally, the focus on skills development shifted from training 
a new workforce to supporting lifelong skills for incumbent workers. All enterprises shared an obligation to 
pay vocational training levies but had the opportunity for levies to be refunded upon provisional training (Ra 
& Kang 2012, pp.46-47). 
The vocational skills development system continues to accommodate the needs of workers and their new 
working conditions. The government established the Workers Vocational Training Promotion Act in 1997 
and the Workers Skills Development Act in 2004. Table 4.3 outlines the changes in vocational training systems 
from the 1960s to the 2000s. 
Table 4.3  Changes in Vocational Training System
Economic backgrounds Strategies for Skill development
Enactment and revision of 
legislation
1960s
- 1st, 2nd EDP
-  Shift from agriculture to light 
industry
-  Rising demands for workers  
- Vocational high schools
-  New vocational training 
system 
-  Vocational training subsidy 
system
-  Vocational Training Act 
(1967)
1970s
3rd, 4th EDP
- Shift to HCI
-  Serious shortage of skilled 
workers
-  Unlimited supply of unskilled 
workers from rural to urban 
areas
-  Strengthening vocational 
education, and public 
training centers
-  Obligatory training system 
of business and training levy 
system
-  Vocational Training Special 
Measures Act (1974) 
-  Basic Vocational Training Act 
(1976) 
-  Vocational Training 
Promotion Fund Act (1976)
1980s
5th , 6th EDP 
- Stabilization,
-  Transition to high-tech 
industries
-  Falling demand for in-plant 
vocational training
-  Reinforcement of public 
vocational training (Korea 
Vocational Training 
Management Agency, 1982) 
-  Advanced vocational training 
courses (master craftsman 
courses)
-  4th amendment to Basic 
Vocational Training Act 
(1987)
1990s
-  Moderate growth low and 
unemployment 
- Economic crisis of 1997
-  Growing need to raise 
incumbent workers’ skill 
levels
-  Incentive for voluntary 
vocational training by 
employers 
-  Training as social safety net 
for unemployed people
-  Employment Insurance Act 
(1995) 
-  Workers Vocational Training 
Promotion Act (1999)
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Economic backgrounds Strategies for Skill development
Enactment and revision of 
legislation
2000s
-  Knowledge-based global 
economy,  
- Sluggish growth
- Flexible labor market
-  Lifelong vocational training 
system
-  Strengthening of training for 
vulnerable groups
-  Workers Vocational Skills 
Development Act (2004)
Source: Ra & Kang 2012
IV. Promoting Brain Gain  
1. Studying Abroad
At the initial stage of development, South Korean society faced what is referred to as “brain drain” when it lost 
many of its students to study abroad. After the end of the Korean War in 1953, the United States (U.S.) began 
to receive an influx of South Korean students. From 1953 to 1967, approximately 8000 students left to study 
abroad (Table 4.4); this was comparable to the total number (9096) of undergraduate students enrolled in 
Seoul National University in 1966. Among them, only 12.2 percent returned to South Korea. 
Table 4.4  Number of South Korean Students in US
Year No. of South Korean Students
1950 302
1960 2310
1970 3857
1980 6150
1990 23360
2000 59022
Source: Cho 2010; Institute of International Education, Open Doors.
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2. Active Programs to Promote Brain Gain 
The increasing number of students who left the country to study abroad were initially regarded as “brain 
drain.” These students, however, later became a reservoir for “brain gain” and could function as priming 
water for “brain circulation,” a term defined as the flow of high caliber talent from one country to another 
(Saxenian 2002). Many experts acknowledged that a skilled workforce would expedite the socio-economic 
transformation of a poor agriculture-based economy.38 In addition to establishing a modernized educational 
system, the government sent students abroad for training and invited foreign experts to design new systems 
for technological advances. The Seoul National University (SNU) project, the Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology (KIST) project, and the Korea Advanced Institute of Science project (KAIS) project supported by 
the U.S. government accelerated brain circulation between the U.S. and South Korea. 
The South Korean and American governments initiated the SNU project, undertaken by the University of 
Minnesota, in 1954. American professors acted as consultants, residing in South Korea and molding the SNU 
after the American university model. They oversaw the construction of buildings, procured necessary research 
materials, and selected South Korean professors for an American education that would bring them up to date with 
current research, legitimize their expertise, and identify them as conduits of modern education (Cho 2010, p.37).
The SNU project was undertaken over six academic years, with the first class entering in the 1955-1956 
academic year and the last entering in 1960-1961. The first phase involved training teaching staff at the 
SNU’s schools of medicine, agriculture, and engineering, with veterinary medicine and nursing as subfields. 
The second phase of the project worked to establish the School of Public Administration, which included 
recruiting new faculty members. South Korea contracted University of Minnesota professors to develop the 
new departments and choose its first faculty members, who were immediately sent to Minnesota for training. 
Participants for the second phase came from South Korean bureaucratic offices and various universities in 
South Korea. During the two phases, 226 members of the SNU faculty studied at the University of Minnesota 
(Cho 2010, p. 67).39 
Besides the SNU project, many other international development-aid agencies also operated technical training 
programs for South Korea. For example, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Vanderbilt 
University operated training and scholarship programs for South Korean public officials from 1956 to 1970 as 
well (Cole et al. 2015). 
38  For example, the Nathan Report (Robert, 1952), and the Tasca Report (Tasca, 1953). 
39  57 professors in agriculture, 64 in engineering, 78 in medicine, and 27 in public administration were trained by the 
SNU project. 
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However, South Korea still lacked the innovative capacity needed to transform its economic and industrial 
structure. In the 1960s, the role of tertiary educational institutions remained limited to replicating theoretical 
textbook knowledge that had little impact on the industrialization of the economy. Shortsighted domestic 
businesses were not mature enough to recognize the importance of R&D investment, nor were they ready 
to absorb advanced technologies from foreign countries. At the same time, the U.S. announced that it would 
withdraw military forces from the peninsula, creating another challenge for South Korea: a threat to national 
security. The promotion of heavy and defense industries was one of few options that political and business 
leaders could choose. As they were preparing to develop chemical, steel, and machinery industries, the leaders 
targeted the global market and pursued export-oriented strategies by promoting these new industries. Thus, 
the new capital-intensive industries benefitted from international markets’ scale, overcoming the limits of a 
comparatively small domestic market. 
While preparing for industrial restructuring, the South Korean government realized that highly trained 
scientists and engineers were difficult to retain because most were educated abroad. Also, officials noted that 
domestic universities focused more on theories than practical training. Industrial development saw mounting 
demand for domestic graduate education. Dr. Jeong Geun-mo, a South Korean scientist in the U.S. and alumni 
of the School of Public Administration of Seoul National University, drafted a proposal for a specialized 
graduate school in science and engineering, hoping for USAID support. In March 1970, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology drew up plans for the school. The U.S. government dispatched a delegation, led by 
Frederic E. Terman, former Vice President of Stanford University and a founder of Silicon Valley, to investigate 
the new science and engineering graduate school in South Korea. Based on Terman’s recommendations, South 
Korea established the Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS) within the Seoul Research Development 
Park in Hong-neung in April 1971. The KAIS hired 40 professors and officially opened in September 1973. 92 
students graduated in the first class of 1975. Many KAIS alumni lessened the shortage of high caliber scientists 
in South Korea (Hong et al. 2013, pp.85-86).40 
Moreover, the top leadership also decided to establish the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) 
in 1966 to expedite South Korea’s internalization of foreign advanced technologies. As the first modern, 
comprehensive applied-research institute in South Korea, KIST provided fundamentals for becoming up-to-
date on science, technological catch-up, and self-reliance through domestic R&D capabilities (Hwang & Kang 
40  In 1990, KAIST graduates comprised 73 percent of total doctorate degree winners in South Korea in the science 
and engineering sector. 30.6 percent of the KAIST graduates entered the education sector, while 36.8 percent and 
27.6 percent joined research institutions and the industry, respectively. Also, 35 percent of KAIST’s master’s program 
graduates entered the private industry sector to develop new technologies (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology, 1992).
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2011, p.84). KIST ran an innovative operation system with limited government interference despite public 
financial support. It could recruit scientists from abroad with exceptionally high compensation and initiated 
dynamic research activities, which would not have been possible with too much governmental oversight 
(Hwang & Kang 2011, pp.59-60). 
The Korea Development Institute (KDI), a comprehensive public think tank for economic research and policy 
review, also contributed to the return of South Korean economists and scholars who had studied and were 
working abroad. Professionals who returned were later deeply engaged with national development planning 
and major socio-economic policy reforms, with patronage from top political leadership. The government also 
allowed autonomy to the KDI, in addition to providing public financial support, similar to the KIST. 
Government-funded research institutions (GRIs) like the KIST and the KDI supported the government by 
implementing and monitoring policies while working as brain reservoirs for technical fields. GRIs provided 
an opportunity to many South Korean specialists staying abroad to contribute to the localization of advanced 
technologies and take a leading role in modern scientific and technological development in South Korea 
(Hwang & Kang 2011). GRIs especially contributed to South Korea when Korean universities and business 
were incapable of renovating the country and GRIs rose as a key player in the National Innovation System 
(NIS). GRIs, together with South Korea’s modern universities that offered globally competitive education, 
contributed to national innovation and effective brain gain, working as conduits that bridged South Korea’s 
domestic society with global communities.
3. Promoting R&D and Innovation  
In order to retain the domestic economy’s sustainable growth, South Korea’s industries had to survive in the 
global market through innovation. In the early stages of industrialization, during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
South Korean government took on large-scale foreign loans and invested them into selected industries, leading 
to massive foreign capital goods imports and turnkey plants. South Korea’s major source for technological 
advancement was original equipment manufacturing (OEM) for light industries’ production arrangements. 
South Korean businesses had to reverse-engineer imported capital goods to acquire technology for heavy 
industries. The government legislated the Science and Technology Promotion Act and the Science Education 
Act in 1967 in order to encourage more technological advances (Chung 2011; Kim 1997). 
When the economy shifted from light to heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s, the government arranged 
for massive investment projects to establish facilities for those industries. The turnkey plants for chemical 
industries and foreign licensing for heavy machinery required domestic industries to assimilate and apply 
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transferred technologies. The government helped private businesses adopt technologies by establishing GRIs. 
The Korea Institute of Machinery and Metals, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, 
the Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology, the Korea Research Institute of Standards and Science, 
the Korea Institute for Energy Research, and the Korea Ocean R&D Institute brought technological education 
to private businesses (Chung 2011; Kim 1997). Table 4.5 outlines which GRIs were responsible for developing 
and commercializing which technologies.
Table 4.5  GRIs and Developed Technologies
Government-funded research institution Technologies
Korea Institute of Science and Technology
polyester film, semiconductor lead frame 
technology, computerizing technology
Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials
automation system, software and design 
technology used for CAD/CAM
Korea Chemical Technology Research Institute antibiotic substances, advanced chemical materials
Electronics and Telecommunications Research 
Institute
domestic computers, 4M DRAM semiconductors, 
digital switching system called time-division 
exchange (TDX) series 
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute localization of nuclear fuel, Korean nuclear Reactor
Source: Hwang & Kang 2011, pp.84-85
Economic development and competition in the global market in the 1980s demanded more sophisticated and 
advanced technologies from industry. South Korea responded with a policy shift from technology assimilation 
to technology development. The government facilitated several private R&D activities, including tax 
incentives, financial assistance, procurement, and other promotional actions. The government also employed 
new R&D investment strategies that allowed cooperation between private industries and the public sector. 
The Ministry of Science and Technology launched the National R&D Program in 1982, which was followed 
by the Industrial Base Technology Development Program of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, 
the Information and Communication Technology Development Program of the Ministry of Information and 
Communication, and other programs (Chung 2011; Kim 1997). Private industries increased R&D investment 
and surpassed government investment in 1981. Private industries accounted for more than 75.4 percent of 
total national R&D investment in 2016 (National Science & Technology Information Service 2018). 
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4. Limits and Challenges 
South Korea acquired abundant human capital for research and development through its expanded 
undergraduate and graduate education. South Korea’s ratio of researchers to population is fourth in the world 
behind Finland, Denmark, and Singapore. South Korea has spent as much as 4.23 percent of the GDP for R&D 
in 2016 (Lee et al. 2015; National Science & Technology Information Service 2018). In spite of the rapidly 
increasing output, however, concerns persist about the quality of South Korea’s research and its impact on 
industry and the national economy. 
National innovation, for which R&D plays a critical role, should run parallel to the economic vitality of a 
country. The strategy transition from assimilation to creation in South Korea, however, has had few tangible 
impacts on the economy. South Korea’s economic potential growth rate is expected to stay at approximately 3 
percent per year between 2008 and 2050 (International Monetary Fund 2006). Additionally, a low fertility rate 
and lagging productivity in the service sectors result in a diminished growth potential. Additionally, export 
growth that once accelerated is now less effective at boosting domestic consumption or creating jobs (OECD 
2014).  
South Korea has many challenges to overcome in order to encourage sustainable economic development 
through innovation-driven growth. R&D capacities must be examined and reoriented. The majority of R&D 
takes place in a few large businesses with an emphasis on “applied research,” without ample support for “basic 
research.” Applied research involves the expanded research, development, and applications of technology 
that has already been explored, as opposed to basic research, which seeks to innovate science and technology 
through a better understanding of scientific foundations. Applied research without strong innovation 
propelled by basic research can limit the progress of R&D by relying too heavily on past practices, which may 
become outdated (National Science Foundation 1952; Stokes 1997). Furthermore, an old-fashioned focus on 
rote learning in education, which mirrors the focus of applied research in R&D, instead of critical thinking, the 
heart of basic research, has also hampered creative innovation in the education system and economy (Stokes 
1997; Connell 2013; Kim 2001; Lee et al. 2013). 
South Korea has already proven, however, through extensive efforts, its ability to develop a strong basis for 
human capital through educational reforms. The path toward innovation-driven development in R&D and 
other sectors requires a similar focus on the nurturing of human capital through continued critical thinking 
and creative learning. Just as the South Korean government was able to elevate public opinion and increase 
educational capacity for technical professions in the past, South Korea must now adopt a more positive 
attitude towards risk-taking and promote active entrepreneurship in order to move toward sustainable, 
innovation-driven growth. Human capital was a critical factor in transforming the country’s agriculture-based 
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poor economy to a technology- and manufacturing-based rich economy; human capital will again be a key to 
harmonizing economic, social, and environmental values in the rapidly-changing and knowledge-intensive 
global economy.
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I. Understanding the Saemaul Movement 
The Republic of Korea’s rural landscape changed immensely in the 1970s. The Saemaul Undong, or New 
Village Movement, was a main force behind South Korea’s rural modernization. The Saemaul Movement 
showed how local leadership could enable an entire society to eradicate poverty, increase agricultural 
productivity, increase educational opportunities, and improve living conditions overall (Sachs 2010). 
The Saemaul Undong was not simply a rural development policy; it was an enormous national movement. 
The Movement accomplished many large rural development tasks. It produced broad-based and inclusive 
economic growth, improved the living conditions of individual village residents, and contributed to the 
reforestation of South Korea. The Saemaul Movement succeeded because of the self-reliance of the villagers, 
the supporting policies of the South Korean government, and dedication to grassroots innovation. 
The United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) share many of the Saemaul Movement’s 
concentrations, including eradicating poverty, improving health, increasing education, empowering women, 
and reforestation. Thus, the Saemaul Movement’s success holds important implications for the achievement 
of SDGs in other developing countries. 
1. Principles of the Saemaul Movement
When the Saemaul Movement began in the 1970s, South Korea’s impoverished rural areas often experienced 
the Barley Hump, a period of famine in the spring before the barley harvest. Off-season, many people living in 
rural areas occupied themselves with gambling and drinking because of the lack of work (Goh 2010, p.15). In 
1970, the electricity supply of rural villages was approximately 27 percent, and many people used oil lights (Park 
2005, p.19). Approximately 60 percent of villages could not be accessed by automobile. Modern bathrooms and 
water supply were also very low, and approximately 80 percent of farmhouses had straw roofs (Goh 2010, p.15). 
The Saemaul Movement was a comprehensive rural village development movement that aimed to improve 
the conditions of all villages in South Korea’s rural areas. Its slogan was “Living a Good Life.” The Saemaul 
Movement adopted multiple reforms which revitalized rural communities through cooperative engagement 
between the self-sufficient village societies and the financial and administrative support of the government 
(Chung 2014). 
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2. Achievement of the Saemaul Movement
The Saemaul Movement resulted in significant rural development. It accomplished many of its goals targeted 
for 1980 by 1977. The average income of rural residents increased by approximately eight times between 1971 
and 1979, and, by the fourth year of the Saemaul Movement, the average income of a rural resident surpassed 
the average income of an urban resident. Figure 5.1 charts the income increase of rural residents during the 
Saemaul Movement from 1971 to 1982. 
Figure 5.1  Rural Income Increase During the Saemaul Movement
                                      Source: Jun 2010, p. 75
Additionally, the Saemaul Movement supplied almost all rural areas with electricity and water. By 1977, 
approximately 98 percent of rural residents had electricity (Park 2005, p.125). Improved roads made 
automobile transportation possible. Farmers grew in confidence as their income rapidly increased and living 
conditions improved. This kind of self-efficacy became a valuable asset for the continued development of rural 
areas, and, according to many social surveys, the Saemaul Movement ranks as one of the proudest moments 
in South Korea’s contemporary history (Han 2010).
The Saemaul Movement hoped to achieve broad-based and inclusive development that reduced 
socioeconomic gaps between South Korean regions. The Movement achieved this goal by targeting all rural 
villages in the country as well as individual families. South Korea evaluated and classified village development 
as either Basic, Self-help, or Self-reliant (or Advanced). South Korea based the classification on indicators 
that depended on objective criteria, were easy to understand, and could encompass various issues into one 
composite value. South Korea divided the evaluation into five different criteria: rural area infrastructure, 
residential environment, agricultural base, cooperative livelihood, and project income. Table 5.1 outlines 
specific conditions Self-help and Self-reliant villages were responsible for within the five criteria: 
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Table 5.1  Development Criteria for the Development of Villages
                                      Source: Ministry of Home Affairs 1980a, pp.23-24
Self-reliant villages became more prevalent from the beginning of the Saemaul Movement until 1979. Figure 5.2 
outlines the spread of self-reliant villages.
Figure 5.2  The Spread of Self-Reliant Villages (percent)
                                                  Green: self-reliant village, Brown: self-help village, Blue: basic village
                                                  Source: Ministry of Home Affairs 1980a, p.22
South Korea defined a village unit as a living unit with 50 to 100 households. A village unit’s living conditions 
and production base were linked to a farmer’s individual profits. For example, in the early 1970s, an individual 
farmer seeking to sell his products in the market could not, by his effort alone, improve the roads connecting 
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the farms and main roads. He needed the development of the village unit as a whole in order to increase his 
own income. As a result, the Saemaul Movement adopted the principles of cooperation, diligence, and self-
sufficiency, where each principle was mutually dependent on the other (So 2013).
Villager initiative during the Movement played a large part in the planning, monitoring, and implementation 
of village projects. The government provided steel and cement to villages but villagers, at general assemblies, 
decided how to use the materials. Also, whenever the government gave a project grant to a village, it did so 
without specific project plans or targets, giving full responsibility to villagers for the development of their village. 
The Saemaul Movement achieved public-private cooperation when villagers worked to improve the living 
conditions of the village and the government financially supported villages and promoted policies for rural 
modernization, such as electricity supply and land-line distribution. The government monitored the results 
of the movement through a village foreman and a Saemaul leader placed in each village but also depended 
strongly on trust between the villages and the government. In 1970, the government could not have delivered 
free cement to all villages if the government had not trusted the villages to use the cement for village 
development projects. The government also held villages accountable for their development and introduced 
an element of competition between villages when they awarded more financial support, often through 
Presidential grants, to villages with higher evaluations. For instance, in 1970, the government distributed 355 
sacks of cement to all villages but, in 1971 distributed another 500 sacks of cement only to villages evaluated as 
“outstanding” after the previous year. 
II. Business Models of the Saemaul Movement
1. Job Creation
The Saemaul Movement developed various business models in order to increase the income of farmers. When 
the Saemaul Movement began, a South Korean farm household cultivated less than one hectare of its rural 
land and villages suffered from severe unemployment. South Korean cities were home to major industrial 
facilities that provided employment to urban residents. Rural areas, however, needed jobs catered to the 
circumstances of a rural area. Jong-Ho Kim (1973, pp.109-110), Director of the Department of the Saemaul 
Movement within the Ministry of Home Affairs, maintained the importance of keeping farmers busy during 
the off-season. He said, “rather than receiving a wage, there is no greater virtue than finding gratification in 
work.” Creating off-season employment opened the possibility for decreasing idleness and increasing both 
income and self-gratification. 
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The government created jobs utilizing two main methods: projects by direct management and projects 
by contract. Through the management of infrastructure projects in cities, districts, towns, and townships, 
direct management sought the participation of and provided wages for citizens in construction projects that 
increased villagers’ non-farming income. Under this method, wages were given either in full or half of the 
market-price. Businesses that paid full market-price worked on projects that did not directly benefit villagers 
and could not be completed by relying only on volunteer work. Businesses paying half the market-price, 
however, worked on projects which, because they entailed a direct benefit to villagers’ lives, justified a certain 
extent of volunteer work. 
Projects by contract were projects run by the government with independent contractors or directly with 
villagers. Before the Saemaul Movement, civil engineering projects could, according to the Construction Law, 
only be carried out through businesses with a construction license (Kim 1973, p.104). The Saemaul Movement 
began by making construction contracts with villagers’ organizations or village development committees. 
Using this method, if the government signed a contract with the village development committee, a provincial 
construction project – one under KRW 3,000,000, for instance – could be executed by the villagers instead of 
another private company.  
 In addition to construction, another important source of employment for rural villages was village tree-
nursing projects. The Saemaul Movement emphasized village reforestation by encouraging villagers, through 
the Village Forest Cooperative, to cultivate seedlings purchased by the government. Additionally, the Saemaul 
Movement utilized government loans for joint projects where villagers with a strong “Saemaul mentality” 
received loans under KRW 200,000 for projects such as managing livestock or cultivating plants. Project 
managers distributed profits according to villagers’ labor and participation.
Other than public work, the Saemaul Movement also emphasized side jobs in accordance with the Off-Season 
Production Policy, which promoted activities, such as making straw bags and straw ropes, crafting bamboo, 
cultivating “bush clover” (the tree used to make brooms), tie-dying, sewing, making toys, folk craft, and other 
projects that did not require special skills and could be done with low capital during the off-season period. 
Furthermore, the construction of factories increased non-farming income and reformed the regional industry 
structure by producing labor for rural areas. Upgrading existing family businesses into factories, opening new 
farming equipment factories, and diversifying rural light industries created many job opportunities (Ministry 
of Home Affairs 1980, pp.466-471). The establishment of Saemaul factories is very similar to the Private Public 
Partnership (PPP) that exists in South Korea today.  
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2. Grassroots Innovation
After the Saemaul Movement began in the 1970s, the off-season disappeared from South Korea’s rural areas 
through new farming practices, such as raising hogs, poultry, cattle, cash-crops, and what was known as the 
“white revolution,” which introduced new farming techniques, including the use of greenhouses. The new 
farming methods supported entrepreneurial businesses instead of traditional subsistence agriculture, which 
led to many grassroots reforms within villages.
Although the government made project or model suggestions for village reforms, village development 
committees and village assemblies handled the execution of reforms according to a village’s specific 
conditions. The South Korean government directly transferred grants to villages without interference from 
experts or government officials. The villagers deposited the grant in a bank account, directly managed the 
funds, and decided which projects to invest in. 
In the terms of the Saemaul Movement, grassroots innovation refers to the villagers’ ability to implement 
reforms in concordance with the specific circumstances of their village. In order to increase the income of 
farming households, rather than introducing high-skill farming techniques, grassroots innovation targeted 
what is now termed the “diffusion of appropriate techniques.” For example, appropriate grassroots innovation 
in fishing communities may have included oyster farming, common fisheries, laver farms, or anything else that 
appropriately applied the techniques of that specific community. For example, Chon Ch’ang-Kyu, leader of a 
village in Kong-Chu County in Ch’ungnam province, suggested breeding cows instead of the country office’s 
suggestion of breeding chickens because the bad smell of chickens would inconvenience the village. Compared 
to breeding poultry, however, breeding cows was a costlier investment and required more skill. Nevertheless, 
upon receiving financial support from the government, Chon Ch’ang-Kyu raised 500 cows for the village, 
which greatly contributed to its income growth.
Exemplifying the spirit of grassroots reforms, many Saemaul village leaders used their own houses as 
educational sites. For example, Ha Sa-Yong taught greenhouse techniques from his house; the house of Choi 
Wang-Ki, in Kyŏnggi province, overflowed with farmers wanting to learn about the poultry industry; and, in 
Ch’ungbuk province, Yu Yong-Mo wrote a textbook about red pepper cultivation modeled on the experience 
of his village. 
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3. Income Reinvestment Project
Self-reliant villages incentivized projects based on the “Income Reinvestment Principle.” The Income 
Reinvestment Project was a business model of the Saemaul Movement that became a PPP widely adopted 
in the rural areas after 1973. Because villages lacked start-off capital, the Income Reinvestment Project used 
funds from the government to establish businesses. After establishing businesses, the Income Reinvestment 
Project increased the development-fund and self-sufficiency of villages.  
South Korea adopted the Income Reinvestment Principle in 1973 as a method to boost income projects in 
villages. In 1970, the government carried out many small-scale civil engineering projects aimed at improving 
the living conditions and reorganizing the product base of rural areas. Usually, in a small-scale civil engineering 
project, the government worked with local contractors who hired villagers. Under the Income Reinvestment 
Principle, however, the government contracted with the Village Development Committee instead of local 
contractors. By doing business directly with the village, villagers’ income and project ownership increased. 
Constructions based on the Income Reinvestment Principle gave villagers a way to find employment. Upon 
receiving a grant from the government, the village transformed from being a stagnant pastoral village to a 
business enterprise.  
The first step of the Income Reinvestment Project was a government grant. If the government gave a grant, “G,” 
to a village, the Village Development Committee contracted with the local government for the project, “P1.” 
Villagers participating in P1 received wages. Because villagers had already planned the budget during village 
assemblies, however, they were not only workers but also participating managers. 
The government granted money for projects under the condition that villagers participating in the projects 
would invest half their wages in the Village Fund, which could then be invested in a subsequent income-
increase project, “P2.” Farmers decided P2 and its implementation business at village meetings and, while 
investing, the farmers also participated as owners of P2. When P2 began, farmers who also worked on the 
project invested half their earned wages in the Village Fund.  The profits from P2 were proportionately divided 
according to the amount invested by individual villagers and could then be invested into another project, “P3.” 
Through the repetition of G1 à P1 à P2 à P3, the Income Reinvestment Principle continuously promoted 
projects. In this way, villagers increased their income through both earned wages and investment profits 
and developed a sense of ownership for projects. This business model turned villagers simultaneously into 
workers, managers, and investors of projects that enabled the continuous development of their village. The 
Village Fund increased as projects continued, so villages built a basis for sustainable development without 
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further external support. Figure 5.3 outlines the process through which a government grant contributed to the 
Income Reinvestment Principle.41
Figure 5.3  Income Reinvestment Principle Diagram
                                                       Source: Kim 1973, p.49
Income Reinvestment Projects operated under strict guidelines. Villages decided projects during assemblies 
held at town halls or the village leaders’ houses. The assembly elected a business committee and inspection 
committee to prepare the project. The managers of the village project developed a plan that corresponded 
to the village conditions; any aspects of the plan that fell outside of the villagers’ skills were the responsibility 
of an external expert. The assembly deposited the government’s grant in either a village credit-cooperative 
or bank account in the name of a village representative. When withdrawing or depositing money, joint 
subscribers signed off on transactions and a member of the auditing committee audited expenses weekly. The 
assembly held a village meeting once a week to report how they delivered the project’s expenses and material 
supplies, which were also announced on the village bulletin board. Village assemblies prevented corruption 
and increased transparency by reporting all stages of the project to the entire village. Aside from material costs 
and technicians’ wages, the assembly divided the remaining profits among the villagers (Han 2013, pp.141-
149). 
41  An expanded explanation of the Income Reinvestment Principle can be found in the Textbook for Saemaul Movement 
Leaders, 1973.
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III. Local Initiative and Responsibility
1. Village Meetings and the Village Development Committee
One of the core principles of the Saemaul Movement was the active participation of villagers. The 
government’s financial and policy support was also important, but villagers played a leading role in 
implementing projects. The village general assembly controlled the design, implementation, and monitoring 
of village projects. The village general assembly was more than just a space for decision-making; it was also 
a place for education and cooperation (Chung 2008, p.66). Training programs taught village leaders about 
the handling of village meetings (Figure 5.4). The Saemaul Movement Guideline suggested that, during 
assemblies, villagers should establish long-term and project plans for the village, analyze results, discuss the 
acquisition and management of joint property, enact and revise village regulations, and elect village leaders 
(Ministry of Home Affairs 1975, p.1032). During the Saemaul Movement, the attendance of village assemblies 
was 80-90 percent of the village population (Han 2013, pp.149-152).
Figure 5.4  Village Assembly Meeting Minutes
                                                             Source: Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, n.d.
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Along with village general assemblies, the village development committee also contributed to new projects. 
The committee enforced decisions made at the village assembly. Approximately 15 villagers – including a 
foreman, a Saemaul leader, a president of the committee, and a development member – manned the village 
development committee (Chung 2008, p.66). Government officials or people from outside the village could 
not serve on the committee. The village development committee functioned as a leadership team that 
mediated between different interests and stimulated project development. Even though a village contained 
only about 40 to 100 households, the committee observed a variety of opinions based on gender, age, and 
class. The Saemaul Movement Handbook recommended that a core group in the village implement projects 
alongside the village Saemaul leader. The village development committee could play the role of that core group 
(Korea Saemaul Undong Center 2003, p.12). 
2. Saemaul Leaders
The role of Saemaul leaders cannot be overlooked in rural villages during the Saemaul Movement. 
Traditionally, each of South Korea’s villages had a village head who dealt with administrative matters and 
connected the village with the government. While keeping the village head’s role intact, the government 
created the Saemaul leader to divide labor; the village head managed administrative tasks and the Saemaul 
leader was in charge of development. Throughout the country, the government promoted the election of one 
male and one female Saemaul leader per village. Traditionally, the person in charge of development was either 
an external expert or government official, but, during the Saemaul Movement, a fellow villager, elected by the 
village assembly, took on this role.   
Villages required that Saemaul leaders possess entrepreneurial skills, including project-planning, project-
implementation, accounting and evaluation, understanding new techniques, the ability to implement village 
reforms, and marketing skills. There were many similarities between entrepreneurship education and the 
Saemaul leadership training offered at the Saemaul Leaders Training Institute. It was important for Saemaul 
leaders to commit to their work as a leader and ground themselves in an entrepreneurial mindset. 
When a village assembly elected Saemaul leaders, they usually chose one male and one female leader. Female 
village leaders, who also led the village women’s association, worked toward the empowerment of rural women 
during the Saemaul Movement. In the 1970s, the societies of underdeveloped villages were more conservative 
than urban society. During the Saemaul Movement, women, before thought of as only wives and mothers, 
became leaders who contributed to the village development and cultural reform. In the initial stages of the 
Saemaul Movement, women mainly participated in anti-gambling campaigns, family planning, and removing 
bars from villages, but later they contributed to income-generation and other economic reforms.
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IV. The Saemaul Movement and Cooperatives
In the 1970s, one of the business models that the Saemaul Movement adopted was “cooperatives.” 
Cooperatives were organizational methods and platforms rather than an income-generating project like the 
other business models adopted by the Saemaul Movement (Zamagni & Zamagni 2010). 
1. Role of Cooperatives in the Saemaul Movement
The “Village Fund” was another name for credit cooperatives in the Saemaul Movement. The Village Fund 
was a cooperative organization built with the mutual help and interest of villagers. It promoted a regular 
savings method for its members and provided low-interest loans for small-scale businesses. The Village Fund 
could be considered a non-profit credit cooperative which allotted business profits to its members. The 
Village Fund adopted eight standards based on the principles of a credit cooperative: the democratic principle 
(each one person received one vote), voluntary membership, autonomy and independence, fairness and 
equity, cooperation, political and religious neutrality, educating its members, and the development of union 
members, organizational structure, funds, etc. (National Association of Village Fund 1977).
The rural Village Fund evolved from the Catholic Credit Associations of the 1960s. In 1972, the Village Fund 
became part of major projects in the Saemaul Movement (Chung 2009, p.104). Under the legal foundations 
established by the Credit Unions Act, the Village Fund model spread extensively during the Movement. 
The South Korean government offered standard instructions so that villagers could establish a Village Fund 
(Ministry of Home Affairs 1980, 352). The government also provided education for Village Fund members. 
The Village Fund movement contributed to decreasing high-interest loans and increasing villagers’ savings, 
income, and economic capacity.  From a micro-financing perspective, the Village Fund was similar to a micro-
credit bank because it specialized in low-interest loans to villagers based on trust rather than collateral. 
Unlike a micro-credit bank, however, it was owned by villagers, was democratic, and granted loans between 
members. The Village Fund operated without external interference and offered unsecured credits with low 
interest-rates solely on the basis of a member’s credit file (Kim 2013, pp.26-27). 
The Village Fund often reduced high-interest loans and increased income in rural households. The Village 
Fund movement in the poor village of Chibuk, Sunch’ang County, Chŏnbuk province, was a particular striking 
example of Village Funds during the Saemaul Movement. Village member KwonSook-Young received a Village 
Fund education in November 1971 and established a Village Fund with 26 other members. Despite initial 
hardships, the reserves of the Village Fund grew rapidly and, in 1974, the village was awarded the Prime-
Minister Award in the Village Fund Category at the Provincial Saemaul Leader Convention. The Village Fund 
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settled all high-interest loans and increased the income in Chibuk. Between 1971 and 1978 the assets of the 
Fund increased from KRW 23,000 to over KRW 33,000,000. Household incomes in Chibuk rose from KRW 
245,000 to almost KRW 2,000,000 (Ministry of Home Affairs 1979, pp.496, 507). 
The Village Fund typically managed the Consumer Cooperative.  Since many leaders of village women’s 
associations were trained in savings movements in the 1960s and the 1970s, village women’s associations were 
a driving force in managing Village Funds and Village Consumer Cooperatives. Generally, members of the 
women’s association in a village managed the Village Consumer Cooperative through a monthly chairman 
rotation system. Because the education level of rural housewives was extremely low, managing the Village 
Consumer Cooperative was not an easy task, and the Village Consumer Cooperative received help from the 
female Saemaul leader or the village development committee.
2. Agricultural Cooperatives
The role of the Agricultural Cooperative was another cooperative system that promoted the Saemaul 
Movement. The Agricultural Cooperative was in charge of duties, such as purchasing fertilizer, pesticide, and 
tools, supplying farming funds and tax deduction, purchasing farm products on behalf of the government, 
marketing agricultural products, and teaching members farming skills. The highest level of the Agricultural 
Cooperative was the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative, followed by the County Agricultural 
Federation and the Unit Agricultural Cooperative, respectively. The government’s strong influence on 
organizational management limited the Agricultural Cooperative’s self-governing practices. The Agricultural 
Cooperative, however, still greatly contributed to the development of rural areas. It provided loans to farmers, 
reduced high-interest loans, helped members purchase daily necessities, and modernized the distribution 
system between production and consumption sites (Park, Park & Shin, 2012). 
V. The Saemaul Movement and the Empowerment of Women 
The Saemaul Movement also contributed to the empowerment of women in rural areas. It was impossible to 
carry out the Saemaul Movement without the participation of women. Women usually managed the village 
credit cooperatives, were active in income-generating businesses, and prevented gambling and drinking. In 
the Saemaul Movement, women actually participated in the movement more actively than men (Goh 2010; 
Han 2013). 
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1. Women’s Education
In the 1970s, South Korea created women’s associations in all rural villages and the chairperson of the 
women’s association became the female Saemaul leader. Becoming the chairperson meant spearheading the 
modernization of the village and “village cultural reforms.” Women were the driving force behind consumer 
co-op projects, the village credit cooperatives movement, the savings movement, and the cultural revolution 
against drinking and gambling. These types of movements required both organizational and accounting skills, 
so the government introduced capacity-building programs aimed at helping women reform the rural culture. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, South Korea promoted women’s education for saving-movements, family planning 
policies, and village credit-cooperative movements. It was not until the Saemaul Movement, however, that 
women’s empowerment improved throughout South Korea. In the early 1970s, men dominated the South 
Korean rural society, and the majority of rural women did not benefit from a modern education. Most women 
faced discrimination, were illiterate, and did not attend elementary school. Thus, women could not compete 
with men in terms of leadership and other skills (Chang 2008; Yu 2001).
Women elected as village leaders received educational opportunities. Although there was leadership 
education for women in urban areas, a leadership program targeting housewives from the rural area was a 
new concept, especially considering that most village housewives had not received any modern education. 
The idea of a village wife, for whom even leaving the house to visit her parents was unusual, leaving the 
house during the week to train as a Saemaul leader was groundbreaking. Women’s education at the Saemaul 
Leader Training Institute did not center on being a “good mother and good wife.” Specific education included 
reform-awareness directed at changing the villages’ wasteful culture of gambling and drinking, income-raising 
methods, women’s economic empowerment, managing the village credit cooperative, promoting Saemaul 
projects, organizational management, and methods for holding a meeting (Saemaul Leader Training Institute 
1982, p.333).
2. Self-Reliance and Empowerment
Female Saemaul Leaders focused their efforts on the empowerment of other women in the villages. Leaders 
shared the education they received with other women and provided practical education through jointly 
implementing projects. For village women without a modern education, projects, such as consumer 
cooperatives and village credit cooperatives were new concepts, and women “learned by doing” by using 
“rotation of responsibility” as a management method. A study written by Hyoung Cho, representative scholar 
of women studies in South Korea, and Irene Tinker (1981, p. 359) revealed that women’s education at the 
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Saemaul Leader Training Institute contributed to the overall improvement of women’s positions in rural 
societies and families. Saemaul education gave women a sense of honor and pride. The majority of female 
Saemaul leaders expanded their scope beyond the village towards townships and counties, where some 
became advisors to local authorities. 
The Saemaul Leadership Training Instituter invited women, as examples of success, to give lectures about 
their experience in the Saemaul Movement. Many village women who gave lectures received additional 
invitations from large companies and public institutions and went on to present across the country. During 
the first nationwide Saemaul Leaders’ Convention in November 1973, under the eyes of the president and 
4000 people, the convention presented two successful cases: one was the case of a male Saemaul leader 
and the other of a female leader. The case under discussion was Kim Yong-Sun from Ankang-Ub village in 
Wolsung County, Kyungbuk province. Kim Yong-Sun, a simple housewife from the rural area, spoke in front of 
the president, high-level officials, members of the national assembly, the media, and other Saemaul leaders. A 
rural housewife speaking at the convention was a remarkable event in South Korean history. 
VI. The Saemaul Movement and Leadership Education
The evaluation of the first year of the Saemaul Movement, conducted in 1970-1971, confirmed the 
importance of leadership in village units. Additionally, in 1973, a team of experts visited 100 rural villages 
and declared leadership one of the main reasons for village success (Kim 1983, p.23). There was a difference 
between the Saemaul leader and the traditional village leader or local influential figure that existed before the 
Saemaul Movement. The Saemaul leader was an entrepreneur who managed modern businesses and modern 
organizations. Saemaul leaders developed business management skills through capacity-building. Often this 
education was not obtained in a classroom, but from co-workers or direct observation through study trips. 
The Saemaul Leaders Training Institute, established in July 1972, trained outstanding farmers for Saemaul 
leadership through practical entrepreneurship education centered on examples and fieldwork (Saemaul 
Leaders Training Institute 1982, pp.141-158). 
1. Educational Content
The Saemaul Leaders Training Institute divided its education into three parts: the “New Mindset of the 
Saemaul Movement,” entrepreneurial business-management skills, and organizational management skills (Han 
2013).
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The primary goal of developing a “Saemaul mindset” was overcoming the sense of destiny and submission to 
one’s fate that was widespread in rural areas, and inspire a mindset of self-reliance. Kim Chun, President of 
the Saemaul Leaders Training Institute, emphasized self-reliance in his classes and had a lasting influence on 
his students. The Saemaul Leaders Training Institute offered courses on “patriotism,” “establishing love for 
the nation,” “creating a new history,” “principles for the modernization of the rural area,” “development of the 
cooperative mind,” and “the development of the rural area as a model for other countries.” The concentration 
on self-reliance helped students develop the pride and self-esteem needed to overcome poverty and adapt 
to a productive and modernized rural lifestyle. The Saemaul leader volunteered to develop his village, and, 
because leaders were not paid, their only motivation was their pride and belief in their village. Saemaul 
Leaders Training Institute used examples of successful village leaders to encourage a “mindset education” in 
other leaders. According to a 1980 survey, trainees ranked “mindset education” and “successful examples” as 
the most useful course content taught at the Saemaul Leaders Training Institute (Hwang 1980)
The second goal of Saemaul leaders’ education was developing entrepreneurial skills, such as farm-
management, improvement of distribution channels, Saemaul income planning, managing livestock, and civil 
engineering techniques. The third goal of Saemaul leader’s training was establishing methods that allowed 
a leader to manage a village like a small company and included learning how to organize village assemblies, 
guide farmers, and resolve conflict. Saemaul leaders also had to learn how to draw-up business plans and learn 
business management and distribution.
2. Educational Methods
The Saemaul Leaders Training Institute adopted various educational techniques to increase the impact of 
their training.  One of the most effective aspects of the Institute was its isolation from the outside world. The 
Institute prohibited television, newspapers, and radio within the Institute so students could fully focus on their 
studies. Training also took place during a strict 5:30am to 11:00pm schedule (Han 2013, p.119). 
Students often learned from the success stories of other farmers, which encourage learning through mutual 
circumstances. The Institute presented success stories followed by group discussions, a method called 
“community of practice” that encouraged mutual exchange between peers instead of a student-teacher 
dynamic.  The Institute also encouraged study tours where Saemaul leaders visited successful villages in 
order to benchmark the success of the village. The teachers of the Saemaul Movement were not development 
experts; they were fellow Saemaul leaders who had set successful examples. This “peer teaching” method 
was highly successful because it connected villages, townships, and counties and promoted the diffusion of 
successful examples, or “Best Practice” cases. 
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Besides the practical education offered by the Saemaul Leaders Training Institute, the Movement also offered 
special education for leaders of underdeveloped villages. Upon receiving basic education at the Institute, 
leaders of an underdeveloped village stayed in an exemplary village for four days to receive on-site training. 
Therefore, although the Saemaul Movement emphasized competition among villages, it also encouraged 
cooperation between villages so the development of all villages advanced (Chung 2008, p.137; Han 2013, 
pp.123, 172-176). 
VII. The Saemaul Movement and Reforestation
In the face of several natural and manmade environmental factors, reforestation has become an important 
worldwide issue. South Korea’s reforestation success, achieved through village-based forestation during 
the Saemaul Movement, gained worldwide attention. Village-based forestation of the Saemaul Movement 
is the same as Community-based Forestry Management (CBFM), a reforestation campaign managed by 
villagers who benefit from reforestation by-products (Chung 2014, p.243). CBFM has not been successful 
in all developing countries, but South Korea successfully implemented it during the 1970s. In South Korea, 
CBFM utilized the mutual trust between the government and villagers during the Saemaul Movement. The 
government viewed reforestation as a national task and supported villagers’ efforts administratively and 
financially. At the same time, villagers participated in reforestation policies and enjoyed the material benefits 
of reforestation, such as the income received from selling seedlings to the government at the market price and 
the supply of fire wood from the participating forests (Lee 2013, p.239).
The government also implemented Saemaul erosion control projects, which were small-scale projects that 
restored denuded land around villages. Contracts under the Income Reinvestment Principle between the village 
and the government promoted erosion control projects. Between 1973 and 1975, the Saemaul Movement 
accounted for 70.7 percent of the erosion control projects across South Korea (Lee 2013, p.285).
1. Cultivating Seedlings in the Village 
In 1973, South Korea planned to reforest 10,000 hectares of land in the mountain area over a 10-year period. 
The Saemaul Movement implemented seedling-cultivation projects to meet this demand. The government 
purchased the seedlings and villagers nurtured them. Between 1973 and 1978, the Saemaul Movement 
cultivated 34.8 percent of the seedlings needed for the national reforestation project. The villagers’ income 
increased through government-funded land rentals and the selling of seedlings to the government (Lee 2013, 
pp.264-269).
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The South Korean government considered reforestation a project that improved living conditions, so they 
implemented the project without wages. In 1977, Saemaul reforestation accounted for 60.5 percent of the 
national reforestation total. Villages planted fruit trees (mostly chestnut and persimmon), rapid-growth trees, 
long-term trees, ornamental trees, and fuel forest trees (Lee 2013, pp.276, 294). 
2. The Village Forestry Cooperative 
After the Korean War, the government passed the Forest Land Protection Temporary Measures Law to 
encourage reforestation in the country. In December 1961, the government revised the Forest Law and 
enforced the Forestry Cooperative. Villagers became members of the Forestry Cooperative in order to harvest 
forest fuel in the nearby hills. The duties of the Forestry Cooperative included self-regulated forest protection, 
local solutions to forest fuel, erosion control projects, increasing the income of members by planting trees, 
and participating in joint projects according to Forestry Management plans (Lee 2013, p.312). The Forestry 
Cooperative became the Saemaul Forest Cooperative in 1973 in order to better cooperate with the Saemaul 
Movement, although its organizational features remained largely unchanged. 
3. Crosschecking Planting Trees
The South Korean government implemented the “check on the tree plantation” principle, a term coined 
by the Ministry of Home Affairs, in order to combine planting and follow-up cultivation into one process. 
The government carried out the first inspection at the city and county level and crosschecked the second 
inspection with the performance of the province. To avoid favoritism, different cities and counties inspected 
one another. The third inspection, supervised by the National Forestry Service, crosschecked all nine 
provinces. Due to these three inspections, the survival rate of seedlings between 1973 and 1980 was 88-92 
percent (Lee 2013, p.259).
VIII. Successful Cases and Lessons for Developing Countries
The results of the Saemaul Movement exceeded government expectations. Villagers experienced the success 
directly in their villages, success that only served to further encourage neighboring villages. 
Based on the principle giving priority support to the better performed villages, the government supported 
successful villages for further development. In the Movement’s second year, South Korea gave further support 
to successful villages, which were half of the total number of villages. The government annually published 
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pamphlets introducing successful stories and distributed them to village leaders. Popular publications 
included Footprints of Glory: The history of the Saemaul Movement in the Village Unit and Correspondence 
Teachings of the Saemaul Movement. Television, newspapers, radio, and movies or dramas also publicized 
Saemaul Movement success stories. The book The Road to a New Village featured the following two success 
stories (Case 5.1 and Case 5.2). 
Case 5.1  Ms. Jeong Mun-Ja (Born in 1940, Female Saemaul Leader,  
Oryu-ri Village in Imsil County, North Cholla)42
Jeong Mun-Ja was the female village Saemaul leader of Oryu-Ri, Imsil County in North Cholla. Although it 
was rare for women to graduate elementary school in the 1950s, Jeong Mun-Ja was a high school graduate. 
After high school, she trained as a seamstress for six months. Before the Saemaul Movement, she and her 
family lived on a mountain roughly four kilometers from Oryu-ri. In 1968, she received funds through a 
government program entitled Special Income-Generation Project for Farming and Fishing Villages, and 
invested in Korean cattle, but she lacked knowledge about cattle farming and the investment failed.  
Even though her husband was a government official, Jeong Mun-Ja lived an impoverished and lonely 
life. Her four children lacked educational opportunities, so, in 1971, the family left the mountain and 
went to live in the village. Jeong Mun-Ja joined the village’s “Mothers Association for Family Planning.” 
Witnessing the cycle of domestic violence, drinking, and gambling among the village men inspired her to 
launch an economic movement to improve women’s economic power. 
With the women’s association, Jeong Mun-Ja made and sold school uniforms to students from a nearby 
elementary school. She sold approximately 100 uniforms. She used the money from the uniforms as capital 
for a Village Fund. She also began a rice savings movement: where housewives saved one spoon of rice 
everytime they cooked it and brought the saved rice to the rice savings association at the end of each month. 
When Oryu-ri received cement for Saemaul projects, Jeong Mun-Ja and other village women wanted 
to transform village kitchens from traditional kitchens where women cooked sitting down into modern 
kitchens where women worked standing up. The cement could only be used for the village’s common-
use facilities, however, so women were not allowed to use the cement for their private kitchens. Thus, 
the women association looked for another solution; five women donated their wedding rings and bought 
cement to make their own bricks for their kitchens.  
42  Information in this section came from Mun-Ja Jeong’s 1975 report “Women of Oryu-ri” from The Way to Saemaul: 
The Report on the Inspection of Japan’s Agriculture Industry and Success Stories published by the Saemaul Leader 
Training Institute.
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Afterward, Jeong Mun-Ja asked the county governor for 2,000 chestnut trees for the women’s association. 
She received the trees free of charge and made an agreement with the mountain owner for harvesting 
the trees. 30 percent of the trees went to the mountain owner and 70 percent went to the women’s 
association. The county governor was moved by Jeong Mun-Ja’s efforts and also gave the women 
association 500 sacks of cement for the kitchens, more than the men had been given. With this cement, 
the women’s association modernized 100 percent of the kitchens in the village. 
To raise more funds for the women’s association, the members organized a joint farming group. Every 
morning before cooking breakfast, the women, as a team of farm workers, met to work at a farm and 
received wages from the owner to be saved in the women’s association fund.  The women’s association 
also succeeded in closing all three bars in the village. After reforming the gambling and drinking culture 
of the village, the women’s association held periodical feasts for the elderly and provided them soymilk 
tea every morning to improve their health.  
Stories of Jeong Mun-Ja and the women’s association spread across the country. The mayor of Seoul 
brought them three calves as a present. The women’s association managed the animals through a cow 
bank until each member of the association eventually became an owner of a cow. Jeong Mun-Ja expanded 
her efforts to include Saemaul projects. She persuaded the director of a factory company in Kangkyong 
Town to build a small-scale factory where young women could work in her village.  The women working 
at the factory were elementary school graduates, but Jeong Mun-Ja and the church minister organized 
evening middle-school courses for them. 
In 1974, Jeong Mun-Ja received a Presidential Prize for her success in the Saemaul Movement. With the 
prize of KRW 2,000,000, she invested in the construction of a bridge across the village river. She lacked 
enough funds for the project, however, and she presented her case at the Saemaul Leaders Training 
Institute. The president of a plywood business who listened to her presentation financed the remaining 
funds for the bridge. The villagers named the bridge “The Bridge of Women’s Heart” in honor of Jeong 
Mun-Ja and her women’s association (Jeong 2012). Jeong Mun-Ja’s story was later adapted into a film 
named “The Ladies of Oryu-ri” in 1974.43
43 http://archives.saemaul.com/jsp/saemaul/leader_represent_Jmj.jsp
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Case 5.2 Mr. Im Gwang-Muk (Born in 1934, Male Saemaul Leader, Chulpo-ri village, in 
Dangjin County, South Chungcheong Province)44
Im Gwang-Muk was a male Saemaul leader in Chulpo-ri village in Dangjin County, South Chungcheong 
Province. Chulpo-ri village was a poor fishing and farming village. Under the Saemaul Movement, the 
village began farming oysters and their income greatly increased. Oyster farming did not require many 
technical skills, but did require the full cooperation of the villagers (Im 2008). 
Based on their success, the villagers developed a reclamation project in order to develop more land for 
agriculture. Chulpo-ri villagers believed that “we can be rich only when we reclaim land from the sea” (Im 
1975, p.88). In the 1960s and early 1970s, two businessmen from outside the village attempted the same 
project but failed. In 1972, Chulpo-ri resolved to undertake the project with no advanced machinery 
or equipment. Instead, they used existing technology, such as A-frame carriers, cooling racks, and 
handcarts. As an incentive, the village promised each household 3,300 square meters of farmland upon 
the completion of the project. The village completed the project on May 26, 1972. 
Because of the poor technology, the constructed embankment collapsed twice before completion. 
In order to repair the collapsed embankment, the villagers requested heavy equipment from the 
government but did not receive any support, despite the fact that the resulting farmland greatly 
contributed to sustainable income-generation in the village. Chulpo-ri is not unique; many successful 
villages during the Saemaul Movement succeeded without government assistance.  
In 1972, Chulpo-ri developed further through reclamation projects, oyster farming, and the 
improvement of rooftops. In 1973 the government certified the village as self-reliant, and it ranked fourth 
in Dangjin County among successful villages during the Saemaul Movement. It also received a self-reliant 
village award from South Chungcheong Province. The villagers decided to dedicate the award money to 
a self-reliance program for impoverished farmers in the village. In 1974, the village received a Presidential 
Grant, which they used to finance an Income Reinvestment Project. With the Presidential Grant, the 
village carried out a stream straightening project. The village saved 25 percent of the labor income in a 
village development fund for the next income-generating project. The villagers in Chulpo-ri decided to 
invest the village development fund in oyster farming. The oyster farming project became the signature 
project of Chulpo-ri and significantly increased the income level of the village. 
44  Information in this section comes from the archived material Collection of Village Documents: Leader Im Gawng-Muk 
I from the Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute. n.d.
154  Secrets of an Economic Miracle: Lessons for Sustainable Development from South Korea
Im Gwang-Muk became a Saemaul Movement teacher for fellow farmers. He lectured at the Saemaul 
Leaders Training Institute about the success story of his village many times. His house also became 
a training place where Saemaul leaders of less successful villages stayed to observe the Saemaul 
achievement of the Chulpo-ri village and receive practical lessons from it.
The success stories of Im Gwang-Muk and Jeong Mun-Ja’s villages are only two out of many success stories 
during the Saemaul Movement. Many villages learned and benefited from the examples of Chilpo-ri and 
Oryu-ri. The developing countries of the 21st century can now learn from the success of South Korea’s 
Saemaul Movement as a whole. Developing countries can apply the same tools of self-reliance, public-private 
cooperation, and optimism utilized by the Movement in the 1970s for their current pursuit of the Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
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I. Overview of the Status of Women in South Korea
1. Gender Agenda in the SDG Development Framework
In the 1960s and 1970s, feminists in the Republic of Korea criticized the industrialization strategies of 
sustainable development and the international market economy for not effectively improving the lives of 
women or the impoverished. South Korea’s market economy, with production based on family labor, had 
provided men with near-exclusive opportunities but left women behind in the household (Boserup 1970; 
qtd. in Kim, et al. 2014, p.6). If sustainable development now hopes to integrate women into the development 
process, it has to not only eliminate discriminatory practices and laws, but also incorporate the following 
factors: equal access to economic resources, universal access to safe reproductive health and education, equal 
access to healthcare services, and equal rights and access to ownership and control over property, financial 
services, inheritance, and natural resources (Kim, et al. 2014, p.8). 
Unpaid and unfairly distributed labor greatly affects gender equality, and financing women’s rights is a 
prerequisite for sustainable development (Kim, et al. 2014, pp.239-240). A key challenge, however, remains 
for strengthening a human rights agenda: often the people suffering from inequality do not have the capacity 
to translate their rights into reality. Policy planning, therefore, proves vital for implementing tangible human 
rights development (United Nations 2012). In South Korea, women’s collective action played an important role 
in translating rights into capacity and capacity into rights (Kabeer 2013; qtd. in Kim, et al. 2014, pp.238-239). 
2. Women in South Korea45
In South Korea, socio-economic inequality increased consistently after President Park Chung-hee’s 
authoritarian government adopted an unbalanced growth policy in the 1960s. Although an authoritarian 
regime can successfully produce outstanding economic growth, such modernization was often pushed 
forward by a small group of elites, leading to a socio-economic imbalance that favored the elites but deprived 
the middle class and laborers. Political resistance from workers and citizens played a pivotal role in the 1987 
democratization movement. The South Korean people hoped that political democratization and economic 
liberalization would encourage sustained economic growth, curtail corruption, improve social justice, and 
create a conductive inflow of foreign capital. South Korea discarded their unbalanced growth policy after a 
45  This section summarizes the article “Political and Economical Dynamics of Unbalanced Growth Policy, Human Rights, 
and Democracy in Korea” by Yeonho Lee, Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, 
Yonsei University.
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financial crisis in 1997, but the legacy of socio-economic inequality persisted. The government was aware that 
a conglomerate-centric economic structure caused inequality, but South Korea needed the cooperation of 
industrial capital in order to overcome the financial crisis. Therefore, South Korea could not fundamentally 
reconstruct the export and conglomerate-oriented economic and industrial structure. As a result, socio-
economic inequality continued to persist after democratization and the financial crisis. 
South Korea’s socio-economic inequality especially impacted women’s opportunities and empowerment. 
South Korean women lacked educational and employment opportunities because of the economic conditions 
and patriarchal culture of their country. A low education rate for women paralleled a low economic 
participation rate, which, in 1963, was half that of men’s economic participation rate. Many women could not 
find employment and, if they did, were compelled to retire after getting married or giving birth, thus socially 
conforming to their housewife roles. Additionally, employment often offered women poor labor conditions 
and low wages. In the 1970s, women received about 43 percent of the average wage that men received (Choi 
2013, pp.11-15).
II. Women’s Policies in South Korea
Despite these obstacles, South Korean feminists pushed the government and civil society to achieve many social 
developments and policy changes, such as promoting gender equality during the 1970s Saemaul Movement 
(see chapter five in this volume), improvements in women’s policy infrastructure, and increasing women’s 
political representation. Women’s policy infrastructure has been especially critical to women’s empowerment 
in South Korea. The establishment of the Korean Women’s Development Institute (KWDI), the Ministry 
of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), and the Korean Institute for Gender Equality Promotion and 
Education (KIGEPE) have all contributed tremendously to policy change for women in South Korea. 
1. The Korean Women’s Development Institute46
The United Nations declared 1975 “International Women’s Year” and the following decade the “UN decade 
for Women.” In response, South Korea created national machinery that tackled women’s issues, specifically the 
Korea National Council of Women. Additionally, in the mid-1970s, South Korea’s Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs hoped to establish a new government-funded institute for women’s issues, preliminary named the 
46  This section summarizes Hyun Joo Chung’s 2013 article, “The Establishment of the Foundation of Women's Policy 
R&D: The Case of Korean Women's Development Institute.” 
162  Secrets of an Economic Miracle: Lessons for Sustainable Development from South Korea
“National Commission in Women’s Welfare,” to replace two existing organizations: the National Commission 
on Women’s Employment and the National Commission on Women’s Welfare (Chung 2013, pp.11-12). 
In 1981, a new political party named “Democracy and Justice” emerged in South Korea. The party focused 
on developing female human resources and declared that women’s social and economic activities should be 
central in institutional reforms. South Korea’s eleventh National Assembly elected eight women legislators 
who were deeply invested in gender equality. Recognizing the plan to establish the National Commission 
of Research on Women’s Welfare, the women legislators instead suggested creating one comprehensive 
organization that followed the concept of other government-funded institutes such as the Korea Development 
Institute (established in 1970). They named their proposal the Korean Women’s Development Act (KWDI 
Act) (Chung 2013, pp.11-13).
After the government appointed a female legislator, Jungrye Kim, as the Minister of Health and Social Affairs 
in May 1982, the KWDI Act gained momentum. Forty-two legislators proposed the bill for the KWDI Act 
during the 14th National Assembly on November 23, 1982. In accordance with the KWDI Act, the Korean 
Women’s Development Institute began in 1983 as a government-funded research institute. Government 
support secured offices, classrooms, dormitories, and international conference halls for the KWDI. The 
first president, Young-jung Kim, a professor at Ewha Womans University was appointed on March 29, 1983 
(Chung 2013, pp.9-14, 88). Figure 6.1 outlines the international and domestic circumstances that led to the 
establishment of the KWDI. 
Figure 6.1  International and Domestic Circumstances
                                                   Source: Chung, 2013, p.9
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The KWDI aimed to “conduct research and education/training on women’s issues, support women’s groups, 
promote women’s participation in society and improve women’s welfare” (Chung 2013, p.3). During its first 
30 years, the KWDI supported women’s organizations and women’s volunteering, encouraged women’s 
cultural activities, and promoted gender-equal media and awareness of gender equality (Chung 2013, p.74). 
The KWDI’s most important task was devising a national mid- to long-term basic framework for women’s 
policy by drawing together short-term women’s policies. South Korea enacted its Framework Act on Women’s 
Development in 1995 and launched its first Five-year Basic Plan for Women’s Policy, which enabled women’s 
rights to serve not only as a policy agenda but also as a stepping stone to political discourse (Chung 2013, 
pp.36-37, 89). The South Korean government revised the Framework Act on Women’s Development in 
December 2002 to include a basis for gender impact assessment. In 2004, the Ministry of Gender Equality and 
Family secured KRW 600,000,000, the largest amount in the history of South Korea’s women’s policy research, 
and commissioned the KWDI to institutionalize gender-sensitive polices. The MOGEF designated the KWDI 
as the Central Gender Impact Assessment Center. In the 2010s, the KWDI provides consultations to central 
government agencies, manages a gender impact assessment database, develops best practices and promotion 
strategies, and maintains a nationwide support network among regional gender impact assessment centers47 
(Chung 2013, pp.41-43). 
In 2007, the MOGEF commissioned the KWDI to research a mid- to long-term plan for gender impact 
assessment (Chung 2013, pp.43-44). The KWDI published “The White Paper on Women” in 1985 and “Social 
Statistics and Indices on Women” in 1986, and, from 1994 to 2007, it annually published “The Year Book on 
Women-related Statistics,” which was renamed “South Korea’s Gender Statistics” in 2008. The KWDI began 
operating a gender statistics information system in 2006, compiled a regional gender statistics database in 2007 
and an international gender statistics database in 2008, and offered an English-language website dedicated to 
gender statistics48 (Chung 2013, p.48). 
Additionally, beginning with research on women’s political participation in 1988, the KWDI expanded 
women’s political participation through extensive research (Chung 2013, pp.51-52). By holding public hearings 
in which major women’s organizations and female National Assembly members participated, the KWDI 
pressured political circles to implement a 30 percent female candidate quota in the Political Party Act (Chung 
2013, p.52). The KWDI also engaged in a wide range of policy research designed to secure equal educational 
opportunities for both men and women. This research spans across many aspects of education, including 
curricula, textbooks, teacher’s education, and career guidance for students (Chung 2013, p.60). 
47 See the KWDI Gender Impact Assessment Center at http://gia.kwdi.re.kr/main.do
48 See the KWDI Gender Statistics Information System at http://gsis.kwdi.re.kr/gsis/kr/main.html.
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In 1960, South Korea introduced the family headship, or hoju, system into the Civil Code, which mandated 
patrilineage in families and served as an obstacle in gender equality. The family headship system was finally 
abolished in 2005 and replaced by the Act on the Registration of Family Relationships in 2008. This new family 
registration system relaxed the principle of the paternal family name and encouraged a more gender-equal 
family register (Chung 2013, pp.62-64). As family dynamics diversify with the socio-economic environment, 
however, South Korea needed a more universal family policy. As part of this process, the KWDI conducted 
studies on the formation of family policies, including the Report on the National Survey on Families in 
2003, A National Survey on Families in 2005, a National Survey on Childcare in 2005, Research on Divorce 
and Support Policies for Divorced Families in South Korea in 2005, Division of Roles and Conflicts among 
Working Mothers in 1998, Research on the Support System and Legislative Efforts for Single-parent Families 
in 2011, and A Survey on Single-parent Families in 2013. Additionally, the institute helped modify the Mother 
and Fatherless Child Welfare Act of 1989 into the 2003 Single-parent Welfare Act and the 2008 Single-parent 
Family Support Act (Chung 2013, pp.65, 89).
The KWDI also studied the issue of violence against women and sponsored a wide range of nationwide 
surveys for counseling centers, shelters, probation centers, expert workshops, and seminars. In 2001, 
the KWDI provided an overview of policies regarding violence against women through Research on 
Comprehensive Measures to Prevent Violence against Women, Research on Measures to Prevent Prostitution, 
and proposed the Act on the Prevention of Prostitution Including Brokerage (Chung 2013, pp.70-73). The 
KWDI worked on legislation and modification for three bills on women’s human rights: the Special Act on 
Sexual Crimes in 1994, the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence and Protection, etc. of Victims in 1997 
and 2004, and the Gender Impact Analysis and Assessment Act in 2010 (Chung 2013, pp.89-90). 
Before the government’s involvement in gender recognition, the KWDI worked with international 
organizations and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for relevant research, pilot projects, and 
training to develop gender sensitive policies. Relevant policy actions reflected many of the KWDI’s research 
outcomes, such as women professor quotas in public universities or women candidates in public election 
offices and supporting framework for women scientists (Chung 2013, pp.90-91). The KWDI’s successes, 
however, would not have been achieved without its dedication to the opinions of various women’s groups and 
collaboration between parliament and academia in an effort to reach a national approval for such an institute. 
A close relationship with parliamentarians and government officials who were interested in women’s issues 
was critical for the KWDI’s budget approval and initial 164-employee staff. The commitment of the KWDI’s 
employees was also important, as a strong sense of vocation drove the KWDI forward. Later, the KWDI 
introduced systems and institutions to improve research quality and comprehensive research evaluations for 
a more effective research topic selection. The KWDI brought in international and domestic experts to enable 
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institutional considerations of women’s issues. Global partnership, including international organizations such 
as the UN, helped leverage the outcomes of similar women’s issues in other countries (Chung 2013, pp.93-94).
2. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family49
During the 1950s, South Korea approached women as part of the refugee and orphan group that needed relief 
and protection after the Korean War. At the time, the Women’s Bureau in the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
was responsible for abolishing prostitution, conducting research, and studying labor conditions for improving 
women’s welfare. In the 1960s, policies integrated women and children’s issues. This period focused on family 
planning and programs that promoted “healthy families.” The Mother and Child Health Act passed in 1973 
and the Family Law was revised in 1977, laying the foundation for policies that controlled the birth rate and 
population growth rate in the 1970s. During the 1980s, women’s policies expanded to no longer only focus on 
the welfare of married women (bunyeo), but to focus on all females (yeoseong). 
The democratic movement, which grew in tandem with the women’s movement from the late 1980s to the 
1990s, resulted in a presidential election, local elections, and other political changes that encouraged the 
government to think of women as voters. The government launched the Ministry of Political Affairs, the 
precursor of the MOGEF, and legislated laws, such as the Mother and Fatherless Child Welfare Act in 1989, 
the Gender Equality Employment Act in 1987, the Act on the Prevention of Sexual Assault in 1994, and the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act in 1997.
International pressure also brought about changes in women’s policies in South Korea. In 1985, the UN held 
their third World Conference on Women in Nairobi, Kenya that promoted women-related agencies in UN 
countries, and, in 1979, the UN adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. South Korea dispatched government representatives to the annual UN Commission on the 
Status of Women. In 1995, South Korea legislated the Framework Act on Women’s Development, which 
mandated a basic plan for women’s policy every five years and provided a systematic framework to improve 
the status of women in South Korea.
In 1999, six South Korean government agencies (the Ministry of Government Administration and Home 
Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Labor) established offices that handled women’s policies. In 2001, the Kim 
Daejung Administration declared the need for a single government agency that solely dealt with women’s 
49  This section is a partial summary of “A research on the selection of gender ODA programs for the establishment of 
Korean ODA Model” by Eun Kyung Kim, et al. (2012) 
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issues and launched the Ministry of Gender Equality. With one office and three bureaus, the Ministry of 
Gender Equality prohibited and regulated sexual discrimination and improved the position of South Korean 
women in society.
During 1994, the National Assembly operated a Presidential Commission on Women’s Affairs that was later 
reorganized into the Commission on Women’s Affairs. This commission was under the jurisdiction of the 
MOGEF and could introduce legislative bills. It also had the right to pre-deliberate the budget, operate the 
women’s development fund under the ministry, and investigate government agencies and the ministry. Table 6.1 
summarizes the South Korean government’s implementation of women’s policies and development history.
Table 6.1  Implementation of Women’s Policies and Development History
                            Source: Author based on Kim 2005.
The Women’s Policy Committee, established in 1983, and the Ministry of Political Affairs and the Presidential 
Commission on Women’s Affairs, both established in 1998, preceded the Ministry of Gender Equality. 
However, these organizations were limited by a lack of coordinating or policy advisors with legislative or 
voting rights. As a central agency, the Ministry of Gender Equality, however, did have voting rights in the 
Cabinet Council and legislative and enforcement functions. A women’s affairs agency with effective legislative 
power was vital for substantive change in women’s policies. As the South Korean government gradually caved 
in to international pressure to pursue democratic changes within their civic society, women transformed from 
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being beneficiaries of policy to partners in national development. South Korea implemented women’s policy 
at the central government level and also at the local government level. 
Another factor for women’s policy change in South Korea was women’s groups. Women’s groups helped build 
a gender governance that improved awareness of women’s issues within South Korea’s largely patriarchal 
society. Women’s groups spearheaded the establishment of agencies that focused on women’s issues, legislation 
of key laws, abolishment of hoju, and illegalization of sex trafficking. The Korean Women’s Association United 
and many other major women’s groups in South Korea developed with the help of foreign aid. After South 
Korea established the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, the MOGEF implemented joint programs with 
women’s groups. Every time the MOGEF enacted an important policy, it received feedback from women’s 
groups. 
3. The Korean Institute for Gender Equality Promotion and Education50
South Korea installed the KWDI in 1983 as a government agency that exclusively addressed women’s 
issues and instigate gender training for public officials. The KWDI’s Office of Education and Training was 
responsible for training female leaders and developing vocational training and pilot education programs. In 
1984, the Office of Education and Training offered training for mid-level female managers in order to expand 
gender equality awareness in the country. South Korea delivered the 1999 Guidelines on the Training of 
Public Officials, which raised awareness about gender equality and discriminatory practices against women, 
to training institutions affiliated with central or local governments (Kim & Song 2013, pp.21-30). During the 
period of 1991 to 2002, public servant training institutions and the KWDI officially took charge of gender 
training for public officials. Public servant training institutions were affiliated with central or local government 
agencies and generally featured a two-hour unit on gender awareness within a three- to five-day general 
training program. Units included “Awareness of Gender Equality,” “Women’s Policy,” “Female Leadership,” and 
“Women’s Status and Capacity Development” (Kim & Song 2013, pp.26-31). The Framework Act on Women’s 
Development in 1995 established a foundation for gender training, prompted by the 1995 Beijing Conference 
on Women and the inception of the MOGEF. The inauguration of the Korean Institute for Gender Equality 
Promotion and Education in 2003 became another watershed moment in South Korea’s gender training (Kim 
& Song 2013, p.17).
50 This section is a summary of Jae-In Kim and In-Ja Song’s 2013 article, “Gender Training for Public Officials.” 
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The Korean Institute for Gender Equality Promotion and Education (KIGEPE) is a professional gender-
sensitivity training institute for public officials aimed at eradicating gender-discriminatory perceptions and 
practices. On March 30, 2006, South Korea reestablished the KIGEPE as a legal entity in accordance with 
Article 21-3 of the Framework Act on Women’s Development. Since its inception, the KIGEPE provided 
diverse education that targets a wide range of public officials, including the administrative, legislative, and 
judicial branches of the government, National Assembly members, local council members, and aides of 
National Assembly and local council members (Kim & Song 2013, p.46). The KIGEPE arranges program 
content while considering the characteristics of its clients, the amount of education required for each item, 
and the characteristics of specific areas (Table 2). Gender training for public officials can be divided into 
education on gender equality policy, gender sensitivity improvement, Gender Impact Assessment (GIA), and 
gender budgeting (Kim & Song 2013: pp. 67, 79). 
In order to increase the efficiency of education and maximize its applicability in the field, programs included 
gender training on curriculum construction principles and could be adapted to suit the situations of 
participants through five- to one-day programs. Training did not just involve the simple transfer of knowledge, 
but also required a commitment to gender equality through the reassessment of personal beliefs and values. 
Gender sensitivity education was critical for government and civilian leaders who held influence over society 
so that the changed values and beliefs of leaders could impact society as a whole. The KIGEPE especially 
tailored its programs to high-level government officials, judges, prosecutors, and media professionals (Table 
6.2) (Kim & Song 2013, pp.59-60, 82-83). 
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Table 6.2  Overview of KIGEPE Training Programs for Public Officials
Title Goals Methods Targets
Creation 
of gender 
sensitive 
policies
Increase expertise to reflect 
gender perspectives in 
the establishment and 
implementation of policy
Improve the ability to 
implement gender-sensitive 
policies
Promote commitment 
and the ability to put into 
practice gender equality in 
order to expand policies 
on work-life balance as a 
response to the falling birth 
rate
Understanding the concept 
of gender equality
Gender perspectives and 
gender-sensitive policies
Changing paradigms of 
gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming
Laws and policies related to 
gender equality
Gender equality and 
government policies 
(education, human 
resources, agriculture, 
welfare, employment, etc.)
Crafting gender-sensitive 
policies and administrative 
efforts
Establishing action plans 
Public officials at all levels
Council members
Government committee 
members
High-level employees at 
public companies
Gender 
sensitive 
training 
Improve the ability to 
implement policies with a 
gender perspective
Improve the ability to 
create a gender-sensitive 
organizational culture
Achieve work-life balance 
through equal partnerships
Understanding the concept 
of gender awareness 
Laws and policies related to 
gender equality
Shifting paradigms of 
gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming
Gender communication 
within an organization
Understanding 
organizational culture and 
gender partnership training
Discussion of the issue 
of gender equality and 
establishing action plans
Public officials at all levels
Council members
Military personnel and 
police officers
High-level employees at 
public companies
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Title Goals Methods Targets
GIA and 
gender 
budgeting
Strengthen the substance 
and efficacy of GIA to 
accompany the enactment 
of the Gender Impact 
Analysis Act (March 16, 
2012)
Increase the ability to reflect 
a gender perspective in 
the establishment and 
implementation of policy 
and practical ability to 
implement GIA
Implement the provisions 
related to gender budgeting 
in Articles 16, 26, 34, and 57 
of the National Finance Act
Implement the provisions 
related to gender budget 
settlements in Article 15-2 
of the National Account Act
Implement the provisions 
related to gender budgeting 
in Articles 3, 36, and 53 of 
the Local Finance Act
Improve the ability to reflect 
a gender perspective in 
establishing the budgets 
and settlements on policies 
and programs
Understanding gender 
equality in order to 
implement GIA
Understanding the concept 
and methods of GIA
Studying oversees cases 
regarding GIA
Practicing case analysis by 
project
Concept and methodologies 
of GIA and gender 
budgeting
Understanding gender 
perspectives and the 
budgeting system
The National Finance Act 
and gender budgeting
Understanding gender 
budgets/settlements
Theories and methods of 
gender budget analysis
Gender budgets/settlement 
and gender statistics
Working-level public officials 
in charge of GIA
Public officials in managerial 
positions related to GIA
Public officials in charge of 
gender budgeting
Consultants and other 
experts on GIA
High-level officials in 
administration, council 
members, public 
organizations
Source: Kim and Song, 2013, pp.80-81
III. Economic Empowerment of Women51
South Korea’s equal employment policies continued to advance since the enactment of the Equal Employment 
Act in 1987. In 2007, the government revised the Act into the Equal Employment Opportunity and Work 
Family Balance Assistance Act. This Act initially prohibited discrimination against female workers and then 
51  This section is a summary of “Equal Employment Policies in Korea: An Introductory Guide” by Heekyoung Kim and 
Myung-Sook Jun.
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prohibited a wide range of discriminatory treatment against women, including granting equal opportunity 
in recruitment and hiring, and prohibiting discrimination in education, assignment, and promotion. It 
also stipulated a provision on the definition of discrimination and established provisions on equal pay for 
work of equal value, indirect discrimination, prohibition of sexual harassment in the work place, capability 
development, Affirmative Action, maternity protection, and work family assistance. 
1. Policies for Supporting Women Workers
Although women’s education levels and job skills were not lower than men’s, the South Korean corporate 
environment often undervalued the labor provided by women and inefficiently utilized women as human 
resources. Table 6.3 reveals how the South Korean women’s economic participation rate has lagged behind 
many OECD countries. 
Table 6.3  Comparison of Female Economic Participation Rate among Key OECD Countries 
(2009-2014) (percent)
       Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2015
South Korea’s discriminatory corporate culture, however, conflicted with the mounting social demand for 
competitive diversity in corporations. Businesses began to value the stronger competitive edge that a variety 
of viewpoints and opinions, rather than just a homogeneous group opinion, provided. Additionally, the aging 
rate in South Korea is significantly faster compared to other advanced nations. By 2026, South Korea expects 
to become a super-aged society where over 20 percent of the population will be over 65-years-old, and they 
face a future shortage of labor and hindered economic growth if they do not alter their employment policies 
(Miskolczi & Cséfalvaiová 2013, p.1022). 
The Equal Employment Opportunity and Work Family Balance Assistance Act stipulated various systems in 
order to assure equal opportunity and treatment in employment. Based on this act and relevant laws, including 
the Labor Standards Act and the Mother and Child Health Act, the South Korean government implemented 
policies to support equal employment within companies, taking into consideration possible difficulties, such 
as childbirth and childcare, unique to women employees. 
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Maternity protection included within the Equal Employment Opportunity and Work Family Balance 
Assistance Act provided various measures to relieve economic activity constraints for women with children. 
It granted women a protective leave of a total of 90 consecutive days before and after childbirth, with at least 
45 days of the 90 allocated to after childbirth. The Employment Insurance Fund subsidized maternity-leave 
benefits, and, upon returning to work after maternity leave, maternity protection guaranteed women a job 
and wage equal to the job and wage she held before leave. Additionally, for miscarriages and stillbirths after 
16 weeks of pregnancy, maternity protection granted 30 to 90 days of leave and guaranteed paid benefits 
that were based on the same subsidy standards as maternity leave. Also, an employer must allow a pregnant 
woman worker to take requested time off for prenatal examinations and could not cut wages for reasons such 
as prenatal examinations. Maternity protection also supported paternity leave in that men could request a 
leave for up to 3 days within 30 days of their spouse giving birth.
The Equal Employment Opportunity and Work Family Balance Assistance Act provided guidelines for 
employee childcare. A worker with a child eight-years-old or younger could take up to one year of leave with 
40 percent of the ordinary wage before childbirth within the bracket of KWR 500,000 to KRW 1,000,000. 
A childcare leave was at least 30 consecutive days, and the employment insurance subscription period 
covered at least 180 days. In cases where both parents took childcare leave alternately for the same child, the 
leave could be accumulatively two years. In cases where both parents took childcare leave simultaneously, 
benefits were paid to only one person. Childcare systems prohibited unfavorable treatment or termination 
of those who requested childcare leave, and, upon returning to work, workers were guaranteed the same 
work. Additionally, for up to one year, a worker could choose to work shorter working hours, between 15 
to 30 weekly hours, instead of taking a childcare leave. The government paid KRW 200,000 per month to 
employers for the duration of childcare leave or shortened working hours for 30 days or more. For employers 
who hired substitute workers during childcare leaves or shortened working hours, the government subsidized 
KRW 300,000 per month for every new worker hired during the period of employment as substitute labor. To 
facilitate the changeover, employers hired substitute labor 30 days prior to the start of the childcare leave or 
shortened working hours. Additionally, the government executed various childcare policies to support work 
and family balance. For example, the government provided employers and employer groups with financial 
support to build childcare facilities and funded construction, acquisition, rent, repair, facility-conversion, or 
labor costs for teachers. 
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2. Affirmative Action
Although legal institutions secured a foundation for gender equality, gender discrimination still persisted 
in areas of recruitment, employment opportunities, and promotions. affirmative action supporters hoped 
to facilitate the use of female human resources by improving indirect discriminatory practices. Broadly, 
affirmative action included all tentative measures taken by the state, local government, or employer to redress 
existing forms of discrimination or to promote equal employment. Narrowly, affirmative action included all 
procedures based on Article 17 Clause 3 of the Equal Employment Opportunity and Work Family Balance 
Assistance Act. The procedure required companies whose submitted data on men and women workers 
ratio that fell below the 60 percent mark of the average of companies in the same size bracket or industry to 
voluntarily implement plans for improving the employment of women. 
Affirmative action applied to public organizations and private companies with the yearly average of 500 or 
more full-time equivalent employees. After March 1, 2006, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance implemented 
an affirmative action policy in private companies and public institutions with 1000 or more full-time 
equivalent employees and applied a two-year grace period to private companies with 500-999 full-time 
equivalent employees. The headquarters and local branches of the Ministry of Employment and Labor were in 
charge of affirmative action and the operation of the system was entrusted to the Korea Labor Foundation.
Affirmative action began when a company submitted data by job and position via the AA-NET website by 
March 1st of each year. Companies with insufficient women employment submitted implementation plans for 
improvement. An implementation plan contained the following demands:
•  Analyze human resource utilization and employment management plan for imbalances in male and 
female resources.
•  Set annual employment goals for women in all occupational categories. Occupational categories 
include managers, experts and related practitioners, office workers, service workers and sales workers, 
technicians and related technical practitioners, including machine operators and assembly workers, 
manual workers, and skilled workers in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.
•  Set an employment management improvement plan to achieve employment goals in a designated 
implementation period. 
•  Note case-specific difficulties, such as difficulties in improving the percentage of women in a short period 
of time, employer’s opinions about necessary policy measures to expand women’s employment, etc. 
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By March 31st of each year, a substandard workplace submitted an implementation plan to the AA-NET 
website. The Ministry of Employment and Labor categorized plans according to three levels: “satisfactory,” 
“partial supplementation needed,” or “redraft.” If a company received a “partial supplementation needed” or 
“redraft” evaluation, the company resubmitted the plan according to the evaluation’s specific requirements. 
By March 31st of the following year, a workplace that submitted an implementation plan reported the 
implementation results. The Ministry of Employment and Labor categorized reports as “satisfactory,” “average,” 
or “implementation required.” The ministry gave further implementation deadlines to companies that received 
an evaluation of “implementation required.” Companies with exceptional implementation results were 
awarded with a certificate every April for demonstrating outstanding equal employment. The implementation 
report included the following:
• Results of the goals for women’s employment compared with the implementation plan goals
•  Status of new employment recorded by the percentage of women employees and women managers for 
the given year
•  Results of employment management improvement plan compared with the employment management 
improvement plan goals
In 2006, the Ministry of Employment and Labor first applied the affirmative action policy to a total of 546 
public institutions and companies. In 2014, 1945 workplaces were subjected to affirmative action. The 
percentage of women employees at companies subjected to affirmative action increased from 35.24 percent 
in 2012 to 37.09 percent in 2014. The percentage of women managers also grew from 16.62 percent in 2012 to 
18.37 percent in 2014. Table 6.4 details changes in workplaces as the result of affirmative action. 
Table 6.4  Impact of Affirmative Action Policy on Number of Female Workers and Managers 
(2012-2014) (person, percent)
      Source: Status of Affirmative Action, Korea Labor Foundation, 2012-2014
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The effect of the affirmative action policy was clear, but changes are still needed in the details of the 
current system, conditions within companies, and the sociocultural environment. In South Korea, women’s 
employment is mostly non-regular employment – temporary employment under a contract that must 
be periodically renewed – so percentages do not necessarily consider the qualitative aspects of achieving 
short-sighted goals. Therefore, the qualitative aspect must be supplemented by reports about employment 
status. South Korea’s affirmative-action system drew many of its methods from the United States. The latter, 
however, legally required affirmative action whereas South Korea left affirmative action up to the discretion of 
companies. Lacking a legal enforcement mechanism, South Korea should develop incentives to attract private 
company participation. The high tendency of women to leave a job because of marriage, childbirth, or child 
care serves as another reason that companies may be reluctant to hire women. Preventing women, through 
continuous career management, from becoming economically inactive, requires the expansion of the social 
infrastructure, such as additional support services for childbirth and child care. Also, affirmative action efforts 
must increase awareness about the advantages of hiring women, including enhancing competitiveness.
IV. The Political Participation of Women
The improvement of women’s political representation in South Korea was largely made possible through 
the adoption of a gender quota system in politics. The gender quota system guaranteed a certain percentage 
of women participants in the political and other administrative arenas, which ensured diversified opinions 
in the political process and allowed the government to focus more on women’s policies (Kim & Oh 2010, 
p.158). Women’s political participation resulted in many remarkable achievements, one among them being 
the elimination of the Family Headship System, a system that perpetuated paternal bloodlines from father to 
eldest son throughout generations (Song n.d, p.3).
1. Process of the Gender Quota System 
After June 1987, the domestic political and social environments surrounding the rapidly developed 
democracy, as well as the 1995 World Conference on Women held in Beijing, facilitated discussions about the 
gender quota system in South Korea (Kim 2014, p.21). Politically active women’s groups formed the Gender 
Quota System Women’s Alliance in the 1990s. These women’s groups commonly recognized that a gender 
quota system would have to be introduced to expand women’s political participation. The Women’s Alliance 
requested each political party to allot 10 percent of total candidates to women for the 1995 local elections. 
In 1996, during the 15th legislative election, the Women’s Alliance called for at least 30 percent women 
candidates in local constituencies and 50 percent in national constituency seats. The Women’s Alliance finally 
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achieved their goal in the 2000 revision of the Political Parties Act when the gender quota system became 
mandatory (Table 5) (Moon, et al. 2008; Kim 2010, p.115).
Leading up to the legislative election for the 17th National Assembly, the Women’s Alliance created the Clean 
Politics Women’s Network (Clean-net) to find women candidates. Clean-net recommended a total of 101 
women candidates to each party. In turn, 46 women from Clean-net were nominated by each political party: 
15 out of 66 in district lists and 31 out of 91 in party lists. The Women’s Alliance also actively promoted the 
voter’s movement in order to encourage citizens to vote, fund collection, and other participatory movements 
for women in politics. As a result of the Women’s Alliance efforts, 39 women legislators were elected during 
the 2004 legislative election. Before the formation of the Women’s Alliance, women’s political efforts were 
entirely individual, but the Women’s Alliance proved how a collective women’s movement could play an 
important role in enhancing women’s representation (Kim 2010, p.116).
Table 6.5  Revision of the Political Parties Act Related to the Women Nomination Quota  
(2000-2004)
           Source: Kim, 2010, p.112
South Korea revised the Political Parties Act in 2000, 2002, and 2004. In 2000, it became mandatory to 
nominate women to 30 percent or more of the proportional representation seats at the National Assembly and 
Local Council, but there was no mention of local constituencies. In 2002, the mandatory percentage of women 
representative seats at the local council increased to 50 percent and the government agreed to grant aid if 
30 percent or more women were nominated to the local constituency seats. In 2004, it became mandatory 
to allot 50 percent or more proportional representation seats at the National Assembly and local council to 
women. Article 31 of the Political Parties Act revised the 2004 gender quota system to designate 50 percent 
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proportional representation seats at the National Assembly, 50 percent proportional representation seats at 
the Local Council Metropolitan Assembly, and 30 percent of Metropolitan Assembly local constituency to 
women (Table 6.5) (Kim 2010, pp.111-112).
2. Outcomes of the Gender Quota System 
In the fifth local election in 2010, the ratio of females in metropolitan councils increased by 14.8 percent 
and by 21.6 percent for the basic local assembly. In line with the 18th general election in 2008, the basic local 
assembly transferred to the political party quotas, while 10 percent of the proportional representation was 
introduced (Kim 2014, p.65).
Table 6.6  Women in Parliament Before and After the Gender Quota  
(1988-2012) (people, percent)
                                 Source: Kim, 2010, p.113
Increased women candidates in the local and national government served to implement policy change and 
improve gender equality at the political level. While South Korea implemented various policies to improve 
women’s political representation, however, the representation rate remained low (Table 6.6). Also, the 
proportional representation at the national assembly and local elections was low. In order to implement the 
gender quota system effectively, the quota system must be supplemented with a compulsory provision to 
nominate a certain number of women candidates at a district level, as well as a proportional representation. 
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Above all, the gender quota system will never reach its full potential if awareness about women’s issues is not 
encouraged (Kim 2014, p.65).
3. Achievements of the Political Participation of Women
One significant development the gender quota system stimulated by increasing women’s political participation 
was the amendment of the Civil Act’s family headship system on December 31, 2007. The former Civil Act 
organized family relations using the patrilineal hoju system. The head of a family was, in principle, a male 
lineal descendant from the former head of the family. Only in exceptional cases could a woman become the 
head of a family, such as the complete absence of men in a family. A married daughter could not succeed to 
head of a family because, after marriage, she belonged to her husband’s family. If there was no female lineal 
descendant to succeed to head of a family, then the wife or the mother, respectively, of the deceased head of 
the family could become the head of the family. Even if a woman became the head of a family, however, she lost 
her headship when she married. Moreover, in the family headship system, if a woman married the eldest son, 
she entered into a family with her father-in-law as head of the family, but, if the man she married was not the 
eldest son, her husband established a branch family in which she became subject to him (Song 2015, pp.2-5).
Article 36-1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea stipulated that “marriage and family life shall be 
entered into and sustained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes, and the State shall do 
everything in its power to achieve that goal.” The family headship system, however, discriminated against 
women by granting an automatic privilege to men in a family. The Constitutional Court asserted that the 
family headship system led to “very wide and deep social and psychological impacts.” The family headship 
system led to a preference for sons and became a leading cause in the abortion of unborn daughters. Many 
women suffered personal confusion or loss of identity after marriage. The official confirmation of marriage 
internalized a married daughter as a chul-ga-oi-in, or an outsider, in the minds of her previous family. 
Furthermore, barring few exceptions,52 the family headship system stipulated that a child naturally entered 
into its father’s family register. The family headship system enforced, by law, that all people belonged to the 
male-centered family system (Song 2015, pp.4-6).
The abolition of the family headship system originated from the Movement to Amend the Family Act led 
by the Korean Legal Aid Center for Family Relations, which was established in 1956 by Dr. Tae-Yeong Lee, 
South Korea’s first woman lawyer. The first revision of the Family Act occurred in December 1962 with an 
52  Only an unmarried mother's child whose father was a foreigner or unrecognized may enter into the mother's family 
register (Song 2015, p.6).
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amendment to the Civil Act. The amendment established a legal branch within the family headship system for 
a married second son. This resulted in the Civil Act’s view of extended family to shift to nuclear family and an 
overall weakening of the patriarchal idea of family in the headship system (Song 2015, pp.8-9).53
In the 1970s, women’s NGOs formed alliances for a concerted effort against the Family Act. In 1973, led by 
the Korean Legal Aid Center for Family Relations, 61 women’s groups formed the Pan-Women’s Meeting 
to Facilitate the Revision of the Family Act, which presented 10 major guidelines for the amendment of the 
Family Act. The women’s groups established “abolition of the family headship system” as the first priority in 
their guidelines (Song 2015, p.9, 16). 
In the 1980s, South Korea’s leading women’s groups – the Korean National Council of Women and the Korean 
Women’s Association United – led the movement to revise the Family Act (Kim & Hwang 2010, p.130). 
In 1983, the establishment of the KWDI, the signing of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, and the establishment of the Women’s Policy Review Board laid the basis for 
women’s affairs policies (Kim 1991, p.226). With this background of domestic and international achievement, 
women’s groups formed the Women’s Association for the Revision of the Family Act on July 14, 1984. In 1986, 
the Association and members of the National Assembly submitted a Family Act revision bill. As the 12th-term 
National Assembly closed its session in 1987, however, the bill was automatically discarded. Also in 1987, 
South Korean women’s groups formed the Korean Women’s Association United (Kim 1991, p.227). Under the 
leadership of the Korean Women’s Association United and the existing Women’s Association for the Revision 
of the Family Act, women politicians once again made an all-out effort to pass the revision bill at the National 
Assembly. On December 19, 1989, the Constitution established a new provision on individual dignity and 
gender equality in marriage and family life but still did not abolish the family headship system (Song 2015, 
pp.10-12).
In the 1990s, women’s groups conducted more allied efforts to abolish the family headship system. Led by 
the Korean Women’s Association United in 1997, they conducted the “Movement to Use Parents’ Surnames 
Together,” which was a campaign to use both parents’ surnames as a child’s surname instead of only using 
the father’s. Subsequently, on September 22, 2000, 113 women’s, civic, and social groups launched the Civic 
Solidarity for the Abolition of the Family Headship System (Song 2008, p.36). In January 2001, the central 
government established the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and the political situation of the presidential 
elections added momentum to the movement for the abolition of the family headship system. This was the 
first stage of the abolition process (Song 2015, pp.13-15).
53	 Also see Gyeong-sook Bae and Geum-sook Choi 2006 lecture “Lecture on Family and Inheritance Law.”
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The Minister of Women’s Affairs, Eun-hee Ji, proposed the abolition of the family headship system in a 
Cabinet meeting and, as a result, in May 16, 2003, the Special Planning Task Force for the Abolition of the 
Family Headship System held its first meeting. The women’s community, social organizations, and the Special 
Planning Task Force for the Abolition of the Family Headship System exerted its final efforts to abolish the 
family headship system. The Constitutional Court finalized these efforts when it ruled against the provisions 
on the family headship system on February 3, 2005. South Korea abolished the family headship system on 
March 2 of the same year (Song 2015, p.15). The Constitutional Court, in amending the family headship 
system, explained that the family headship system no longer agreed with the 21st century’s diversified family 
unit which now included families without children, single-parent families, or families of multiple generations 
(Song 2015, pp.7-8).
The Special Planning Task Force for the Abolition of the Family Headship System disbanded in March 2005 
as the Civil Act revision bill passed the National Assembly and achieved its main goal to abolish the family 
headship system (Song 2015, p.27). Many factors brought about the abolishment of the family headship 
system, including the alignment of women’s and civic groups to the cause, the election pledge and policy 
agenda of the Participatory Government, South Korea’s first female justice among nine Constitutional Court 
justices, and public awareness of the social injustices caused by the family headship system (Song 2015, p.18). 
It was a triumph for the political participation of women, and one that spurred the continued empowerment 
of women across South Korea. 
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I. Environmental Degradation
The Republic of Korea’s rapid economic growth and industrial development in the second half of the 20th 
century brought about drastic economic and social improvements. This development, however, came at a high 
cost. South Korea’s industrial strategy focused on energy-intensive, fossil fuel-centered heavy and chemical 
industries (HCI), which resulted in significant energy consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
South Korea’s economic strategy was not unique, and many advanced countries also followed fossil fuel-
centered development strategies. HCI continues to drive economic growth in the new millennium, and energy 
intensive industries created a dependency on energy consumption and GHG emissions. The rapid increase 
of fossil fuel consumption resulted in negative externalities across the world, such as air and water pollution, 
depletion of fossil fuels, and climate change. 
Faced by the threat of global climate change, many international communities, including South Korea, 
have elevated their concern for sustainable environmental development. South Korea’s own environmental 
development efforts include government reforestation and afforestation policies, the restoration of the 
Cheonggye Stream, the remediation of Lake Sihwa, and reduction of carbon emissions in the industrial 
process. In 2008, South Korea adopted green growth policies as an alternative paradigm for economic growth, 
placing South Korea at the center of international debates regarding sustainable economic and environmental 
development. The green growth initiated by the South Korean government has several similar definitions, all 
of which are outlined in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1  Comparison of “Green Growth” Definitions
Institution/Organization Definition
The Fifth Ministerial 
Conference on Environment 
and Development in Asia 
and Pacific (2005)
Environmentally sustainable growth
President Lee Myung-Bak’s 
Commemorative Speech for 
the 60th Anniversary of the 
Founding of the Republic of 
Korea (2008)
Green growth refers to sustainable growth that mitigates greenhouse 
gas emissions and prevents environmental degradation. It is also a new 
national development paradigm that creates new growth engines and 
jobs through green technology and clean energy
Presidential Council for 
Future and Vision (2009)
Green growth means growth in harmony between economy and 
environment by preventing climate change and reducing environmental 
damage with conservation of energy and resources and efficient use of 
them, securing new growth engine through research and development of 
clean energy and green technology and creating new jobs
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Institution/Organization Definition
Framework Act on Low 
Carbon, Green-growth
(2011)
Growth achieved by saving and using energy and resources efficiently to 
reduce climate change and damage to the environment, securing new 
growth engines through research and development of green technology, 
creating new job opportunities, and achieving harmony between the 
economy and environment
OECD (2011)
Green growth means fostering economic growth and development 
while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and 
environmental services, on which South Korea’s well-being relies
UNESCAP (2012)
Green growth is a policy for the Asia and Pacific region that emphasizes 
environmentally sustainable economic progress to foster low-carbon, 
socially inclusive development
Source: Kang 2014, p.31
1. Rapid Energy Consumption
South Korea is not a resource-rich country and requires energy imports, including coal and oil, for economic 
growth. Oil imports decreased temporarily in the early 1980s due to an oil shock, reducing the energy import 
share of total imports. However, energy imports have grown overall since a slight dip in 1985. Table 7.2 reveals 
the amount of energy imports South Korea received from 1981 to 2013. 
Table 7.2  Amounts of Energy Imports to South Korea (1981-2013)
Category 1981 1985 1990 2000 2010 2013
National Total Imports(A)
(Billion USD)
26.1 31.1 69.8 160.5 425.2 515.6
Energy Imports(B) 
(Billion USD)
7.8 7.3 10.9 37.9 121.7 178.7
Energy Share of Total Imports 
(B/A, percent)
29.7 23.5 15.6 23.6 28.6 34.7
Dependence on Overseas 
Energy (percent)
- - 87.9 97.2 96.5 95.7
Source: Kang 2014
Energy security continues to be a concern as South Korea’s growing economy increasingly relies on foreign 
energy sources. Although energy accounted for 29.7 percent of total imports in 1981 and that portion 
decreased to 14.1 percent in 1995, it surpassed the initial percentage to account for over a third of all imports 
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in 2013. Energy dependence as a share of energy import to domestic energy demand reached 87.9 percent 
in 1990, rose to 97.2 percent in 2000, but decreased to 95.7 percent in 2013. Coal, petroleum, electricity, 
and thermal consumption all grew steadily from 1981 to 2013. Although total consumption grew with rapid 
economic growth, per-capita consumption also significantly increased. For example, per-capita electricity 
consumption increased from 915 kilowatt hours (kWh) in 1981 to 9,285 kWh by 2013, and per-capita oil 
consumption nearly doubled from 3.39 barrels to 15.62 barrels during the same period. Table 7.3 outlines final 
energy consumption for a variety of energy sources.
Table 7.3  Final Energy Consumption of South Korea (1981-2013)
Category 1981 1990 2000 2010 2013
Coal (Million tons) 27.0 35.7 30.4 43.5 49.5
Petroleum (Million barrels) 131.2 324.0 698.7 767.4 799.1
Natural gas (Thousand tons) - - - 430 358
City gas (Million m3) 21 963 11,963 19,982 23,890
Electricity (GWh) 35,424 94,384 239,535 434,160 474,849
Thermal Energy (Million TOE) 0 0.075 1.119 1.718 1.695
New and Renewable Energy (Million TOE) 2.5 0.8 2.1 5.3 7.9
Electricity Consumption per Capita 
(kWh/person)
915 2,202 5,018 8,595 9,285
Petroleum Consumption per Capita 
(Barrels/person)
3.39 8.31 14.64 15.19 15.62
Source: Korea Energy Economics Institute 
South Korea put significant effort into diversifying and increasing domestic energy production through new 
and renewable energy. Renewable energy use increased from 2.1 million TOE (ton of oil equivalent) in 2000 to 
7.9 million TOE by 2013.
2. Rapid Increase in CO2 Emissions
In 2012, South Korea’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions ranked seventh largest in the world, emitting 
approximately 600 million tons of CO2 with a 158.6 percent rate increase from 1990 to 2012 (Table 7.4). 
In terms of per capita CO2 emissions, South Korea ranked 18th in the world in 2012 with a 121.7 percent 
increase from 1990 to 2012 (Table 7.5). 
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Table 7.4  CO2 Emissions of Top 20 Countries (1970-2012)
(million tons)
Country 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012
70~12
Rate of 
Increase
(percent)
90~12
Rate of 
Increase
(percent)
1
China 
(including HK)
824.7 1,440.0 2,277.7 3,350.3 7,294.9 8,250.8 900.4
262.2
2 United States 4,291.3 4,661.6 4,868.7 5,698.1 5,427.1 5,074.1 18.2 4.2
3 India 200.8 283.6 580.5 978.1 1,749.3 1,954.0 873.2 236.6
4
Russian 
Federation
- - 2,178.8 1,496.7 1,580.2 1,659.0 -
-23.9
5 Japan 758.8 880.7 1,056.7 1,170.6 1,134.0 1,223.3 61.2 15.8
6 Germany 978.6 1,055.6 949.7 825.0 769.9 755.3 -22.8 -20.5
7 South Korea 52.1 124.4 229.3 437.7 564.5 592.9 1,038.8 158.6
8 Canada 339.6 426.9 428.2 528.6 531.4 533.7 57.2 24.6
9
Islamic Rep. 
of Iran
41.7 90.2 178.7 315.1 508.5 532.2 1,177.3
197.8
10 Saudi Arabia 12.7 99.1 151.1 236.3 414.9 458.8 3,502.4 203.7
11
United 
Kingdom
623.5 571.1 549.3 524.3 473.6 457.5 -26.6
-16.7
12 Brazil 90.2 177.6 192.4 303.6 388.5 440.2 387.8 128.8
13 Mexico 97.0 212.1 265.3 349.6 417.9 435.8 349.1 64.3
14 Indonesia 25.1 68.9 146.1 272.8 392.4 435.5 1,633.2 198.2
15 Australia 144.1 208.0 260.5 335.4 387.3 386.3 168.0 48.3
16 South Africa 156.7 208.8 253.7 297.1 376.3 376.1 140.0 48.3
17 Italy 292.9 359.8 397.4 426.0 399.2 374.8 27.9 -5.7
18 France 431.9 461.4 352.8 378.7 355.1 333.9 -22.7 -5.4
19 Turkey 41.4 70.9 126.9 200.6 265.9 302.4 630.2 138.3
20 Poland 286.7 413.1 342.1 290.9 306.4 293.8 2.5 -14.1
World 6,646.9 10,707.2 14,001.1 16,346.3 23,752.3 32,407.9 387.6 98.3
Source: International Energy Agency 2012
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Table 7.5  Global CO2 Emissions per capita (1970-2012) 
(metric tons)
Country 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012
70~12
Rate of 
Increase 
(percent)
90~12
Rate of 
Increase 
(percent)
1 Qatar 18.72 34.29 29.94 40.35 34.61 36.95 97.4 23.4
2 Kuwait 17.38 19.38 13.94 25.77 26.84 28.08 61.6 101.4
3
Trinidad and
Tobago
 6.43  7.31  9.30 14.36 28.92 27.74 331.4 198.2
4 Bahrain 13.63 20.54 25.09 26.67 22.41 21.86 60.4 -12.9
5
Netherlands 
Antilles
89.64 50.55 14.55 21.20 18.06 20.85 -76.7 43.3
6 Oman  0.34  1.93  5.60  9.17 20.60 20.41 5,923.7 264.2
7
Brunei 
Darussalam
 2.93 13.62 12.64 13.34 18.86 20.38 594.9 61.2
8 Luxembourg 45.11 32.75 27.12 18.31 20.78 19.21 -57.4 -29.1
9
United Arab
Emirates
 9.00 18.83 28.73 28.28 18.04 18.57 106.3 -35.4
10 Australia 10.92 14.05 15.17 17.40 17.27 16.70 52.9 10.1
11 Gibraltar  3.78  4.14  6.24 13.46 17.16 16.52 336.4 164.6
12 Saudi Arabia  2.10 10.06  9.32 11.73 15.22 16.22 671.7 74.0
13 United States 20.66 20.47 19.46 20.18 17.52 16.15 -21.9 -17.0
14 Canada 15.46 17.41 15.46 17.23 15.57 15.30 -1.0 -1.0
15 Kazakhstan 　 　 14.46  7.59 13.32 13.45 -7.0
16 Turkmenistan 　 　 12.12  8.12 11.22 12.34 1.8
17 Estonia 　 　 22.53 10.66 13.79 12.20 -45.9
18 South Korea  1.58  3.26  5.35  9.31 11.42 11.86 648.9 121.7
19
Russian 
Federation
　 　 14.69 10.23 11.10 11.56 -21.3
20
Chinese 
Taipei
 2.07  4.04  5.62  9.82 11.67 10.95 427.8 95.0
Source: International Energy Agency 2012
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South Korea’s HCI economic structure provided significant economic returns with value-added production, 
yet the energy intensive industries created many environmental issues in the country. Since the economy 
was based largely on high-energy consumption, South Korea faced serious challenges for reducing carbon 
emissions. The rapid increase in energy consumption negated any gains in energy efficiency. South Korea 
overwhelmingly relied on hydrocarbons, such as coal, petroleum, and natural gas, which accounted for more 
than three-quarters of the country’s energy, and any efforts to reduce GHG emissions in South Korea must 
address these main energy sources. 
II. Environmental Improvement during Industrialization
Since the 1960s, South Korea’s GHG emissions and economic growth have increased proportionally. Figure 
1 shows the relationship between CO2 emissions and South Korea’s per capita GDP (both nominal and 
constant) from 1960 to 2012 (Figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1  Per capita Income and CO2 Emissions Trends for South Korea (1960-2012)
             Source: World Development Indicators
While South Korea experienced rapid economic growth and industrial development, areas that neighbored 
industrial centers experienced several environmental issues, which the government acknowledged was a 
side effect of industrial development. HCI complexes, such as the Gumi Electronic Industrial Complex, the 
Changwon Machinery Industrial Complex, and the Yeochun Petroleum Chemical Complex created industrial 
waste issues that contaminated the soil and water of local metropolitan regions with heavy metals, including 
cadmium, lead, and steel (Cho et al. 2013, p.21). 
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1. Environmental Protection Strategies
In response to the growing environmental issues, South Korea formed a pollution department under 
the Sanitation Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Society in 1973. In 1977, South Korea legislated the 
Environmental Preservation Act in order to prevent environmental degradation, particularly degradation 
linked to industrial complexes. Under this legislation, the government required that all national projects 
receive approval from the Ministry of Health and Society through Environmental Impact Assessments (Cho 
et al. 2013, p.21). In the 1980s, South Korea expanded the scope of their environmental preservation by 
incorporating environmental challenges of industrial growth into their later 5-Year Economic Plans. South 
Korea tailored the fifth economic 5-Year Plan from 1982 to 1986 to “promote measures for environmental 
management for environmentally influenced areas, improve the effectiveness of pollution regulations, 
reinforce the comprehensive control capability of environmental preservation work, and organize local 
environmental management organizations” (Cho et al. 2013, p.24). In 1980, the government formed the 
Environmental Office and introduced Environmental Impact Assessments for national and large-scale 
private sector projects. Due to the lack of detailed regulations, however, the Ministry did not immediately 
implement Environmental Impact Assessments, and pollution continued to increase. By the 1980s, industrial 
pollution, such as acid rain and polluted waterways, spread nationwide and drew public attention through 
media coverage. South Korea revised the Environmental Preservation Act in 1981 and 1986 to better address 
industrialization pollution.
By the 1990s, South Korea had overcome multiple development and economic challenges, and the public’s 
attention turned to the environmental damage created by industrial pollution. Investments in fundamental 
environmental facilities, such as landfills and sewage disposal plants were insufficient. Water pollution 
concerns regarding Paldang Lake Reservoir and the phenol contamination of the Nakdong River in the late 
1980s and early 1990s galvanized public support and mobilized civic groups toward advocating for clean 
drinking water and improved public safety (Cho et al. 2013, p.24). 
Rising environmental awareness and increased pressure from the public forced the government to proactively 
tackle environmental concerns. South Korea elevated the Environmental Office to a department in 1990 
and granted it ministerial status in 1996, which increased the government’s ability to develop and enforce 
environmental policies (Cho et al. 2013, p.25). The government expanded environmental policies and 
facilities, such as implementing volume-based waste fees in 1995. At the turn of the 21st century, the 
government enhanced policies that supported “environmental health,” such as sustainable management and 
the preservation of natural resources, including water, air, and ecology. In 2008, the government implemented 
a green growth policy that aimed to increase both sustainable economic growth and environmental health. 
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2. Policies Regarding Water and Air Pollution
Until the start of the 21st century, South Korean industries emitted significant amounts of air pollutants. 
National environmental policies in 2000 improved air quality by substantially decreasing sulfur dioxide, 
carbon monoxide, and particles in the air. In 1990, the South Korean government passed both the Framework 
Act on Environmental Policy and the Clean Air Conservation Act and, in 2003, passed the Special Act on 
Seoul Metropolitan Air Quality Improvement to specifically address urban air quality. The policies regulated 
air pollutants, fuel sources, and levels of emissions from facilities and vehicles. Table 7.6 reveals how South 
Korea’s efforts decreased air pollutants from 1988 to 2012. 
Table 7.6  South Korea’s Air Pollutant Emissions by Year (1988-2012)
(thousand tons)
Year Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)
Nitrogen Dioxide 
(NO2)
Particles  
(TSP)
Carbon Monoxide 
(CO) Total
1988 1,417.2 978.7 388.7 1,534.3 4,321.0
1990 1,611.0 926.0 420.3 1,991.1 4,950.4
1995 1,532.3 1,152.8 405.5 1,109.1 4,201.7
2000 531.1 1,004.0 89.4 825.2 2,451.6
2005 408.5 1,306.7 88.9 788.9 2,595.0
2010 401.7 1,061.2 177.6 766.3 2,408.8
2011 434.1 1,049.4 236.1 980.6 2,702.2
2012 417.8 1,084.4 216.5 964.5 2,683.2
Source: Kang 2014, p.27
South Korean policies also focused on water pollution. South Korea measured water quality at various 
locations along two major South Korean waterways, the Han and Nakdong Rivers, using Biological Oxygen 
Demand (BOD) and the Suspended Solids (SS) as water quality indicators. BOD levels for both river basins 
declined significantly from 1981 to 2012. However, SS levels only declined in the Han River. In 2004, South 
Korea adopted the Total Maximum Daily Load System, which regulated maximum levels for key pollutant 
indicators and discharge amounts (National Institute of Environmental Research 2004. p.16). By computing 
target levels with maximum pollutant levels, the policy aimed to balance preservation and development. Table 
7.7 lists the pollutant levels of the Han river basin and the Nakdong river basin from 1981 to 2013. 
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Table 7.7  Status of South Korea’s Water Pollution by Year (1981-2013)   
 (mg/L)
Year
Han river basin system: Noryangjin Nakdong river basin system: Gupo
BOD SS BOD SS
1981 5.2 25.0 4.3 18.8
1985 4.7 22.6 4.2 9.2
1990 3.4 11.3 3.3 10.9
1995 5.5 12.6 8.9 12.6
2000 2.7 9.0 2.9 14.2
2005 3.1 8.8 3.0 17.8
2010 3.2 10.5 2.4 23.3
2013 2.1 8.5 2.2 10.8
Source: Kang 2014, p.28
III. Environmental Restoration and Industrialization
1. Afforestation 
Forest degradation was rampant in Korea during the first half of the 20th century. The Japanese government’s 
procurement of war materials during their occupation of Korea, and Korea’s growing population after 1945 
negatively affected the Korean forest. In 1948, under the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the Korean 
government established the Bureau of Forest and developed the 10-Year Plan for Erosion Control, which took 
place from 1948 to 1957. The Korean War suspended projects in 1950 until the government implemented the 
“Temporary Measures for Forest Protection” policy in Busan during the war in 1951 (Kang 2014, p.58). Even 
in the midst of a civil war, the government deployed approximately 1000 individuals to protect private forests 
and enacted many forest protection laws and policies, including a fully funded forest police.
In the post-war period, South Korea no longer had access to North Korea’s electricity production, and the 
limited development of oil and coal prompted South Korea to turn to fuelwood, which further exacerbated 
forest conditions. The International Cooperation Agency and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction 
Agency assisted in implementing the forest police and other projects that focused on erosion control, 
afforestation, forest disease, and fire prevention. Projects also attempted to develop a sustainable supply of 
fuelwood while also controlling erosion and included efforts such as developing separate forests for fuel or 
relying more on coal for fuel (Kang 2014, p.58). 
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The total forested area in South Korea reached 6.7 million hectares (ha) in 1960. Prior to the 1960s the 
primary target of forest resource management was the growth of private forests. 71 percent of forested land 
was private, 21 percent was national, and the remaining 8 percent was public. By 1965, the national forest 
declined significantly by 143 thousand ha and total private forests grew by 117 thousand ha (Yoo et al. 2014, 
p.83). Increased housing, industrial, and agricultural development resulted from continual forest declines. 
Slash-and-burn agriculture in South Korea also resulted in massive forest deterioration.54 Although 70.5 
thousand households participated in slash-and-burn farming, accounting for only 40 thousand ha, the impact 
on South Korea’s forests was much more significant. Slash-and-burn fields reduced fertile topsoil, increased 
erosion and flooding, and hindered forest management. In the 1960s, the government inhibited slash-and-
burn agricultural with the Forest Protection Act and Forest Law. From 1965 to 1966, the government resettled 
nearly 5,000 slash-and-burn households. The Readjustment of the Slash-and-Burn Fields Act in 1966 further 
deterred the practice. In 1973, President Park’s government implemented the Readjustment of Slash-and-Burn 
Fields 5-Year Plan. The plan required that all agricultural lands have a less than 20-degree incline. Any land 
with more than a 20-degree incline would be reforested. Employment promotion projects assisted households 
in maintaining living standards prior to relocation. The government also offered financial support of KRW 
200 thousand for relocating households, provided KRW 400 thousand for moving expenses, and encouraged 
alternative livelihoods through local public projects, such as cattle breeding, sericulture, and growing seedlings 
(Yoo et al. 2014, pp.88-91). 
Afforestation took place in conjunction with industrialization. Forest resources were a vital fuel source, 
especially for smaller villages and rural communities. Although South Korea used coal and oil in cities since 
the early 1950s, a large portion of the population lived in smaller urban and rural areas where coal was 
unavailable (Yoo et al. 2014, p.35). It was not until the 1960s, under President Park’s economic development 
plans, that alternative fuel sources were more widely distributed. The reduction in demand for wood fuel and 
afforestation efforts greatly increased the size and health of South Korean forests. Table 7.8 records how the 
growing stock, which indicates the total quantity of trees in forests, increased steadily from 1972 to 2010 as a 
result of the afforestation during the First and Second Economic Development Plan Periods (1962-1972) and 
the First and Second Afforestation Projects (1973-1987) (Korea Forest Service 2011, p.13).
54  Slash-and-burn agriculture involves cutting down and burning forested land in order to farm the nutrient-rich layer of 
land left behind. 
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Table 7.8  South Korea Forest Land Area and Growing Stock (1952-2010)
Year Area(Thousand ha)
Growing Stock
(Thousand ㎥) percent of Land Area
Growing Stock  
Per ha
1952 6,415 36,315 64.64 5.66
1962 6,695 81,277 68.01 12.14
1972 6,597 72,696 66.98 11.02
1982 6,554 157,756 66.18 24.07
1992 6,464 272,387 65.08 42.14
2002 6,412 448,456 64.39 69.94
2010 6,369 800,025 63.67 125.62
Source: Korea Forest Service 2010; 2011
2. Restoration of Cheonggye Stream
The 13.7 km Cheonggye Stream ran through the heart of Seoul, flowing from Mt. Nam, Mt. Inwang, and 
Mt. Bukak into the Han River. The Cheonggye was a traditional public space during the Chosun period, but 
from 1934 to 1940, under the “Kyungsung Plan,” Japan constructed the Gwangtonggyo to Gwanghwamun 
intersection across the area. In the 1950s, debris from war refugee settlements polluted the water and, after the 
Korean War, the condition of the stream greatly deteriorated (Kim 2010, p.8). From 1958 to 1978, South Korea 
covered the remaining stream to improve the city’s roads (Cho 2010, p.150). Located in the central business 
district, Cheonggye Street was a thriving commercial and industrial area through the 1980s. Toward the end 
of the 20th century, however, Seoul’s industrial structure shifted to a technological sector and the commercial 
area rapidly declined. Due to structural defects, including corroding concrete of the Cheonggye overpass, the 
public raised serious safety concerns about the street (Sung & Kim 2005, pp.265-66). The maintenance cost 
alone reached KRW 2 billion annually. 
The Cheonggye Stream restoration project became a central point of the 2002 Seoul mayoral election, won 
by future South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak. The restoration project had four facets: reducing noise 
pollution, restoring historical monuments, urban revitalization, and resolving safety concerns (Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport 2013, pp.58-59).
In the face of criticism about the project management and public participation, demolition work for the 6 km 
of paved road and the 5.8 km of elevated highway began in July 2003 (Hwang 2004, p.1). The restored 5.8 km 
of the Cheonggye Stream opened in October 2005 (Figure 7.2). Over the 27-month construction period, South 
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Korea spent KRW 380 billion on developing the public space and restoring historic ruins, such as Supypgyo 
and Gwangneunggyo (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 2013, pp.59, 62). 
Figure 7.2  Before (2002) and After (2005) the Cheonggye Stream Restoration
                       Source: Seoul Museum of History 2014
The restoration of the stream marked a turning point toward a greater government concern for environmental 
and social issues within urban development. Mayor Lee Myung-Bak carried the legacy of Cheonggye into his 
future presidency and his 2008 Green Growth policies. The Cheonggye Stream provided downtown Seoul 
with an oasis and lowered temperatures by 2.3°C (Cho 2010, p.159). 
3. Restoration of Lake Sihwa and the Tidal Power Plant
In 1987, The Banwol Special Regional Development Plan, established in 1970, began construction on a 12.7 
km long embankment along the western coast of South Korea in Kyeonggi Bay. South Korea completed 
construction in 1994, creating Lake Sihwa, which was surrounded by the cities of Ansan, Siheung, and 
Hwaseong. The artificial lake had a storage capacity of 332 million tons of water and the reclaimed land on 
which the lake was built was approximately 133.7 km2 (Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology 
2012, p.5).
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South Korea originally planned to use the man-made lake as a freshwater reservoir to supply the region 
with agricultural and industrial water (Ibragimova 2009, p.1). Urban and industrial growth surrounding 
the lake, however, resulted in a “hypoxic/anoxic lake, posing a serious environmental threat to neighboring 
coastal ecosystems” (Han & Park 1999, p.1194). Lake Sihwa became known as the “Lake of Death,” and the 
Department of Environment abandoned their original plans in 1997, allowing a seawater exchange instead. 
The lake’s tidal access allowed the seawater to flush contaminants from the basin and greatly improved the 
quality of the water. Table 7.9 tracks the water quality of Lake Sihwa from the late 1990s until 2012. Chemical 
oxygen demand (COD) declined from 17.4 mg/L in 1997 to 3.0 mg/L in 2012. Total phosphorus (TP), the 
main source of eutrophication, decreased from 0.064 mgP/ml in 2001 to 0.059 mP/ml in 2012. 
Table 7.9  Water Quality of Lake Sihwa (1997-2012)
Category 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2005 2010 2011 2012
COD 17.4 7.9 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.2 3.3 4.2 3.0
T-P - - - - 0.064 0.075 0.037 0.053 0.059
Source: Kang 2014, p.71
In 2001, South Korea approved a new plan to harness the lake for clean energy. The Sihwa Lake Tidal Power 
Plant broke ground in 2004 and was completed in 2011 (Figure 7.3). It was South Korea’s first tidal power 
plant and the largest of its kind in the world. The plant consisted of 10 generators and was “designed for single 
effect flood generation that can be operated in one direction, from the sea to the lake, allowing up to 60 billion 
tons of seawater to be circulated annually” with a capacity of 245 megawatts (MW) (Bae et al. 2010, p.455). 
Following the natural tides of the Yellow Sea, the plant generated 100 million kWh by February 2012, and, in 
December 2014, it reached 1 billion kWh. The project cost approximately USD 325 million and registered 
as a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project with the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) with an annual GHG reduction of over 315 thousand tCO2eq (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 2014). 
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Figure 7.3  Before (1998) and After (2011) Sihwa Lake Tidal Power Station
                            Source: The Hankyoreh
                            Source: ICLEI East Asia
4. Greening Industry
Although it was a large source of GHG emissions, industrial development was also at the core of South Korea’s 
economic growth and could not be wholly abandoned for the sake of the environment. In order to retain 
industrial and economic growth while reducing GHG emissions, South Korea needed to implement short-
term industrial energy reduction and long-term green innovations to industries. Between 1971 and 2010, 
South Korea was the fastest growing emitter of GHGs among members of the Organisation for Economic 
Development and Cooperation (OECD) due to an abundance of HCIs, including automobile, shipbuilding, 
steel, semiconductor, and cement production. In 2010, the industrial sector accounted for more than half of 
the country’s total energy consumption (International Energy Agency 2012, p18). South Korea pledged a 37 
percent reduction relative to the country’s projected levels by 2030. Steel, power, secondary battery, and smart 
grid industries successfully capitalized on greening efforts and technological innovation.
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In 2010, The Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), South Korea’s second largest steel company and 
CO2 emitter, announced they would reduce CO2 emission intensity by 9 percent from the average emission 
levels reported for 2007-2009, which would reduce emissions from 2.18 tons of CO2 per ton of crude steel 
produced to 1.98 tons by 2020. POSCO committed to developing more carbon efficient steel and lower CO2 
emissions during the steelmaking process, and they developed a portfolio of technologies from solar, wind, 
and refuse-derived fuel energy projects (Pohang Iron and Steel Company 2011, p.12). The Korea Electric 
Power Corporation (KEPCO), a state-owned corporation and the leading provider of energy generation 
and transmission across South Korea, was the largest single GHG emitter in South Korea (Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance 2013, p.15). KEPCO invested in greater energy security and reduced carbon emissions as 
South Korea moved toward an emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 2015, including certification for ISO 14001 
in environmental management.55 KEPCO aimed to increase efficiency in renewable generation technologies, 
high voltage direct current, smart grid, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and energy storage systems. The 
energy company developed a number of renewable energy projects, including biogas turbine generators, solar 
energy testing facilities, and offshore wind farms in the Yellow Sea (Korea Electric Power Corporation 2013, 
pp.29, 37). 
A critical component to decreasing GHG emissions and maximizing energy production is the ability to 
store energy. South Korea’s technological innovations in secondary battery technologies made the country 
one of the top producers of secondary batteries in the world. Initially focusing on technical development, 
South Korea began domestic development of secondary batteries through the Next Generation Technical 
Development Strategy Program in 2003 (Kang 2014, p.102). In 2010, the government announced the 
Secondary Battery Competitiveness Strengthening Plan to boost global market shares to 50 percent by 2020 
and to enhance the domestic industrial ecosystem through a KRW 15 trillion investment (Cho 2011, p.1; 
Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning 2013, p.260). Government support allowed global market shares 
to jump from 21.3 percent in 2007 to 43.5 percent in 2012. 
The South Korean government invested heavily in next generation infrastructure to optimize energy use and 
drastically reduce GHG emissions. The government announced the Smart Grid Roadmap in 2010 to complete 
the nationwide intelligent power grid by 2030, which modernized the electrical grid to include access to a 
variety of energy sources, including renewable forms. The Roadmap included goals to develop model smart 
grid cities by 2012, regional smart grids by 2020, and connect with a national network by 2030 (Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy 2010, p.15). The Jeju Smart Grid Test-bed, constructed from 2009 to 2013 through a 
consortium of 168 companies, created five demonstration projects for smart renewable, smart place, smart 
55 ISO 14001 is the international standard that requests an effective environmental management system. 
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power grid, smart electric services, and smart transport. The Jeju Smart Grid developed their smart grid in the 
Gujwa-eup region of Jeju Island and supplied approximately 6,000 households with new and renewable energy 
along with the ability to operate electric vehicles and an energy management system that allowed users to 
monitor their energy use. South Korea also tested renewable technologies, including wind, solar, geothermal, 
bioenergy, hydro, ocean energy, waste energy, and fuel cell power in order to diversify low carbon energy 
options (Park et al. 2011, p.2446). 
IV. Green Growth Initiative as a Shift in Development Paradigms
1. Low Carbon, Green Growth
In 2008, South Korea declared green growth as a national vision, led by the message that environmental 
protection and economic growth were no longer opposing forces (Presidential Council for Future and Vision 
2009, p.109). The government’s green growth strategy focused on solving environmental problems and 
improving the South Korean people’s quality of life through social development policies (Kang 2010, p.4). To 
integrate environmental protection and economic growth, South Korea initiated the Low Carbon, Green Growth 
policy in 2008 and the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth in 2010. In 2009, South Korea pledged to 
reduce CO2 emissions to 30 percent below business-as-usual (BAU) levels by 2020, and the Framework Act on 
Low Carbon, Green Growth provided structure for mid- and long-term carbon reduction targets.
The government focused on technological innovation to create green technologies for new economic 
engines. South Korea’s 2009 Green Technology R&D Plan focused on 27 technologies in five areas: forecasting 
technologies in climate change, higher efficiency technology, low-carbon energy sources, post-treatment 
technologies, and pollution free industries such as virtual reality. South Korea promoted R&D through 
government-funded research and the commercialization of green technologies. Additionally, South Korea 
introduced renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in 2012 with an initial quota of 2 percent that rose to 10 
percent by 2022 with USD 8.2 billion invested in offshore wind energy that would grow from 0.4 GWh in 
2012 to 2.5 GWh by 2019 (Energy Information Administration 2014). In 2012, South Korea became Asia’s first 
country to pass the ETS, and, in 2015, legislated the Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Permits. Table 7.10 outlines South Korea’s first and second 5-Year Plans for Green Growth. 
202  Secrets of an Economic Miracle: Lessons for Sustainable Development from South Korea
Table 7.10  South Korea’s First and Second 5-Year Plan for Green Growth Goals and Strategies
Visions/Policy Goals Strategies
The First Plan 
(2009-2013)
-  Become one of the seven greatest green 
countries by 2020
- Become one of the five greatest green 
countries in the world by 2050
1.  Mitigation of Climate Change and 
Energy Independence
2.  Creating New Engines for Economic 
Growth
3.  Improvement of the quality of life and 
strengthening of the national stature
The Second 
Plan  
(2014-2018)
-  Establishment of low carbon economic 
and social structure
-  Realization of a creative economy with 
green technology and ICT convergence
-  Establishment of a safe and sound 
lifestyle in response to climate change
1.  Effective curbing of greenhouse gas 
emissions
2.  Establishment of a sustainable energy 
system
3.  Construction of ecology for the green 
creative industry
4. Realization of sustainable green society
5.  Reinforcement of global green 
cooperation
  Source: Presidential Committee on Green Growth 2009, p.31; Joint Work of Relevant Agencies 2014, p.28
At the beginning of 2014, the Ministry of Environment announced the National Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Reduction Roadmap 2020, which outlined the reduction targets and action plans for seven sectors to reduce 
233 million tons of GHGs at the national level. Industries targeted a reduction of 81.3 million tons, or 18.5 
percent, by switching to lower carbon fuel sources, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG). The transportation 
sector hoped to reduce by 34.2 million tons, or 34.3 percent, through developing the Intelligent Transportation 
System, and planned to build 200 thousand electric and 500 hydrogen fuel cell vehicles by 2020. The building 
sector targeted a 27-percent reduction, or 45 million tons, though highly efficient heating and cooling 
systems. The public sector expected to reduce by 4.46 million tons, or 25 percent, by introducing quotas 
and improving energy efficiency, including a 70 percent market penetration of light emitting diode (LED) by 
2020. Agriculture hoped to reduce by 1.48 million tons, or 5.2 percent, through expanding energy facilities 
from eight in 2013 to 30 by 2020. The waste sector targeted a reduction of 1.71 million tons, or 12.3 percent, 
by converting waste to energy. The power generation sector targeted a reduction of 64.9 million tons, or 26.7 
percent, by adopting carbon capture and storage (CCS) and increasing the share of renewable energy in the 
energy mix by 7.2 percent. 
In September 2014, the government increased the ETS emissions cap by 3 percent. The government planned 
to distribute 1.687 million tCO2eq permits from 2015 to 2017, as compared to the expected 1.64 million 
tons. The government set aside 1.598 million tons for the 526 firms and allocate the remaining 89 million 
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tons as reserves (Cho 2014). Because of rising economic concerns, the expanded permits will likely lessen 
the emissions targets for the building, communications, and power sectors. One tCO2eq of emissions will be 
traded for KRW 10 thousand and the Ministry of Environment will fine companies up to KRW 100 thousand 
per ton for failure to purchase enough permits. Businesses will reduce emissions gradually: 573.4 million tons 
in 2015; 562.1 million tons in 2016; and 559 million tons in 2017. In the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution (INDC) submitted to the UNFCC in 2015, South Korea set a mitigation target of a 37 percent 
reduction from the BAU baseline estimate of 850.6 million tCO2eq in 2030. This reduction included domestic 
emissions and international carbon credits. Industries criticized the emissions target for being too costly for 
businesses. 
The second 5-Year Green Growth Plan refocused on the social dynamics of green growth. The three policy 
goals of the plan consisted of establishing a low-carbon socioeconomic infrastructure, achieving a creative 
economy through the convergence of green technology and ICT, and building a pleasant living environment 
safe from climate change damage. The plan also created 20 core tasks for harmonious development between 
the economy and environment. The last three strategies highlighted the inclusion of social aspects at the local 
and international levels. 
Where the first plan created a comprehensive vision for green growth, the second plan focused the green 
growth framework on enhancing existing policies to lower GHG emissions. Also, the first plan focused 
efforts on building the economic and environmental base while the second plan extended greater effort on 
incorporating societal improvements. The second plan marked a change in leadership and priority. While 
the first plan fell under the Presidential Committee on Green Growth, the second plan was under the Prime 
Minister’s Office and was not given the same level of priority that the previous administration gave to the first 
plan (Presidential Committee on Green Growth 2014). 
2. Development Paradigm Shift
The United Nations held its first Human Environment conference in Stockholm in 1972. The conference 
acknowledged the environmental challenges created by conventional development. Efforts to address the 
environment stemmed mainly from developed countries as they experienced pollution from the traditional 
industrial paradigm. By the 1970s, many developed economies began to shift their industrial structure from 
manufacturing to less environmentally damaging industries. As South Korea developed their economy, the 
government shifted their focus towards environmental concerns and hoped to play a pivotal role in the global 
agenda for environmental development. South Korea’s past “growth-first” industrial policies and lack of 
enforcement for environmental laws had an adverse effect on the environment. By the early 1990s, however, a 
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series of public pollution accidents, including the contamination of the Nakdong River in 1991 and an oil spill 
off the southern coast in 1995, led South Korea to more environmentally sensitive economic policies (Joh et al. 
2010, pp.195-196). 
3. Financing Green Growth 
Restructuring the economy for green growth required the development of new green industries and 
technologies and greening existing industries. The start of the 21st century was marked by the rise of green 
trade as a share of trade in the green industries to total trade. Figure 7.4 shows South Korea’s trend in green 
trade from 1976 to 2015.
Figure 7.4  Korea-to-World Green Trade (1976-2015)
                                                    Source: Kang 2018
Although there is some variability, Global trends moved towards the increase of green trade, and green trade 
has generally been over 50 percent in the 21st century. Figure 7.5 shows the share of global green trade over 
the period of 1976 to 2015.
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Figure 7.5  World Green Trade Share
                                                                       Source: Kang 2018
As developing countries look to export production to fuel economic growth, green products and services 
must be made competitive for international trade. In fact, many developing countries, like Cambodia and 
Vietnam, have already begun developing national green growth strategies and plans (Kang 2014, p.136). 
Many developing countries, however, face serious economic constraints and must consider funding for green 
growth policies. It is essential that advanced nations, those primarily responsible for the most GHG emissions, 
provide financial support through foreign aid and green industry-related funds to developing countries. 
Since joining the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, South Korea advocated that official 
development assistance (ODA) not only protect the environment, but also incorporate economic growth and 
green society development (Jung & Kang 2012, p.59). The South Korean government plans to enlarge the 
portion of Green ODA from 11 percent in 2007 to 20 percent in 2013 and 30 percent in 2020 and scale up 
the total ODA to 0.25 percent of gross national income (GNI) by 2015 toward developing countries, focusing 
on Africa, South America, and the Middle East (Jung & Kang, 2012 p.59). Additionally, the United Nations 
backed Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a financial mechanism to transfer money from the developed world to 
the developing world in order to assist developing countries counter climate change (Jung et al. 2013, p.19). 
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4. Green Growth and Sustainable Development
The Brundtland Commission published “Our Common Future” in 1987, setting the stage for greater 
environmental consideration towards sustainable development by meeting “the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (p.41). The 1992 United Nation’s 
Rio Earth Summit reaffirmed this intergenerational concept in a more practical sense in Agenda 21 of the Rio 
Declaration on the Environment and Development and the UNFCCC, which emphasized the importance 
of economic, environmental, and social components in sustainable development. All three components are 
more explicitly defined in the United Nation’s SDGs. In 2012, the Rio +20 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development declared that future sustainable development should include inclusive and equitable economic 
growth, create greater opportunities for all, reduce inequalities, raise basic standards of living, foster equitable 
social development and inclusion, and promote integrated and sustainable management of natural resources 
and ecosystems (Jung and Kang, 2012). 
South Korea’s Green Growth Plan overlaps with many of the SDGs. Figure 7.6 highlights the close relationship 
between green growth and sustainable development. 
Figure 7.6  Green Growth and Sustainable Development
                                                Source: Jung & Kang 2012, p.42
South Korea’s green growth policies primarily emphasize the relationship between economic growth and 
environmental development. Green growth policies, however, have not provided sufficient measures for 
the societal aspects of sustainable development. Green growth policies must consider social developments, 
including relative and absolute poverty, income inequality, capacity building, and social integration. Only once 
green growth embraces social development will green growth policies sufficiently contribute to sustainable 
development. The second 5-Year Green Growth Plan released by the Committee on Green Growth highlights 
the need to enhance social development domestically and abroad. The plan called for the development of 
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green industries through international cooperation. Sustainable development objectives and Green Growth 
strategies are mutually reinforcing, and pursuing green growth policies will support the objective of all 17 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
The global population is on track to reach 10 billion by the end of the century. Rising incomes will place even 
greater pressures on global food production to compensate for growing consumption needs. Globalization and 
the onset of the digital age create new social conflicts as earnings for a highly skilled and educated workforce 
continue to grow while less educated workers experience wage and employment declines, creating social and 
political tensions in both developing and developed economies (Sachs 2012, pp.2207-2208). Global climate 
change’s imminent threats bring a new urgency to sustainable development. The Sustainable Development 
Goals offer an opportunity to balance the three pillars of sustainable development: the economy, environment, 
and society. Building a consensus, however, around the tradeoffs and synergies between the three pillars has 
eluded many nations over the past several decades. As the evidence and impacts of human development on 
the climate grows, countries around the world must plan for an uncertain future. The United Nation’s 17 
Sustainable Development Goals call on all nations to take action toward truly attaining sustainable growth and 
development in order to collectively build a more sustainable world (United Nations General Assembly 2015, 
p.6).
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